The functional unit in phonological encoding: evidence for moraic representation in native Japanese speakers

Speech production studies have shown that the phonological form of a word is made up of phonemic segments in stress-timed languages (e.g., Dutch) and of syllables in syllable-timed languages (e.g., Chinese). To clarify the functional unit of mora-timed languages, the authors asked native Japanese speakers to perform an implicit priming task (A. S. Meyer, 1990, 1991). In Experiment 1, participants could speed up their production latencies when initial consonant and vowel (CV) of a target word were known in advance but failed to do so when the vowel was unknown. In Experiment 2, prior knowledge of the consonant and glide (Cj) produced no significant priming effect. However, in Experiment 3, significant effects were found for the consonant-vowel coupled with a nasal coda (CVN) and the consonant with a diphthong (CVV), compared with the consonant-vowel alone (CV). These results suggest that the implicit priming effects for Japanese are closely related to the CV-C and CV-V structure, called the mora. The authors discuss cross-linguistic differences in the phonological representation involved in phonological encoding, within current theories of word production.     

Can we talk to robots? Ten-month-old infants expected interactive humanoid robots to be talked to by persons

As technology advances, many human-like robots are being developed. Although these humanoid robots should be classified as objects, they share many properties with human beings. This raises the question of how infants classify them. Based on the looking-time paradigm used by [Legerstee, M., Barna, J., & DiAdamo, C., (2000). Precursors to the development of intention at 6 months: understanding people and their actions. Developmental Psychology, 36, 5, 627-634.], we investigated whether 10-month-old infants expected people to talk to a humanoid robot. In a familiarization period, each infant observed an actor and an interactive robot behaving like a human, a non-interactive robot remaining stationary, and a non-interactive robot behaving like a human. In subsequent test trials, the infants were shown another actor talking to the robot and to the actor. We found that infants who had previously observed the interactive robot showed no difference in looking-time between the two types of test events. Infants in the other conditions, however, looked longer at the test event where the second experimenter talked to the robot rather than where the second experimenter talked to the person. These results suggest that infants interpret the interactive robot as a communicative agent and the non-interactive robot as an object. Our findings imply that infants categorize interactive humanoid robots as a kind of human being.     

Children perseverate to a human's actions but not to a robot's actions

Previous research has shown that young children commit perseverative errors from their observation of another person's actions. The present study examined how social observation would lead children to perseverative tendencies, using a robot. In Experiment 1, preschoolers watched either a human model or a robot sorting cards according to one dimension (e.g. shape), after which they were asked to sort according to a different dimension (e.g. colour). The results showed that children's behaviours in the task were significantly influenced by the human model's actions but not by the robot's actions. Experiment 2 excluded the possibility that children's behaviours were not affected by the robot's actions because they did not observe its actions. We concluded that children's perseverative errors from social observation resulted, in part, from their socio-cognitive ability.