Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness

Higher-order theories of consciousness argue that conscious awareness crucially depends on higher-order mental representations that represent oneself as being in particular mental states. These theories have featured prominently in recent debates on conscious awareness. We provide new leverage on these debates by reviewing the empirical evidence in support of the higher-order view. We focus on evidence that distinguishes the higher-order view from its alternatives, such as the first-order, global workspace and recurrent visual processing theories. We defend the higher-order view against several major criticisms, such as prefrontal activity reflects attention but not awareness, and prefrontal lesion does not abolish awareness. Although the higher-order approach originated in philosophical discussions, we show that it is testable and has received substantial empirical support.     

Training behavioral technicians to implement naturalistic behavioral interventions using behavioral skills training

Training behavioral technicians mainly focuses on teaching accurate implementation of structured behavioral intervention programs. Often behavioral technicians are unable to adequately promote their clients' learning in less structured environments, which can limit opportunities for generalization of the clients' skills to the natural environment. The aim of the present study was to evaluate the effectiveness of using behavioral skills training to coach behavioral technicians on the implementation of naturalistic behavioral interventions. Naturalistic behavioral interventions take advantage of naturally occurring situations to teach new skills and practice mastered skills in natural settings, thus promoting generalization across environments and in the presence of natural contingencies. Five behavioral technicians were trained to implement a novel protocol based on play therapy. Specifically, they were coached to engage in well‐defined positive behaviors during their interactions with clients (e.g., labeled praise). All participants reached mastery criteria, maintained skills at follow‐up, and demonstrated generalization of skills with novel clients.     

Intergroup perception as a compromise between in-group bias and fair-mindedness

Previously, perceived competence of and attraction toward targets categorized by race showed in-group bias and no bias, respectively. Consequently, previous investigators regarded intergroup perception as a compromise between the norms of in-group bias and fair-mindedness. An alternative hypothesis for such findings is that attraction is not as relevant a dimension for intergroup discrimination as is competence. To test contrasting predictions of these hypotheses, the present authors asked participants from the majority and minority groups in Singapore (ns = 320) to evaluate either competence of or attraction toward one of the five targets. Consistent with the hypothesis that intergroup perception is a compromise, both dimensions yielded a uniform but weak in-group bias. The participants' equating of the in-group with one out-group further illustrated fair-mindedness. The authors discussed implications of the findings.     

Teasdale's differential activation hypothesis: implications for mechanisms of depressive relapse and suicidal behaviour

Teasdale's differential activation hypothesis (DAH) has been proposed as one account of cognitive vulnerability to depression. This view holds that important factors determining whether one's initial depression becomes more severe or persistent are the degree of activation, and content, of negative thinking patterns that become accessible in the depressed state. This phenomenon has been referred to as cognitive reactivity. Empirical support for the predictions of this model derives from a combination of cross-sectional and prospective studies. In this article, we evaluate this evidence with the goal of determining whether mood-induced cognitive reactivity can be considered a risk factor for depressive relapse/recurrence. Our review demonstrates sufficient evidence to consider cognitive reactivity as a potential causal risk factor for depressive relapse/recurrence. Furthermore, we extend the application of this model to the problem of suicidal relapse/recurrence including a review of preliminary support for this approach.     

Chaplaincy research: a case study

The authors report the pragmatic elements of conducting an empirical chaplaincy research project. The article offers the step-by-step process of implementing, coordinating, and completing a sound quantitative research project. The authors offer a definitive answer to the question, "Can a staff chaplain integrate providing pastoral care and doing a quantitative research project as principle investigator"?     

Perceived body size affected by garment and body mass index

This study investigated the effect of garment size on perceived body size. The perceived body sizes of nine Chinese men, with Body Mass Index between 17.0 and 37.1 kg/m(2), wearing five sizes of white T-shirts were assessed using Thompson and Gray's Nine-figural Scale. Garment sizes on perceived body sizes were different for those of different Body Mass Index. A backpropagation neural net model was used to model the nonlinear relationship between the perceived body size and the body's BMI, body chest girth, and garment ease (difference between garment and body chest girth). When the BMI was less than 20, wearing larger-sized T-shirts tended to increase perceived body size. For large chest sizes and for taller persons (BMI of 20 to 28) large garments made the wearer look thinner. However, for small persons (BMI of 20 to 28) effect of garment size was relatively small. Obese persons (BMI of > 28), wearing garments too tight or too loose were perceived as larger. Minimum perceived body size was found for garment ease of 2 to 3 cm.     

Persistence of inaccurate beliefs about the self: perseverance effects in the classroom

The perseverance of erroneous self-assessments was examined among high school students. Subjects were first exposed to either highly effective or thoroughly useless filmed instruction, leading, respectively, to their consequent success or failure. No-discounting subjects received no assistance in recognizing the relative superiority or inferiority of their instruction. Discounting subjects, by contrast, were subsequently shown the opposite instructional film, highlighting the obvious differences in instructional quality. Subsequent measures revealed that all subjects recognized the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of their instruction, although this contrast was clearer for discounting subjects. Nevertheless, both discounting and no-discounting subjects continued to draw unwarranted inferences--in line with their initial outcomes--about their personal capacities, immediately afterward. Dissociated and disguised measures of academic preferences and perceptions completed weeks later produced even more dramatic results: The continuing impact of initial outcomes was generally greater for discounting than no-discounting subjects.