Uniting model theory and the universalist tradition of logic: Carnap’s early axiomatics

We shift attention from the development of model theory for demarcated languages to the development of this theory for fragments of a language. Although it is often assumed that model theory for demarcated languages is not compatible with a universalist conception of logic, no one has denied that model theory for fragments of a language can be compatible with that conception. It thus seems unwarranted to ignore the universalist tradition in the search for the origins and development of model theory. This point is illustrated by Carnap’s early semantics and model theory, which he developed within a type theoretical framework and which stand out both for their universalistic treatment and for certain idiosyncratic technicalities by which the construction is supported. One special property is that individuals are context relative in Carnap’s system. This leads to a model theory in which the model domains are more flexible than has been suggested in the literature.     

The fate of the oedipus complex: Dissolution or waning

Abstract

Fried R. Personal and Classical Myth; A Confrontation on the Acropolis. Int Forum Psychoanal 1997;6:715. Stockholm, ISSN 0803-706X.

On his only visit to Greece, Sigmund Freud experienced brief but unsettling feelings of alienation as he stood on the Acropolis. Haunted by this experience, Freud did not succeed in analyzing it to his own satisfaction until 32 years after the event, in 1936. His interpretation, that he had felt guilt about superseding his father, did not convince most of the critics who have commented on it. The aim of this essay is to demonstrate that while Freud's critics were right in sensing that his explanation was only partial, none were able to decipher his secret. Prominent among the reasons for these repeated failures was lack of acquaintance with the Acropolis itself. Anyone standing where Freud stood becomes enabled to understand otherwise incomprehensible details of his essay. Seeing what Freud saw, however, still is not enough unless one also attempts to acquire some of his knowledge of archaeology and mythology. His competence in these areas made him aware of contradictions (e.g. between classical and archaic architecture and myth) that do not trouble the casual tourist. But his knowledge also furnished him with the tools for mastering his anxiety, turning fear of death into confidence in immortality, and gratifying desires even more ambitious than that of superseding his father.     

Emotional intelligence (EI), conflict resolution patterns,and relationship satisfaction: Actor and partner effects revisited

This study tested for actor and partner effects in the relationship between ability-based EI and adaptive marital relationships and satisfaction employing a standard dyadic design involving 100 young heterosexual couples. Participants were assessed on the MSCEIT along with measures of conflict resolution patterns and perceived marital satisfaction. A series of path analyses provided support for actor effects—but not partner effects—in the association of EI, assessed as ability, and marital variables. Overall, the data provide only partial support for the common claim and some prior research suggesting that EI plays a pivotal role in marital relationships.     

Eye movements during recall of aversive memory decreases conditioned fear

Cognitive-behavioral therapy for anxiety disorders typically involves exposure to the conditioned stimulus (CS). Despite its status as an effective and primary treatment, many patients do not show clinical improvement or relapse. Contemporary learning theory suggests that treatment may be optimized by adding techniques that aim at revaluating the aversive consequence (US) of the feared stimulus. This study tested whether US devaluation via a dual task – imagining the US while making eye movements – decreases conditioned fear. Following fear acquisition one group recalled the US while making eye movements (EM) and one group merely recalled the US (RO). Next, during a test phase, all participants were re-presented the CSs. Dual tasking, relative to the control condition, decreased memory vividness and emotionality. Moreover, only in the dual task condition reductions were observed in self-reported fear, US expectancy, and CS unpleasantness, but not in skin conductance responses. Findings provide the first evidence that the dual task decreases conditioned fear and suggest it may be a valuable addition to exposure therapy.     

Prepartum autobiographical memory specificity predicts post-traumatic stress symptoms following complicated pregnancy

Prior research has shown that reduced autobiographical memory specificity predicts an increase in post-traumatic stress severity in traumatised individuals. Studies have also demonstrated that reduced memory specificity predicts later symptoms of depression after pregnancy-related life stress. So far, no reported studies have tested the predictive value of memory specificity at the onset of a potentially traumatic situation. Therefore the aim of the present study was to investigate whether prenatal memory specificity would predict post-traumatic stress after complicated pregnancy. The results demonstrate that women who retrieved fewer specific memories with a pregnancy-related content to positive cues during pregnancy (i.e., directly after hospitalisation) reported more post-traumatic stress 6 weeks after giving birth. This relationship remained significant after controlling for variables that were related to both baseline autobiographical memory specificity and later post-traumatic stress. A similar pattern was found for depression symptomatology, even when somatic symptoms were excluded from the analyses. Taken together, these data suggest that the relationship of memory specificity with later depression can be generalised to post-traumatic stress symptoms.     

