Further evidence for the role of inferential reasoning in forward blocking

Previous studies on human causal learning (De Houwer & Beckers, 2003; De Houwer, Beckers, & Glautier, 2002) showed that secondary task difficulty (performing an easy vs. a difficult secondary task during the main causal learning task) and ceiling information (outcome occurs with a maximal vs. submaximal intensity) had an influence on forward blocking (i.e., lower causal ratings for cue T when AT+ trials are preceded by A+ trials than when no A+ trials are presented). We extended these studies by also examining self-reports of participants about the reasons behind their causal ratings. Blocking was found only for participants who reported an appropriate blocking inference. Furthermore, secondary task difficulty and ceiling information influenced the number of participants who reported an appropriate blocking inference. These findings point to a major impact of inferential reasoning in human causal learning.     

Object location memory: The interplay of multiple representations

This article reports three experiments in which the representational nature of human object location memory was studied. The results show that multiple frames of reference can be used to encode the spatial relationships among objects. Depending on their dominancy, availability, and validity, these multiple representations interact to determine memory performance. Specifically, representations that are automatically encoded and extensively practiced are more dominant, and their availability improves performance when they are valid. On the other hand, when the dominant representations are available but invalid, people may have to resort to the less dominant representations. As a result, the availability of these dominant but invalid representations can actually hurt performance, due to interference. If these interfering representations are eliminated, the performance is again improved. The implications of these findings for general human spatial cognition are discussed.     

On the speed of intuition: Intuitive judgments of semantic coherence under different response deadlines

Intuition is the ability to judge stimulus properties on the basis of information that is activated in memory but not consciously retrieved. We investigated one central feature of intuitive judgments--namely, their speed. Participants judged whether or not three clue words were coherent in the sense that they were weakly associated with a common fourth concept. To restrict the time available for conscious deliberation of possible solution words, participants had to synchronize their judgments with a response signal appearing at different lags after the clue words. In two experiments, participants discriminated coherent and incoherent triads reliably better than chance, even when they did not consciously retrieve the solution word and the lag between clue words and response signal was as short as 1.5 sec. Results indicate that intuitive judgments can indeed be made very fast and without extended conscious deliberation. Possible mechanisms underlying intuitive judgments are discussed.     

The visual-auditory color-word Stroop asymmetry and its time course

Four experiments examined crossmodal versions of the Stroop task in order (1) to look for Stroop asymmetries in color naming, spoken-word naming, and written-word naming and to evaluate the time course of these asymmetries, and (2) to compare these findings to current models of the Stroop effect. Participants named color patches while ignoring spoken color words presented with an onset varying from 300 msec before to 300 msec after the onset of the color (Experiment 1), or they named the spoken words and ignored the colors (Experiment 2). A secondary visual detection task assured that the participants looked at the colors in both tasks. Spoken color words yielded Stroop effects in color naming, but colors did not yield an effect in spoken-word naming at any stimulus onset asynchrony. This asymmetry in effects was obtained with equivalent color- and spoken-word-naming latencies. Written color words yielded a Stroop effect in naming spoken words (Experiment 3), and spoken color words yielded an effect in naming written words (Experiment 4). These results were interpreted as most consistent with an architectural account of the color-word Stroop asymmetry, in contrast with discriminability and pathway strength accounts.     

How bad is a 10% chance of losing a toe? Judgments of probabilistic conditions by doctors and laypeople

We presented a Web questionnaire to 139 physicians and medical researchers and 109 laypeople. The subjects made judgments of badness and importance of prevention for eight medical conditions at each of seven different probability levels. By assuming that the response to each of the 56 risks was monotonically related to transformations of the probability and of the disutility of the condition, we could assess the relative effect of probability and disutility on each subject's judgments. Physicians' judgments were more sensitive than laypeople's judgments to changes in probability. Older and female laypeople were less sensitive to probability (and correspondingly, more responsive to differences in severity among medical conditions). Laypeople varied more than physicians in their responsiveness to probability. These results point to general individual differences in the effect of probability on evaluations of medical risks. They may also provide insight into causes and noncauses of physician-patient miscommunication.     

