One-trial backward excitatory fear conditioning transfers across contexts.

One path to human phobia may be one-trial backward fear conditioning. Human phobias transfer readily across contexts. However, animal studies of one-trial backward fear conditioning have yet to demonstrate such transfer. The present study sought to do so. It used a lick-suppression procedure with 84 naive male albino rats. Two conditioning contexts, designated O and V, were crossed factorially with two test contexts, O and V. Within each cell of the factorial design, rats received in the conditioning context either a single 12 sec tone backward paired with a single 4 sec 1 mA shock or the same tone explicitly unpaired with shock. Fear of context and fear of tone were subsequently assessed in terms of the suppression of licking that they evoked. Test results suggested that (1) the rats discriminated between contexts O and V, and (2) despite such discrimination, one-trial backward fear conditioning transferred across the two contexts. The results enhance the plausibility of one-trial backward fear conditioning as a source of human phobia.     

Emergenesis. Genetic traits that may not run in families.

Traits that are influenced by a configuration--rather than by a simple sum--of polymorphic genes may not be seen to be genetic unless one studies monozygotic twins (who share all their genes and thus all gene configurations) because such "emergenic" traits will tend not to run in families. Personal idiosyncrasies that have been found to be surprisingly concordant among MZ twins separated in infancy and reared apart may be emergenic traits. More speculatively, important human traits like leadership, genius in its many manifestations, being an effective therapist or parent, as well as certain psychopathological syndromes may also be emergenic. These ideas reemphasize the importance of the role played in human affairs by genetic variation.     

Scientific rewards and conflicts of ethical choices in human subjects research.

The primary responsibility of the American Psychological Association's (APA) Committee on Standards in Research (CSR) is to advise the APA on issues and standards related to the protection of human participants in psychological research. A related goal is to enhance the use of good ethical practices by APA members. The purpose of this article is to foster the view of research ethics not as an affront to the integrity of sound research, but as opportunities for scientific rewards, including increased understanding of the meaning of data, enhanced recruitment, and the inclusion of more representative samples. Three ethical practices are discussed as examples of this general premise: respect for confidentiality, use of debriefing, and assurance that participants are noncoerced volunteers. The Committee's intent is to promote consideration of these issues, not to promulgate specific guidelines or procedures.     

Redefining the science-practice relationship and professional training.

A revised conception of the relationship between psychological science and professional practice is proposed in the light of postmodern changes in perspectives on knowledge. Positivistic science, which has dominated the traditional interpretation of scientist-practitioner training, is considered from a constructivist point of view to be only one possible foundation of psychological knowledge. It is argued that the knowledge base of the profession should be derived with diverse methods and from multiple sources, including the knowledge of practice. The mutuality of science and practice is emphasized. An evolving framework for understanding the epistemology of practice, based on cognitive psychology, is presented. Emphasis on broadened choices of research methods, the development of reflective skills, and better linkage between teaching in the domains of research and practice are urged. Suggestions for research related to scientific training and the knowledge processes of practice are offered.     

Unconscious influences revealed. Attention, awareness, and control.

Recent findings of dissociations between direct and indirect tests of memory and perception have renewed enthusiasm for the study of unconscious processing. The authors argue that such findings are heir to the same problems of interpretation as are earlier evidence of unconscious influences--namely, one cannot eliminate the possibility that conscious processes contaminated the measure of unconscious processes. To solve this problem, the authors define unconscious influences in terms of lack of conscious control and then describe a process dissociation procedure that yields separate quantitative estimates of the concurrent contributions of unconscious and consciously controlled processing to task performance. This technique allows one to go beyond demonstrating the existence of unconscious processes to examine factors that determine their magnitude.