The composition of imaginal transformations

Three experiments examine the performance of composite imaginal spatial transformations using tasks in which people perform pairs of distinct imaginal transformations either in close succession or simultaneously. The principal aim of the investigation is to determine, for both modes of composition, whether imaginal transformations combine interactively or noninteractively to determine the temporal course of imaging performance. Specifically, does the time to imagine a given composite transformation reflect the independent contributions of its component transformations, or do component transformations have different effects within different composites? Results obtained under a number of distinct task conditions are most consistent with the proposal of noninteractive composition. However, the temporal effects of particular imaginal transformations are neither consistent nor readily predictable across different task conditions. Implications of these results for analogue-spatial models, task demand, and procedural accounts of imaging are discussed.     

The psychology of knights and knaves

Knight-knave brain teasers are about a realm in which some people, knights, tell only truths, whereas all others, knaves, tell only lies. For example, suppose person A says, "I am a knight and B is a knight," and person B says, "A is a knave." Is A a knight or a knave? Is B a knight or a knave? In a pilot study, we asked subjects to think aloud while solving problems like these. Their statements suggested that they were making assumptions about the knight/knave status of the characters and drawing deductive inferences from these assumptions to test their consistency. This encouraged us to model the process by means of a simulation based on an earlier natural-deduction theory of reasoning. The model contains a set of deduction rules in the form of productions and a working memory that holds a proof of the correct answer. The greater the number of steps (assumptions and inferences) in the proof, the greater the predicted difficulty of the puzzle. The experiments reported here confirmed this prediction by showing that subjects were more likely to make mistakes (Experiment 1) and take longer to solve (Experiment 2) puzzles associated with a larger number of proof steps.     

Neuronal models of cognitive functions

Understanding the neural bases of cognition has become a scientifically tractable problem, and neurally plausible models are proposed to establish a causal link between biological structure and cognitive function. To this end, levels of organization have to be defined within the functional architecture of neuronal systems. Transitions from any one of these interacting levels to the next are viewed in an evolutionary perspective. They are assumed to involve: (1) the production of multiple transient variations and (2) the selection of some of them by higher levels via the interaction with the outside world. The time-scale of these "evolutions" is expected to differ from one level to the other. In the course of development and in the adult this internal evolution is epigenetic and does not require alteration of the structure of the genome. A selective stabilization (and elimination) of synaptic connections by spontaneous and/or evoked activity in developing neuronal networks is postulated to contribute to the shaping of the adult connectivity within an envelope of genetically encoded forms. At a higher level, models of mental representations, as states of activity of defined populations of neurons, are discussed in terms of statistical physics, and their storage is viewed as a process of selection among variable and transient pre-representations. Theoretical models illustrate that cognitive functions such as short-term memory and handling of temporal sequences may be constrained by "microscopic" physical parameters. Finally, speculations are offered about plausible neuronal models and selectionist implementations of intentions.     

Hypothesizing and evidence-gathering: the nexus of understanding

Prior discussion of hypothesizing as a session "guideline" has not fully clarified the derivation of hypotheses. Reviewing relevant philosophy of science literature, the authors develop the notions of evidence and evidence-gathering in systemic family therapy. The authors claim evidence-gathering and hypothesizing are interdependent, reciprocal elements of scientific understanding. The structure of evidence is described along with practical and qualitative rules for collecting and using evidence. This model is applied to a case example illustrating the logic of clinical process. Implications are discussed for family therapy training and supervision.     

A sermon from hell: Toward a theology of loneliness

Loneliness as part of the human condition is first explored from an experiential-philosophical perspective. A biblical survey suggests loneliness is normative to the faith experience and may portray a more realistic religiosity. Desert imagery in Scripture indicates a strong association among solitude, spiritual development, and potential dangers of spiritual deception. God's not yet-ness-itself a cause of existential loneliness—is paradoxically the way in which communion with God functions in the here and now. The creative use of solitude may enhance social, psychological, and spiritual well-being, and provide a way to theologize about personal isolation and disorientation.He is also editor of theHarding Journal of Religion and Psychiatry.     

