Salutary proximal processes and distal mood and anxiety vulnerability outcomes of mindfulness training: a pilot preventive intervention

The present study evaluated the effect of a brief mindfulness-based preventive intervention on (a) dispositional (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003) and state (SMS; Tanay & Bernstein, 2010) mindfulness; (b) putative proximal factors/processes engendered through the development of mindfulness, including increased decentering (EQ-D; Fresco et al., 2007) and reduced experiential avoidance (AAQ; Hayes et al., 2004); and (c) distal mood and anxiety vulnerability factors, including reduced depression-related dysfunctional attitudes, (DAS; de Graaf, Roelofs, & Huibers, 2009), anxiety sensitivity (ASI-3; Taylor et al., 2007), and negative affectivity (PANAS-NA; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) among a university-community sample in Israel. Fifty-three adult participants between the ages of 20 and 52 (M(age)=25.2 years, SD(age)=4.3 years; 65.4% women) were recruited from the Haifa University community. Nineteen participants were randomly assigned to an experimental condition (M(age)=25.3 years, SD(age)=4.3 years; 66% women) and studied prospectively over the course of a four-session (21-day) mindfulness skills training intervention; and 34 participants were randomly assigned to a no-intervention (control) condition (M(age)=24.9 years, SD(age)=2.4years; 64.7% women) and studied prospectively. Findings demonstrate statistically robust and clinically significant relations between mindfulness and the theorized proximal and distal mood and anxiety vulnerability factors. Findings are discussed with respect to their theoretical implications for better understanding mindfulness-psychopathology vulnerability relations, clinical implications for larger-scale universal and selective transdiagnostic prevention efforts, and future directions for this area of research.     

Personalized and not general suggestion produces false autobiographical memories and suggestion-consistent behavior

Suggesting false childhood events produces false autobiographical beliefs, memories and suggestion-consistent behavior. The mechanisms by which suggestion affects behavior are not understood, and whether false beliefs and memories are necessary for suggestions to impact behavior remains unexplored. We examined the relative effects of providing a personalized suggestion (suggesting that an event occurred to the person in the past), and/or a general suggestion (suggesting that an event happened to others in the past). Participants (N=122) received a personalized suggestion, a general suggestion, both or neither, about childhood illness due to spoiled peach yogurt. The personalized suggestion resulted in false beliefs, false memories, and suggestion-consistent behavioral intentions immediately after the suggestion. One week or one month later participants completed a taste test that involved eating varieties of crackers and yogurts. The personalized suggestion led to reduced consumption of only peach yogurt, and those who reported a false memory showed the most eating suppression. This effect on behavior was equally strong after one week and one month, showing a long lived influence of the personalized suggestion. The general suggestion showed no effects. Suggestions that convey personal information about a past event produce false autobiographical memories, which in turn impact behavior.     

Giving the Ontological Argument Its Due

In this paper, I shall present and defend an ontological argument for the existence of God. The argument has two premises: (1) possibly, God exists, and (2) necessary existence is a perfection. I then defend, at length, arguments for both of these premises. Finally, I shall address common objections to ontological arguments, such as the Kantian slogan (‘existence is not a real predicate’), and Gaunilo-style parodies, and argue that they do not succeed. I conclude that there is at least one extant ontological argument that is plausibly sound.     

Blind Intuitions: Modernism's Critique of Idealism

Adorno contends that something of what we think of knowing and rational agency operate in ways that obscure and deform unique, singular presentations by relegating them to survival-driven interests and needs; hence, in accordance with the presumptions of transcendental idealism, we have come to mistake what are, in effect, historically contingent, species-subjective ways of viewing the world for an objective understanding of the world. And further, this interested understanding of the world is deforming in a more radical way than just obscuring what is there for the sake of interested needs and purposes; these instrumental ways of knowing and acting, are broadly self-interested, in the interest of survival, without effective concern for the well-being and worth of others; by becoming generalized and exclusive, hegemonic, by driving out modes of encountering things and persons that support their differences and independence, their needs and interests, these instrumental practices are the deepest cause of the ills of our time. As heightened forms of rational self-interest, self-interest being the drive of reason, transcendental interests suppress the interests of others. Adorno argues that modernist artistic practices perform a critique of the set of assumptions governing idealism by demonstrating how there is a suppressed rational form of human comportment directed towards the making and comprehension of unique sensuous particulars. Art, according to Adorno's ‘Aesthetic Theory’, is a broken off and isolated fragment of human knowing; in its hibernates the rational forms of acting and knowing that have been suppressed in the coming to be of Enlightened modernity.     

Discussion of “Melancholic Psychosis”

Derek Hook’s paper (this issue) represents an important discussion of the Lacanian perspective on melancholia and its close and often forgotten clinical link to psychosis. Hook’s paper provides a critical insight into how melancholia is understood as a surrender to the jouissance of the Other. The reviewer only disagrees with Hook’s idea that there is no object loss in melancholia because the melancholic knows whom he has lost but not what he has lost in the absent object. This unknown loss leaves him exposed to an erotogenic masochism proper and a self-annihilating kind of jouissance.     

Different Realities: What Is Reality and What Difference Does It Make?

Consciousness does not exist apart from psyche; it reflects it. Different realities are not interchangeable with other manifestations of psychic reality. “Borderland consciousness” is the term I have conceived for people who, in one way or another, have a living dynamic connection to and relationship with nature. Given this understanding, the oral traditional and Native American cultures manifest a reciprocity psyche, and are today the closest manifestation of the psychic reality in Genesis, pre-expulsion from Eden. Navajo language contains no words for religion, guilt, human, inanimate, psyche, or ego. The Western psyche manifests a dominion psyche; that is, a binary consciousness borne as a result of the expulsion in Genesis, and wedded to logic as an uncompromising characteristic of sanity and health. This kind of consciousness too often crushes the spirit dimension, which is transrational. An awareness of borderland consciousness is entering into the Western cultural collective. This is the telos of the Garden of Eden expulsion, and itself represents the dominion psyche and the reciprocity psyche in dialogue. This dialogue offers a critical counterbalance to the rogue behavior of the overspecialized Western ego of the dominion psyche. This article urges Jungians to develop new methods of connecting with borderland consciousness since the dominion psyche and its technology alone cannot save our species in the face of the threat of a global climate change disaster.