Spatial updating relies on an egocentric representation of space: Effects of the number of objects

Models of spatial updating attempt to explain how representations of spatial relationships between the actor and objects in the environment change as the actor moves. In allocentric models, object locations are encoded in an external reference frame, and only the actor’s position and orientation in that reference frame need to be updated. Thus, spatial updating should be independent of the number of objects in the environment (set size). In egocentric updating models, object locations are encoded relative to the actor, so the location of each object relative to the actor must be updated as the actor moves. Thus, spatial updating efficiency should depend on set size. We examined which model better accounts for human spatial updating by having people reconstruct the locations of varying numbers of virtual objects either from the original study position or from a changed viewing position. In consistency with the egocentric updating model, object localization following a viewpoint change was affected by the number of objects in the environment.     

The adrenergic receptor α-2A gene (ADRA2A) and neuropsychological executive functions as putative endophenotypes for childhood ADHD

There is resurgent interest in the psychiatric literature in endophenotypes, variables thought to more strongly reflect the effects of candidate genes than do manifest disorders. In a sample of 176 children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and 52 of their siblings, we examined the validity of several putative endophenotypes for ADHD that represent commonly used clinical measures of multiple cognitive/neuropsychological domains of executive functions (EFs). We review their distributional normality, their relations to ADHD symptoms in probands and unaffected siblings relative to nonADHD controls, and their correlation in siblings. We also tested the EF measures’ associations with the ADRA2A gene and whether they mediated or moderated the associations between ADHD and ADRA2A. Several EF measures showed association with ADRA2A, as well as moderation, but not mediation, of its association with ADHD. Implications of the results for evaluating the validity and utility of putative endophenotype measures and for finding candidate gene effects on ADHD are discussed.     

Stressors, quality of the child-caregiver relationship, and children's mental health problems after parental death: the mediating role of self-system beliefs

Investigated whether three self-system beliefs, fear of abandonment, coping efficacy, and self-esteem, mediated the relations of stressors and caregiver-child relationship quality with concurrent and prospective internalizing and externalizing problems in a sample of children who had experienced parental death in the previous 2.5 years. The cross-sectional sample consisted of 340 children ages 7-16 and their surviving parent/current caregiver; the longitudinal analyses employed a subset of this sample that consisted of 100 children and their parents/caregivers who were assessed at three time points. A multirater, multimethod measure of caregiver-child relationship quality and a multirater measure of children's mental health problems were used. The cross-sectional model supported a mediational relation for fear of abandonment, coping efficacy, and self-esteem. The three-wave longitudinal model showed that fear of abandonment at Time 2 mediated the relation between stressors at Time 1 and internalizing and externalizing problems at Time 3. Implications of these findings for understanding the development of mental health problems in parentally bereaved children and designing interventions for this at-risk group are discussed.     

Stressors, Quality of the Child–Caregiver Relationship, and Children's Mental Health Problems After Parental Death: The Mediating Role of Self-System Beliefs

Investigated whether three self-system beliefs, fear of abandonment, coping efficacy, and self-esteem, mediated the relations of stressors and caregiver–child relationship quality with concurrent and prospective internalizing and externalizing problems in a sample of children who had experienced parental death in the previous 2.5 years. The cross-sectional sample consisted of 340 children ages 7–16 and their surviving parent/current caregiver; the longitudinal analyses employed a subset of this sample that consisted of 100 children and their parents/caregivers who were assessed at three time points. A multirater, multimethod measure of caregiver–child relationship quality and a multirater measure of children's mental health problems were used. The cross-sectional model supported a mediational relation for fear of abandonment, coping efficacy, and self-esteem. The three-wave longitudinal model showed that fear of abandonment at Time 2 mediated the relation between stressors at Time 1 and internalizing and externalizing problems at Time 3. Implications of these findings for understanding the development of mental health problems in parentally bereaved children and designing interventions for this at-risk group are discussed.

