Setting and response generalization in rational-emotive therapy: A case study

A single case study (n=1) conducted during therapy investigated the relationship between disputing irrational beliefs in vivo and setting and response generalization. Irrational beliefs associated with the subject's anger and depression were disputed at different intervals over a ten week period utilizing a multiple baseline design across four classes in a school setting (setting 1). Depression and anger were rated several times each week. The subject's level of anxiety was also rated in setting 1 but the irrational beliefs associated with it were not disputed. Anger, depression, and anxiety were rated without disputation in a separate work setting (setting 2). Affect ratings significantly decreased across both settings throughout the ten week period. Results indicated that 1) disputing irrational beliefs associated with anger and depression in setting 1 led to reductions in anxiety in this setting (response generalization), 2) anger and depression reductions in setting 2 paralleled setting 1 reductions (setting generalization), and 3) anxiety reductionsWilliam J. Ruth, PhD, Staff Psychologist and practicum supervisor, Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy, NY City; School Psychologist, Board of Cooperative Educational Services, Southern Westchester.Raymond DiGiuseppe, PhD, ABPP, Director of Training and Research, Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy, NY City; Graduate Professor, St. John's University, NY City; co-author,Practitioner's Guide to Rational-Emotive Therapy and RET with Alcoholics and Substance Abusers.     

Psychological conceptions of randomness

This article presents a critique of the concept of randomness as it occurs in the psychological literature. The first section of our article outlines the significance of a concept of randomness to the process of induction; we need to distinguish random and non-random events in order to perceive lawful regularities and formulate theories concerning events in the world. Next we evaluate the psychological research that has suggested that human concepts of randomness are not normative. We argue that, because the tasks set to experimental subjects are logically problematic, observed biases may be an artifact of the experimental situation and that even if such biases do generalise they may not have pejorative implications for induction in the real world. Thirdly we investigate the statistical methodology utilised in tests for randomness and find it riddled with paradox. In a fourth section we find various branches of scientific endeavour that are stymied by the problems posed by randomness. Finally we briefly mention the social significance of randomness and conclude by arguing that such a fundamental concept merits and requires more serious considerations.     

Rational-emotive therapy and the christian client

In some cases a person's religious beliefs can cause or exaccerbate emotional problems. Sometimes religious concepts can be used to ameliorate a client's problems. In dealing with Christian clients, the RET therapist can utilize the teachings and actions of Jesus in leading a client to recognize irrational beliefs. This paper illustrates and discusses rational teachings and actions of Jesus as regards four basic irrational beliefs and eleven underlying irrational beliefs.Sandra D.M. Warnock, M.A., served as a missionary to Hawaii with the Home Mission Board of the Southern Baptist Convention and as Minister of Outreach at Vinton Baptist Church, Vinton, Virginia. She was Senior Staff Clinician at Hollins Communications Research Institute in Hollins College, Virginia and is currently an adjunct lecturer in Psychology at Southside Virginia Community College in Keysville, Virginia.     

Sign language as cognition for deaf people: Pitfalls and prospects

With a tradition reliance on verbal paradigms cognitive psychology has repeatedly rediscovered the centrality of verbal processes in the cognitive representation of the world. Frequently it has been considered that non-speaking groups offer the proof of such psychological theories. Deaf people, because of their apparently poor memory, retardation in reading, relative lack of speech, yet cognitive viability, have offered an ideal test population for cognitive paradigs. Unfortunately deaf people turn out not to be a non linguistic control. We have now discovered sign language—a visual, spatial representation form used naturally by profoundly deaf people. This apparently offers the key the deaf people's cognition without speech. This paper describes some aspects of what we know of deaf people and their language, critically examines some of the evidence for sign representation in memory, and discusses the methodological problems to be faced by anyone searching for conclusive evidence on deaf people's working memory. Despite the attractiveness of ‘sings for words’ in cognition, this paper argues that the evidences is weak and signs may not be equated easily with words.     

Errors in the quantification of uncertainty: A product of heuristics or minimal probability knowledge base?

The use of intuitive heuristics (e. g. representativeness and availability) has been put forward as an explanation for peoples' assignment of probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). This phenomenon is seen as robust since experts as defined by education (professional psychologisis), despite advanced training in statistics and methodology, rely on the same heuristics as novices (lay people). Both experts and novices, as defined by education, were studied in a series of experiments and further classified as experts and novices according to their probability knowledge base, prior to receiving (or not) a brief (15-minute) training session. Immediately following training, subjects completed a probability test which consisted of ten Tversky and Kahneman (e. g. 1974) problems. The training significantly increased the number of problems correctly solved on the probability test and eliminated the expert/novice education classification. The results of a follow-up test 5 weeks after the experiment indicated that the training group maintained its superior performance. It is proposed that failure to use proper methods of probability assignment may not be due to intrinsic human inference biases or heuristics, but is a result of a minimal probability knowledge base.     

Children’s competitive behavior: A challenging alternative

The effect of challenge on the cooperative and competitive behavior of 120 urban American children was assessed using two experimental game apparatuses, one of which provided a challenging cooperative response. Significantly more cooperation was observed when the subjects were presented with a challenging cooperative response. In addition, a reliable age effect was found indicating that the older subject group (10–12 years old) was more cooperative than the younger two age groups (5–7 and 8–10 years old). Finally, a significant game condition x order interaction was discovered suggesting that under some conditions the order in which the games were played affected the degree of subject cooperation. Results are related to a theory of competence motivation. It is argued that cooperation among American children may be increased if the task involves the presence of challenge. A portion of this research was presented at the biennial meetings of the Society for Research in Child Development, Detroit, Michigan, 1983.     

A further empirical evaluation of neurolinguistic primary representational systems (PRS)

Neurolinguistic programmers claim that individuals have preferred (primary) representational systems. These may be auditory, visual or kinesthetic and determine how a person views/deals with the world. Systems can be identified by observation of eye movements. In workshops programmers demonstrated strong associations between eye movements following questioning and types of questions and eye movement categories (assumed to identify systems) and other assessments of systems. Studies have evaluated these ‘workshop’ associations and found little support for their general occurrence. In these studies, it is possible that eye movements following questioning were influenced by artifacts which influence predicted association between these and other variables. An attempt was made to exclude these artifacts in this study. Except for subjects who had attended neurolinguistic workshops, results supported those obtained elsewhere. Possibly, associations in workshops occur as a result of expectational-contextual variables.     

Employment demographics and attitudes that predict preferences for alternative pay increase policies

A survey of 942 university staff employees shows that performance and cost of living are preferred over seniority as criteria upon which to base pay increases. Multiple regression analysis reveals that preferences for performance-based pay increases are most strongly related to perceptions that merit pay does not decrease co-worker cooperation, perceptions that performance differences exist among co-workers, employment in white collar jobs, and never having belonged to a union. Preferences for seniority-based and cost of living-based pay increases are most strongly related to the perceived need for a union, perceptions that merit pay reduces cooperation, education level, and gender. In addition, preferences for seniority-based pay increases are related to years of service.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1989 meetings of the Midwest Academy of Management.