Religious celibacy from the celibate's point of view

What do celibates consider the adaptive and maladaptive aspects of their celibate religious lifestyle? What role has celibacy played in understanding the differences between those who persevere and those who choose to resign from celibate religious life and/or ordained ministry? Using data from extensive interviews, this exploratory study begins to focus some of the perceived effects of celibacy upon personal development for both those who persevere in celibate religious life and those who resign.     

On the limits of the matching concept in monkeys (Cebus apella).

Two cebus monkeys, with many years of experience matching a variety of static visual stimuli (forms and colors) within a standard matching-to-sample paradigm, were trained to press a left lever when a pair of displayed static stimuli were the same and to press a right lever when they were different. After learning the same/different task, the monkeys were tested for transfer to dynamic visual stimuli (flashing versus steady green disks), with which they had no previous experience. Both failed to transfer to the dynamic stimuli. A third monkey, also with massive past experience matching static visual stimuli, was tested for transfer to the dynamic stimuli within our standard matching paradigm, and it, too, failed. All 3 subjects were unable to reach a moderate acquisition criterion despite as many as 52 sessions of training with the dynamic stimuli. These results provide further evidence that, in monkeys, the matching (or identity) concept has a very limited reach; they consequently do not support the view held by some theorists that an abstract matching concept based on physical similarity is a general endowment of animals.     

Dependency, self-criticism, and depressive attributional style

Dependency and self-criticism have been proposed as independent factors in depression. Investigated whether depressive individuals characterized by dependency and self-criticism, respectively, differ with regard to internality of causal attributions for negative events. Sixty psychiatric outpatients completed the Depressive Experiences Questionnaire, the Beck Depression Inventory, the semantic differential, and the Attributional Style Questionnaire. Dependency and self-criticism correlated positively with internality and with each other (p less than .0001). Findings did not support the specificity of dependency and self-criticism as subtypes of depression.     

Hypnotic blindness, awareness, and attribution

Examined whether performance on a spelling task would be influenced by visual information in the reported absence of hypnotized subjects' awareness of that information. Experiment 1 visually presented uncommon spellings of homophones to subjects before and during a suggestion for hypnotic blindness, and subsequently tested subjects' spelling of the homophones. Words presented during hypnotic blindness influenced subjects' spelling performance. Subjects' attributions of their performance did not involve awareness of the homophones. Experiment 2 used the nonexperiment methodology to examine the impact of demand characteristics and indicated that the performance attributions of subjects of Experiment 1 could not be explained in these terms. The discussion focuses on implicit perception in hypnotic blindness and on the relevance of attributions about behavioral performance on hypnotic phenomena.     

Self-discrepancies in clinical depression and social phobia: cognitive structures that underlie emotional disorders?

Previous research indicates that self-discrepancies are cognitive structures that can induce emotional discomfort. The present study compared clinically depressed and social phobic subjects (plus controls) to determine whether different self-discrepancies were associated with the two disorders. In Part 1, it was shown that the depressives possessed the greatest discrepancy between their actual and ideal/own self-states, whereas the social phobics possessed the greatest discrepancy between their actual and ought/other self-states. In a later, ostensibly unrelated study, subjects responded verbally to questions about other people while their mood changes, skin conductance responses, and verbalizations were recorded. The questions included attributes from the subject's ideal and ought self-states that were mismatches with attributes from his or her actual self, as well as mismatch attributes from other subjects. Priming with self-referential mismatches induced momentary syndromes of dejection or agitation (depending on the type of mismatch). The depressives and social phobics showed the greatest increases in dejection and agitation, respectively, according to their dominant self-discrepancy. The results suggest that specific cognitive structures may underlie clinical depression and anxiety.