Discussion: Toward a social‐constructivist view of the psychoanalytic situation

The three papers by Modell, Aron, and Greenberg are discussed in terms of their relationship to a new paradigm for understanding the psychoanalytic situation. The paradigm is called social‐construct‐ivist to capture both the idea of the analyst's participation and the idea of construction of meaning. It is argued that these theorists, as well as many of the authors they cite as part of a broad movement in the field, do not consistently meet the criteria for this paradigm, although they seem to be aiming for it. An important source of inconsistency and confusion derives from the confounding of the two axes: drive‐relational and positivist‐constructivist. Many relational theorists who hold fast to the idea that analysts can grasp the truth of both their own experience and that of the patient are no closer to the constructivist point of view than was Freud. The call by Aron and Greenberg for greater attention to the patient's resisted experience of the analyst's subjectivity is discussed in terms of its potential benefits and problems. The ritualized asymmetry of the psychoanalytic situation is said to have important functions, including prevention of excessive involvement and protection of the unobjectionable positive transference and of a degree of idealization. Modell's notion of paradox, which makes the therapeutic relationship seem “real”; and “unreal”; at the same time, is seen as a special instance of the always precarious social construction of reality. It is argued, moreover, that the social and individual aspects of experience are interdependent. Neither is reducible to the other, and both should be understood, like many other issues in the new paradigm, in terms of a dialectical interplay of figure and ground in experience.     

The Flawed Person of the Analyst: Commentary on Paper by Lauren Levine

The way that the current conception of mutual enactment is understood, any analysis, in order to be ultimately successful must first go badly for some period of time. Any analysis that goes too smoothly is subject to the suspicion that some very difficult interactional material is being mutually unaddressed. In this context I see that Dr. Lauren Levine enacted the role of her abandoned patient (concordant countertransference) and as well, for a time, indeed, figuratively abandoned her patient (complementary countertransference). The author's central contribution in this paper is an illustration of how drawing on difficult and painful dimensions in one's own personal analysis, the analyst has the advantage of being able to withstand highly toxic material in both the transference and the countertransference. Dr. Levine is fortunate in having had a personal analysis that helped her integrate highly shameful aspects of her self, though it must be recognized that this is not always the case in all training analyses.     

Response to Slavin: Considering the Evolutionary and Existential Contexts of Dialectical Constructivism

Within his evolutionary framework, Slavin elaborates eloquently on the dialectic of construction of meaning and anticipation of death. Also within that framework he highlights the emergence of the universal dialectic of self-interest and care for others, perhaps finding its most poignant expression in the relation of parents and children. I raise questions about Slavin's attribution of a “sense of loss” to humans who allegedly long for the experience of evolutionarily earlier species, particularly their sense of automatic connectedness and automatic ways of relating to the world free of the burdens of uncertain, self-conscious choice. A longing for earlier states in human development is easier to grasp than a longing for the experience of less advanced species from which humans evolved. Nevertheless, Slavin's views and my own are otherwise deeply compatible, particularly his sense of what emerges as the uniquely human challenge of intersubjective construction of meaning in the context of individual self-interest and in the face of death. Slavin is also emphatic that the pervasiveness of absolute belief systems that preempt awareness of ambiguity, the anxiety of freedom, and the dread of death, does not gainsay their defensive nature. I argue, in accord with Altman, Butler, and others, that denial of death may promote dissipation of communal sensibility and replacement of it in a capitalist world (and perhaps others as well) with destructive splitting and fetishistic, competitive pursuit of money and power.     

Response to Safran: The Development of Critical Psychoanalytic Sensibility

Jeremy D. Safran feels that my views regarding the relative merits of case studies and systematic empirical research are unnecessarily polarizing. I feel that, on the contrary, I'm offering bridges between my perspective and those of researchers on psychoanalytic process and outcome in two ways. One is through my own constructivist critique of traditional positivist case studies and theorizing based upon clinical experience. The second is through conceptualizing the place of systematic research within a constructivist paradigm. I am arguing that its place can be no different than that of case studies. Both generate possibilities for any particular analyst or analytic therapist to have in mind as he or she works with a particular patient at a particular moment. Safran locates the destructive effects of scientism with “biologically oriented researchers and cognitive therapists.” In my view, it might be convenient if the problem could be located exclusively with them, but the fact is that psychoanalytic researchers, as I demonstrate, are working largely within the same paradigm as their adversaries in the research world. That paradigm erroneously privileges systematic research as hypothesis-testing, whereas case studies are relegated to the status of anecdotal, hypothesis-generating work. I describe what I call “nonlinear constructivist learning” as the kind of “generalization” that case studies can yield and that is optimal for our field.