Business or pleasure? Utilitarian versus hedonic considerations in emotion regulation

It is widely accepted that emotions have utilitarian as well as hedonic consequences. Nevertheless, it is typically assumed that individuals regulate emotions to obtain hedonic, rather than utilitarian, benefits. In this study, the authors tested whether individuals represent the utility of pleasant and unpleasant emotions and whether they would be motivated to experience unpleasant emotions if they believed they could be useful. First, findings revealed that participants explicitly viewed approach emotions (e.g., excitement) as useful for obtaining rewards, but viewed avoidance emotions (e.g., worry) as useful for avoiding threats. Second, this pattern was replicated in implicit representations of emotional utility, which were dissociated from explicit ones. Third, implicit, but not explicit, representations of emotional utility predicted motives for emotion regulation. When anticipating a threatening task, participants who viewed emotions such as worry and fear as useful for avoiding threats preferred to engage in activities that were likely to increase worry and fear (vs. excitement) before the task. These findings demonstrate that utilitarian considerations play an important, if underappreciated, role in emotion regulation.     

Same situation--different emotions: how appraisals shape our emotions

Appraisal theories of emotion hold that it is the way a person interprets a situation--rather than the situation itself--that gives rise to one emotion rather than another emotion (or no emotion at all). Unfortunately, most prior tests of this foundational hypothesis have simultaneously varied situations and appraisals, making an evaluation of this assumption difficult. In the present study, participants responded to a standardized laboratory situation with a variety of different emotions. Appraisals predicted the intensity of individual emotions across participants. In addition, subgroups of participants with similar emotional response profiles made comparable appraisals. Together, these findings suggest that appraisals may be necessary and sufficient to determine different emotional reactions toward a particular situation.     

Emotion Regulation in Adulthood: Timing Is Everything

Emotions seem to come and go as they please. However, we actually hold considerable sway over our emotions: We influence which emotions we have and how we experience and express these emotions. The process model of emotion regulation described here suggests that how we regulate our emotions matters. Regulatory strategies that act early in the emotion-generative process should have quite different outcomes than strategies that act later. This review focuses on two widely used strategies for down-regulating emotion. The first, reappraisal, comes early in the emotion-generative process. It consists of changing how we think about a situation in order to decrease its emotional impact. The second, suppression, comes later in the emotion-generative process. It involves inhibiting the outward signs of emotion. Theory and research suggest that reappraisal is more effective than suppression. Reappraisal decreases the experience and behavioral expression of emotion, and has no impact on memory. By contrast, suppression decreases behavioral expression, but fails to decrease the experience of emotion, and actually impairs memory. Suppression also increases physiological responding in both the suppressors and their social partners.     

An examination of the relation of individual difference variables to loneliness

This study investigated the relation of five individual difference variables (extroversion, depression, self-esteem, neuroticism, and attitude toward others) to loneliness. The relative contributions of two different models that might explain these relations were examined. One model suggests that individual difference variables are related to loneliness through the mediation of social network variables; that is, individual difference variables may reduce people's motivation and/or ability to build and maintain social relationships, which in turn leads to loneliness. The second model, the cognitive bias model, states that both the individual difference variables and loneliness are influenced by the same intrapersonal, cognitive processes. Some people are prone to negative affect and tend to evaluate themselves and their relationships negatively. The relations of self-esteem, neuroticism, and depression to loneliness were hypothesized to reflect the cognitive bias model, while extroversion and attitudes toward others were hypothesized to be related to loneliness through the mediation of social network variables. Eighty-two female and 42 male adults completed measures of loneliness and the five individual difference variables, as well as an instrument assessing their social networks. The results indicated partial support for both models for each of the individual difference variables. Together, the two models did a good job of explaining the correlations of the individual difference variables and loneliness. The implications of these findings, as well as their relation to previous research, are discussed.