Developmental changes in the perception of adult facial age

The author studied children's (aged 5-16 years) and young adults' (aged 18-22 years) perception and use of facial features to discriminate the age of mature adult faces. In Experiment 1, participants rated the age of unaltered and transformed (eyes, nose, eyes and nose, and whole face blurred) adult faces (aged 20-80 years). In Experiment 2, participants ranked facial age sets (aged 20-50, 20-80, and 50-80 years) that had varying combinations of older and younger facial features: eyes, noses, mouths, and base faces. Participants of all ages attended to similar facial features when making judgments about adult facial age, although young children (aged 5-7 years) were less accurate than were older children (aged 9-11 years), adolescents (aged 13-16 years), and young adults when making facial age judgments. Young children were less sensitive to some facial features when making facial age judgments.     

Rorschach Comprehensive System data for a sample of 52 older adult nonpatients from the United States

This study is composed of 52 older adults, ages 60 to 80, all from the United States. In addition to being administered the Rorschach (Rorschach, 1942), all participants also were administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R; Weschler, 1981), the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2; Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989), the Neuro Cognitive Status Examination (NCSE; Kiernan, Mueller, Langston, & Van Dyke, 1987), and the Trail Making Test Part B (Reitan, 1958; Reitan & Wolfson, 1993). Examiners included the principal author as well as three other trained examiners. Inclusion criteria are described. Interrater reliability statistics at the response level are presented along with scores for the Rorschach Comprehensive System (CS; Exner, 1995).     

Temporal integration of monocular images separated in time: stereopsis, stereoacuity, and binocular luster

We evaluated stereopsis and binocular luster using electronically controlled shutter glasses with alternating monocular stimulation. In Experiment 1, we used the standard method for testing stereoacuity to obtain a gradual measure of stereopsis. Stereo thresholds decreased with increasing alternating frequency of two monocular half-images without a delay between them. Increasing delays led to increasing thresholds. In Experiment 2, we compared stereopsis resulting from two monocular half-images of a random-dot stereogram and binocular luster with respect to the minimum alternating frequency of the two half-images and the maximum interocular delay that were tolerated without a breakdown of the impression. Below 3 Hz, no stereopsis occurred. Binocular luster was observed only above 10 Hz. The mean threshold of interocular delay for detecting the global figure in a random-dot stereogram was about 51 msec, but for binocular luster it was about 20 msec. Overall, temporal integration was better for stereopsis than for binocular luster.     

Harnessing the need for immediate gratification: cognitive reconstrual modulates the reward value of temptations

Many of us succumb to temptations, despite knowing that we will later regret doing so. How can such behavior be avoided? In three studies, the authors tested the hypothesis that reconstruing temptation as a test of a valued internal quality ("willpower") would decrease the tendency to succumb by reducing the appeal of the temptation. In Study 1, participants who construed a challenging handgrip task as a test of willpower resisted the temptation to terminate the painful task longer than participants who did not. In Study 2, participants performed a handgrip task twice. Only participants who changed their construal of the task into a test of willpower improved their performance. In Study 3, participants took a timed math test while being tempted by comedy clips. Participants who reconstrued the situation as willpower test compared with participants who did not, (a) enjoyed the videos less, and (b) were better able to resist the tempting videos. These studies demonstrate that cognitive reconstrual can be used to modify reward contingencies, so that succumbing to temptation becomes less appealing, and resisting temptation becomes more appealing.     

The effect of mood on false memory for emotional DRM word lists

In the present study, we investigated the effect of participants’ mood on true and false memories of emotional word lists in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm. In Experiment 1, we constructed DRM word lists in which all the studied words and corresponding critical lures reflected a specified emotional valence. In Experiment 2, we used these lists to assess mood-congruent true and false memory. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three induced-mood conditions (positive, negative, or neutral) and were presented with word lists comprised of positive, negative, or neutral words. For both true and false memory, there was a mood-congruent effect in the negative mood condition; this effect was due to a decrease in true and false recognition of the positive and neutral words. These findings are consistent with both spreading-activation and fuzzy-trace theories of DRM performance and have practical implications for our understanding of the effect of mood on memory.     

About the Contributors

Biography

About the Contributors     

The Perception of Four Basic Emotions in Human and Nonhuman Faces by Children With Autism and Other Developmental Disabilities

Children who experienced autism, mental retardation, and language disorders; and, children in a clinical control group were shown photographs of human female, orangutan, and canine (boxer) faces expressing happiness, sadness, anger, surprise and a neutral expression. For each species of faces, children were asked to identify the happy, sad, angry, or surprised expressions. In Experiment 1, error patterns suggested that children who experienced autism were attending to features of the lower face when making judgements about emotional expressions. Experiment 2 supported this impression. When recognizing facial emotion, children without autism performed better when viewing the full face, compared to the upper and lower face alone. Children with autism performed no better when viewing the full face than they did when viewing partial faces; and, performed no better than chance when viewing the upper face alone. The results are discussed with respect to differences in the manner that children with and without autism process social information communicated by the face.