Opinion revision and the influence of corresponding and conflicting adjectives

The hypothesis was tested that Bayes' theorem would be a good model to predict the revision of opinion about other people in the light of information about these people. This hypothesis was tested in 5 different diagnostic situations. A further purpose was to investigate the influence of corresponding and conflicting items of information on opinion revision. The items of information consisted of 4 successively presented adjectives, favorable (H) and/or unfavorable (L) ones. The Ss revised their opinion after each adjective. Each sequence of 4 adjectives was presented twice, the second time in reversed order.     

Markedness and perspective in the interpretation of the active and passive voice

The subjects were presented with active and passive sentences. For each sentence, they had to choose between two alternative implications. The pattern of choices indicates that in the passive the logical subject was interpreted by the subjects as the focal point of the information asserted by the sentence and as the carrier of overall responsibility for the sentential proposition. In contrast to the passive, there was no clear pattern of preferences for the active. The difference between the two voices was attributed to their markedness asymmetry, the passive being marked and the active unmarked. It is concluded that the active offers a neutral structure for conveying information; a structure available for use when one does not want to superimpose on the information content any stylistic or connotational implications. The passive, on the other hand, suggests special connotations in addition to the basic message.     

A l'occasion du renouvellement de l'annee

Sans résumé     

‘They will not control us’: Ingroup positivity and belief in intergroup conspiracies

This research examined the role of different forms of positive regard for the ingroup in predicting beliefs in intergroup conspiracies. Collective narcissism reflects a belief in ingroup greatness contingent on others’ recognition. We hypothesized that collective narcissism should be especially likely to foster outgroup conspiracy beliefs. Non‐narcissistic ingroup positivity, on the other hand, should predict a weaker tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. In Study 1, the endorsement of conspiratorial explanations of outgroup actions was positively predicted by collective narcissism but negatively by non‐narcissistic ingroup positivity. Study 2 showed that the opposite effects of collective narcissism and non‐narcissistic ingroup positivity on conspiracy beliefs were mediated via differential perceptions of threat. Study 3 manipulated whether conspiracy theories implicated ingroup or outgroup members. Collective narcissism predicted belief in outgroup conspiracies but not in ingroup conspiracies, while non‐narcissistic ingroup positivity predicted lower conspiracy beliefs, regardless of them being ascribed to the ingroup or the outgroup.