Type A behavior and emotional responses to uncertainty: A test of the self-appraisal model

The self-appraisal model of Type A behavior holds that Type A's desire an accurate appraisal of abilities, and respond to uncertainty about abilities with exaggerated attempts to generate diagnostic information. The model also predicts that the major emotional response to uncertainty for Type A's is anxiety. In this study, Type A's and B's were induced to succeed or fail on a task where they were either very certain or very uncertain of their subsequent ability levels. Task failure produced greater depression, anger, and frustration for all subjects. Consistent with the self-appraisal model's prediction, uncertainty (regardless of success or failure) led to greater anxiety for Type A's than for Type B's. In fact, greater uncertainty produced lower anxiety for Type B's, indicating that Type A's and B's differ dramatically in their emotional responses to uncertainty about abilities.     

Selective impairment of phonation: A case study

A 47-year-old right-handed man underwent craniotomy for clipping of an aneurism at the trifurcation of the left middle cerebral artery. Subsequently, he suffered a left hemisphere CVA after which his speech and language resembled that of Broca's aphasia with accompanying apraxia of speech. Medical, behavioral, and acoustical data amassed over a period of several months indicated numerous contraindications to traditional diagnoses of Broca's aphasia, apraxia of speech, and dysarthria. Ultimately, it was determined that the patient had a selective impairement of phonation or laryngeal apraxia. This was illustrated dramatically when he was taught to use an electrolarynx which allowed him to bypass his disrupted phonatory system. Speaking with the electrolarynx, the patient communicated normally. Any semblance of Broca's aphasia disappeared. Supralaryngeal articulation was normal; apraxia of speech behaviors were absent. This case report indicates that dissociation of oral and laryngeal gestures due to brain injury is possible. Mechanisms underlying such a dissociation for this case are reviewed. The possibility of discrete center lesions in the frontal motor association area causing different types of apraxia of speech is discussed.     

Comprehension of sentence structure in anomic and conduction aphasia

Picture-pointing auditory and reading comprehension tests were administered to anomic and conduction aphasics. Subjects responded to active sentences of the present progressive form. The possible errors which a subject could make on these experimental tasks included failure to correctly interpret noun order, number, or lexical meaning. Both groups made significantly more correct responses than error responses. Of their error responses, noun-order errors significantly exceeded number and lexical errors for which no differences were observed. When compared with results previously obtained for agrammatic Broca's aphasics, no differences in the pattern of errors were identified. These results are discussed relative to current theories of syntactic processing and for the mechanisms which account for these syntactic comprehension deficits following aphasia.     

A linguistic deficit resulting from right-hemisphere damage

The ability of right-brain-damaged (RBD) subjects to correctly insert a word into a well-formed stimulus sentence was tested. Subjects also performed three evaluative tasks designed to establish their degree of general cognitive impairment. The performance of RBD subjects on these tasks was compared to that of left-brain-damaged (LBD) and non-brain-damaged (NBD) subjects. Although RBD subjects outperformed LBD subjects on the language-related evaluative tasks, the RBD group was significantly more impaired on a subset of the insertion task. This subset included items which required reassignment of the syntactic status of elements in the stimulus sentence in order for the insertion to be carried out. The results of this study permit refinement of the common characterization of RBD individuals as rigid in their interpretation of meaning and indicate right-hemisphere involvement in aspects of the grammar previously thought to be inaccessible to it.     

A developmental study of the auditory Stroop effect

A pediatric auditory version of the Stroop procedure was developed and administered to 48 normal children from 3 to 6 years of age. Our purpose was to define the developmental course characterizing interaction between auditory and semantic speech dimensions in young children. The procedure was a reaction time (RT) task that required children to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible to words spoken by a male or a female voice. Children were instructed to ignore what was said and to push the "Mommy" button if Mommy was talking or the "Daddy" button if Daddy was talking. Performance was obtained for words with neutral, congruent, and conflicting semantic content. Preschool children manifested processing dependencies that were similar to those observed in adults on the visual Stroop procedure. Conflict between semantic and auditory dimensions significantly increased RT and congruence between the two dimensions significantly decreased RT relative to the neutral condition. The pattern of results indicated that the meaning of words was processed automatically in the normal children. The magnitude of the Stroop effect reflected developmental change with increasing age.     

The foundations of epistemological probability

Epistemological probability is the kind of probability relative to a body of evidence. Many philosophers, including Henry Kyburg and Roderick Chisholm, hold that all epistemological probabilities reflect a relation between an evidential body of propositions and other propositions. But this article argues that some epistemological probabilities for empirical propositions must be relative to non-propositional evidence, specifically the contents of non-propositional perceptual states. In doing so, the article distinguishes between internalism and externalism regarding epistemological probability, and argues for a version of awareness internalism. The article draws three main concluding lessons. First, epistemological probability is not to be identified with the sort of objective, experience-independent probability that is familiar from statistical and propensity interpretations of probability. Second, it is doubtful that epistemological probability is measurable, in any useful way, by real numbers, even if it admits of comparative assessments. Third, contrary to the familiar claim of C. I. Lewis, epistemological probability should not be viewed as requiring a basis of certainty.     

Powers, causation, and modality

A complex theory concerning powers, natures, and causal necessity has emerged from the writings of P. H. Hare, E. H. Madden, and R. Harré. In the course of rebutting objections that other critics have raised to the power account of causation, I correct three of its genuine difficulties: its attempt to analyze power attributions in terms of conditional statements; its characterization of the relation between something's powers and its nature; and its doctrines concerning conceptual necessity. The resulting interpretation of causal modalities is then subsumed under a more general power account of modality, related at a number of points to considerations concerning powers, and further illustrating their philosophical importance.