Personal and general belief in a just world as judgement norms

Research on the belief in a just world (BJW) has focused on its intra-individual functions (e.g., psychological well-being) and its inter-individual consequences (e.g., derogation of victims). Recent theorizing, however, has indicated that the BJW may also have more societal functions and consequences, serving as a legitimizing device of the status quo. The studies in the current paper focus on this latter view and are based on Alves and Correia's ( 2008 ) research which found that the expression of high personal and general belief in a just world is injunctively normative. Two experimental studies aimed at ascertaining three issues: (1) the dimension(s) of social value (social utility and/or social desirability) on which the BJW normativity anchors; (2) whether the expression of moderate BJW is also injunctively normative; and (3) whether the injunctive normativity of the BJW is related to perceptions of truth. Results indicate that moderate and high personal and general BJW are normative. Yet, whereas the normativity of personal BJW anchors both on social utility and social desirability, that of general BJW anchors only on social utility. We discuss personal and general BJW as judgement norms, whose normativity may not be personally acknowledged (in the case of general BJW) and does not necessarily derive from being perceived as true, but from the fact that such norms carry social value at least in individualistic societies.     

Learned preference for a hedonically negative flavor is observed after pairings with positive post-ingestion consequences rather than with a palatable flavor

In two experiments, thirsty rats consumed a compound of sucrose and a non-preferred flavor. In Experiment 1, a conditioned preference was observed in the experimental group when animals were tested both thirsty and hungry, but not when they were tested just thirsty. Animals in the control group, which experienced the flavor and the sucrose unpaired, never showed a preference. Experiment 2 replicated the absence of a preference in the experimental group when rats were tested thirsty, but provided evidence that a flavor-taste association had been formed during training. After conditioning, sucrose was paired with LiCl in group Dev whereas it was unpaired in group NonDev. The sucrose devaluation produced a decrease in CS preference in group Dev, and an increment in group NonDev. Taken together, these results show that preference for a non-preferred flavor can be readily observed after pairings with the positive consequences of the US (calories or absence of an expected illness) rather than with a palatable flavor.     

A General Family of Limited Information Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Multinomial Data

Maydeu-Olivares and Joe (J. Am. Stat. Assoc. 100:1009–1020, 2005; Psychometrika 71:713–732, 2006) introduced classes of chi-square tests for (sparse) multidimensional multinomial data based on low-order marginal proportions. Our extension provides general conditions under which quadratic forms in linear functions of cell residuals are asymptotically chi-square. The new statistics need not be based on margins, and can be used for one-dimensional multinomials. We also provide theory that explains why limited information statistics have good power, regardless of sparseness. We show how quadratic-form statistics can be constructed that are more powerful than X ² and yet, have approximate chi-square null distribution in finite samples with large models. Examples with models for truncated count data and binary item response data are used to illustrate the theory.     

There are Intentionalia of Which it is True that Such Objects Do Not Exist

Abstract

According to Crane’s schematicity thesis (ST) about intentional objects, intentionalia have no particular metaphysical nature qua thought-of entities; moreover, the real metaphysical nature of intentionalia is various, insofar as it is settled independently of the fact that intentionalia are targets of one’s thought. As I will point out, ST has the ontological consequence that the intentionalia that really belong to the general inventory of what there is, the overall domain, are those that fall under a good metaphysical kind, i.e., a kind such that its members figure (for independent reasons) in such an inventory. Negatively put, if there are no things of a certain metaphysical kind, thoughts about things of that kind are not really committed to such things. Pace Crane, however, this does not mean that the intentionalia that are really there are only those that exist. For existence, qua first-order property, is no metaphysical kind. Thus, there may really be intentionalia that do not exist, provided that they belong to good metaphysical kinds.     

La falacia de la validación personal: Más efectos placebo

RESUMEN

En este artículo se pone a prueba la influencia de efectos placebo en la aceptación de informes evaluativos y diagnósticos por los sujetos. Tras introducir brevemente el tema y plantear las hipótesis, los autores describen el método y los resultados de su investigación. En la discusión explican que estos resultados sugieren que la aceptación del diagnóstico que ofrece un profesional es un fenómeno general independiente de las características personales de los individuos que lo reciben, poniendo en entredicho el fenómeno de la validación personal y, al mismo tiempo, interactúa con determinadas características profesionales de los sujetos, ligadas a imágenes de personalidad a las que son más propensos. Los autores también analizan una limitación importante de su trabajo, el tamaño reducido de la muestra, y finalizan destacando que es el contenido del informe, más que el tipo de pruebas o profesionales, lo que parece afectar diferencialmente a distintos grupos profesionales.     

Assessing Approximate Fit in Categorical Data Analysis

A family of Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) statistics is proposed for assessing the goodness of approximation in discrete multivariate analysis with applications to item response theory (IRT) models. The family includes RMSEAs to assess the approximation up to any level of association of the discrete variables. Two members of this family are RMSEA₂, which uses up to bivariate moments, and the full information RMSEA_n. The RMSEA₂ is estimated using the M₂ statistic of Maydeu-Olivares and Joe (2005, 2006), whereas for maximum likelihood estimation, RMSEA_n is estimated using Pearson's X² statistic. Using IRT models, we provide cutoff criteria of adequate, good, and excellent fit using the RMSEA₂. When the data are ordinal, we find a strong linear relationship between the RMSEA₂ and the Standardized Root Mean Squared Residual goodness-of-fit index. We are unable to offer cutoff criteria for the RMSEA_n as its population values decrease as the number of variables and categories increase.     

How Should We Assess the Fit of Rasch-Type Models? Approximating the Power of Goodness-of-Fit Statistics in Categorical Data Analysis

We investigate the performance of three statistics, R ₁, R ₂ (Glas in Psychometrika 53:525–546, 1988), and M ₂ (Maydeu-Olivares & Joe in J. Am. Stat. Assoc. 100:1009–1020, 2005, Psychometrika 71:713–732, 2006) to assess the overall fit of a one-parameter logistic model (1PL) estimated by (marginal) maximum likelihood (ML). R ₁ and R ₂ were specifically designed to target specific assumptions of Rasch models, whereas M ₂ is a general purpose test statistic. We report asymptotic power rates under some interesting violations of model assumptions (different item discrimination, presence of guessing, and multidimensionality) as well as empirical rejection rates for correctly specified models and some misspecified models. All three statistics were found to be more powerful than Pearson’s X ² against two- and three-parameter logistic alternatives (2PL and 3PL), and against multidimensional 1PL models. The results suggest that there is no clear advantage in using goodness-of-fit statistics specifically designed for Rasch-type models to test these models when marginal ML estimation is used.     

Facilitation and interference of behavioral responses by task-irrelevant affect-laden stimuli

Emotional interference on behavior is commonly observed when task-irrelevant negative stimuli appear before behavioral targets. One explanation postulates that affect-laden stimuli readily capture attention, interfering with the processing of the upcoming target. Emotional stimuli might also preactivate motor programs incompatible with the demanded response. Using a cued go/no-go procedure we showed that task-irrelevant unpleasant stimuli cause interference or facilitation depending on their onset asynchrony relative to the target. We observed interference with short (200 ms) stimulus-target asynchronies and facilitation for longer ones (600 ms), both for key press (Experiment 1) and key release (Experiment 2) responses. The interference effect is compatible with an attentional explanation, but the behavioral facilitation is hard to accommodate within either attentional or motor accounts. This interference-facilitation pattern can be explained assuming that once the attentional effect subsides, emotional processing may enhance the perceptual processing of the stimuli, or lower the decision threshold, thereby facilitating the response selection process.