A computational-level explanation of the speed of goal inference

The ability to understand the goals that drive another person’s actions is an important social and cognitive skill. This is no trivial task, because any given action may in principle be explained by different possible goals (e.g., one may wave ones arm to hail a cab or to swat a mosquito). To select which goal best explains an observed action is a form of abduction. To explain how people perform such abductive inferences, Baker, Tenenbaum, and Saxe (2007) proposed a computational-level theory that formalizes goal inference as Bayesian inverse planning (BIP). It is known that general Bayesian inference–be it exact or approximate–is computationally intractable (NP-hard). As the time required for computationally intractable computations grows excessively fast when scaled from toy domains to the real world, it seems that such models cannot explain how humans can perform Bayesian inferences quickly in real world situations. In this paper we investigate how the BIP model can nevertheless explain how people are able to make goal inferences quickly. The approach that we propose builds on taking situational constraints explicitly into account in the computational-level model. We present a methodology for identifying situational constraints that render the model tractable. We discuss the implications of our findings and reflect on how the methodology can be applied to alternative models of goal inference and Bayesian models in general.     

Development in children's attribution of embarrassment and the relationship with theory of mind and shyness

The present study examined the two-stage developmental theory of the understanding of embarrassment (Modigliani & Blumenfeld, 1979) through the administration of verbal and non-verbal measures. Moreover, the relationship between children's attributions of embarrassment and their ability to understand false beliefs and propensity to be shy was investigated. Ninety-five children (4 to 9 years old) were presented with brief stories in which the main character received negative, neutral, or positive social reactions. Verbal and non-verbal attributions of embarrassment were examined. In addition, a false-belief task and a shyness-propensity questionnaire were administered. Using verbal measures, older children reported more embarrassment in the negative and neutral conditions compared to younger children. However, using non-verbal measures, these age differences disappeared. This suggests that young children may have a “mature” understanding of embarrassment, but may not be able to express this linguistically. Verbal and non-verbal embarrassment attributions were not related to the understanding of false beliefs, but they were related to shyness propensity. The results are discussed in terms of socio-cognitive and emotional factors in understanding emotions.     

The unconscious pursuit of emotion regulation: Implications for psychological health

Because of the central involvement of emotion regulation in psychological health and the role that implicit (largely unconscious) processes appear to play in emotion regulation, implicit emotion-regulatory processes should play a vital role in psychological health. We hypothesised that implicitly valuing emotion regulation translates into better psychological health in individuals who use adaptive emotion-regulation strategies. A community sample of 222 individuals (56% women) who had recently experienced a stressful life event completed an implicit measure of emotion regulation valuing (ER-IAT) and reported on their habitual use of an important adaptive emotion-regulation strategy: cognitive reappraisal. We measured three domains of psychological health: well-being, depressive symptoms, and social adjustment. As hypothesised, individuals who implicitly valued emotion regulation exhibited greater levels of psychological health, but only when they were high in cognitive reappraisal use. These findings suggest that salutary effects of unconscious emotion-regulation processes depend on its interplay with conscious emotion-regulation processes.     

Is knowing believing? The role of event plausibility and background knowledge in planting false beliefs about the personal past

False memories are more likely to be planted for plausible than for implausible events, but does just knowing about an implausible event make individuals more likely to think that the event happened to them? Two experiments assessed the independent contributions of plausibility and background knowledge to planting false beliefs. In Experiment 1, subjects rated 20 childhood events as to the likelihood of each event having happened to them. The list included the implausible target event “received an enema,” a critical target event of Pezdek, Finger, and Hodge (1997). Two weeks later, subjects were presented with (1) information regarding the high prevalence rate of enemas; (2) background information on how to administer an enema; (3) neither type of information; or (4) both. Immediately or 2 weeks later, they rated the 20 childhood events again. Only plausibility significantly increased occurrence ratings. In Experiment 2, the target event was changed from “barium enema administered in a hospital” to “home enema for constipation”; significant effects of both plausibility and background knowledge resulted. The results suggest that providing background knowledge can increase beliefs about personal events, but that its impact is limited by the extent of the individual’s familiarity with the context of the suggested target event.