Self-reinforcement

Self-reinforcement in operant situations generally refers to those arrangements in which the subject delivers to himself a consequence, contingent on his behavior. However, it is noted that the definition of all other types of reinforcement make its delivery contingent on the subject's behavior. What is actually at issue is the agent who defines whether or not the response required for reinforcement has been met. In self-reinforcement, the subject himself defines this. In the laboratory, this requirement is machine-defined; in school examinations, it is teacher-defined; and in many clinical self-control situations, it is also independently defined. A reinforcement contingency presupposes such independence, absent in self-reinforcement. Implications for research and practice are discussed and alternative formulations are offered.     

Mental pain and its relationship to suicidality and life meaning

Shneidman (1996) proposed that intense mental pain is related to suicide. Relatedly, Frankl (1963) argued that the loss of life's meaning is related to intense mental pain. The first goal of this research was to test Shneidman's proposition by comparing the mental pain of suicidal and nonsuicidal individuals. Meaning in life and optimism are the polar opposites of suicidality and hopelessness, and the examination of these variables in relation to mental pain was undertaken to provide a test of Frankl's proposition. In two studies, a relationship between a newly developed measure of mental pain--the Orbach & Mikulincer Mental Pain Scale, 2002 (OMMP; see also Orbach, Mikulincer, Sirota & Gilboa-Schechtman, 2002)--and suicidal behavior and life meaning were examined. Results confirmed both propositions. Implications for the study of mental pain and suicide are discussed.     

Accurate, inaccurate and omitted details in collective emotional memories: The case of Itzhak Rabin's assassination

Collective memory of the assassination of the former Israeli Prime Minister, Itzhak Rabin, was originally examined by asking 61 Israeli students, about two weeks after the assassination (T1) and about 11 months later (T2) to fill out an open-ended questionnaire about the assassination. About 13 years later (T3) a new sample of 80 students also filled out the memory questionnaire. In T2 and T3 the participants also self-assessed various emotional and cognitive variables about their memories. All answers were segmented and categorised into accurate and inaccurate memories. Data analyses showed that the amounts of accurate memories decreased from T1 to T2 by 18 per cent, and from T2 to T3 by an additional 16 per cent, and were positively correlated in T2 with national importance and emotional reaction, and in T3 with self-assessed ability to remember events and amounts of visual representations. Content analysis of the most frequently memorised accurate, inaccurate and omitted memories showed that they displayed differential qualitative characteristics and that the most prevalent accurate narrative has varied over time. It appears that the collective memories of Rabin's assassination showed episodic features similar to those shown by eyewitnesses exposed to emotion-arousing events only once. The data suggest a distinction between episodic "collective memories" and semantic "collective knowledge".