A psychometric assessment of a Swedish translation of Spreitzer's empowerment scale

The psychometric properties of a Swedish translation of Spreitzer's (1995a) empowerment scale were assessed. Three parallel assessments were made of data from 1,107 female registered nurses, 758 female assistant nurses, and 107 male registered and assistant nurses. The analyses indicated that the psychometric properties of the scale can be considered satisfactory. Suggestions are made regarding future research in the fields of psychometrics and work- and health-psychology.     

Conceptual versus Perceptual Priming in Incomplete Picture Identification

This paper examined conceptual versus perceptual priming in identification of incomplete pictures by using a short-term priming paradigm, in which information that may be useful in identifying a fragmented target is presented just prior to the target’s presentation. The target was a picture that slowly and continuously became complete and the participants were required to press a key as soon as they knew what it was. Each target was preceded by a visual prime. The nature of this prime varied from very conceptual (e.g., the name of the picture’s category) to very perceptual (e.g., a similar-shaped pictorial prime from a different category). Primes also included those that combined perceptual and conceptual information (e.g., names or images of the target picture). Across three experiments, conceptual primes were effective while the purely perceptual primes were not. Accordingly, we conclude that pictures in this type of task are identified primarily by conceptual processing, with perceptual processing contributing relatively little.     

Self-affirmation and mortality salience: affirming values reduces worldview defense and death-thought accessibility

To the extent that cultural worldviews provide meaning in the face of existential concerns, specifically the inevitability of death, affirming a valued aspect of one's worldview should render reminders of death less threatening. The authors report two studies in support of this view. In Study 1, mortality salience led to derogation of a worldview violator unless participants had first affirmed an important value. In Study 2, self-affirmation before a reminder of death was associated with reduced accessibility of death-related thoughts a short while thereafter. The authors propose that actively affirming one's worldview alters reactions to reminders of mortality by reducing the accessibility of death-related thoughts, not by boosting self-esteem. These studies attest to the flexible nature of psychological self-defense and to the central role of cultural worldviews in managing death-related concerns.     

Development and validation of a self-report measure of emotional intelligence as a multidimensional trait domain

Psychometric review of 33 peer-reviewed studies of six self-report emotional intelligence (EI) measures supports a multidimensional conceptualization of EI. The nature and number of EI facets, however, and their distinctiveness from more established trait domains is unclear. Building on earlier efforts, three studies were undertaken (Ns = 138, 163, 152) to develop self-report measures of 10 facets of EI proposed by Salovey and Mayer (1990). Results support the reliability (internal consistency, test-retest) and validity (content, criterion, construct, structural) of the proposed scales and their distinctiveness among themselves and with respect to more established trait domains (e.g., personality). Specifically, three satisfaction and four cross-cultural adaptability facets were predicted uniquely by 9 of the 10 proposed subscales, controlling for social desirability, the Big Five, positive and negative affect, and self-monitoring. All told, results confirm that trait-EI can be measured using self-report and conceptualized as a distinct multidimensional domain.     

Mother Teresa versus Ebenezer Scrooge: mortality salience leads proselfs to endorse self-transcendent values (unless proselfs are reassured)

Recently, Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski demonstrated that mortality salience (MS) increased contributions to (an ingroup) charity (i.e., the Scrooge effect). The authors examined whether individual differences in social value orientations would moderate the Scrooge effect. In line with an Ebenezer shift hypothesis, proselfs were less likely than prosocials to endorse self-transcendent values in a dental pain control condition but were indistinguishable from prosocials in an MS condition as proselfs increased endorsement of self-transcendent values under MS (Experiments 1 and 2a). However, when participants gave their impressions of an unfavorable prosocial or a favorable proself prior to the MS manipulation, proselfs were again less likely than prosocials to endorse self-transcendent values (Experiments 2a and 2b), suggesting that proselfs are unlikely to transform into prosocials under conditions of MS when given reasons to disidentify with prosocial values or identify with proself values.