Contents of Volume 56

Volume Contents

Contents of Volume 56     

Memories of real-life decisions

Three studies investigated decision makers’ memory representations of choice alternatives in most important real-life decisions. In Study 1, each participant recalled the most important decision that she or he had ever made and rated to what degree a number of characteristics could describe the decisions. In Study 2, the participants were asked to think about an important decision that they had made during the last 7–10 days. In Study 3, the memory representations of decisions of a group of action-oriented participants were compared with those of a group of state-oriented participants (Kuhl, 1983). Characteristics related to standard decision theory, like consequences, values, and likelihood, had high ratings of applicability as well as affect/feeling. When testing the applicability of a circumplex model, the fuzzy-trace theory of memory, and differences between state- and action-oriented decision makers, we found (1) that there was no support for the circumplex model of emotions. Instead, an important decision problem was characterised by both positive and negative affect/emotion and thus, a bipolar mapping was found inadequate; (2) that a comparison of abstract and concrete aspects showed that the abstract characteristics scored higher, thereby supporting the fuzzy-trace theory; and (3) that the prediction that action-oriented participants would score higher than state-oriented participants on the characteristic of activity was not supported. However, state-oriented decision makers rated passivity higher than action-oriented decision makers for the important decision of leaving a partner. State-oriented decision makers used perceptual/cognitive scenario representations to a greater extent than action-oriented participants. Finally, it was stressed that in the development of decision theories it is essential to find theoretical representations as close as possible to how decision makers themselves represent the decisions. The method used in this contribution is focused on the role of memory in decision making and gives further insights into how important real-life decisions are represented by different decision makers.     

Sweden: income and suicide

Previous publications have reported two conflicting patterns describing the relationship between income and suicide in Sweden; positive and negative. Methodologically the studies have differed, and the analysis has been limited to a few areas. To better understand the relationship, a nationwide, cross-sectional, ecological study of the 290 municipalities in Sweden was planned. OLS regression analyses showed the overall and female suicide rates were negatively related to income, while the effect on male suicide rates was not statistically significant. The results confirm earlier findings of a negative relationship between income and suicide.     

Long-term self-monitoring of weight: a case study

The aim of this study was to examine the self-monitoring of weight on a daily basis over a long period of time in order to understand the process of weight regain. An obese female client measured her weight every morning over a period of 10 years. The subject made a total of 2081 weight measurements. Thus, her weight was measured on 67% of all possible days. After the initial weight loss a pattern of gradual weight gain was observed. The subject gained weight during August and September, and at the end of December, in particular. Furthermore, her weight increased slightly at the weekends. This case study highlights the advantage of self-monitoring of weight on a daily basis. Individual patterns of weight change possibly associated with season and weekly variation may be crucial when obese subjects try to maintain their weight after weight loss. However, it may take several months or even years to detect the weekly and yearly rhythms or other patterns in the data. Thus, self-control of weight is problematic, since patterns in the weight regain process are difficult to detect. This may be one reason why self-control of weight is so difficult.     

Realism,relativism, and constructivism

This paper gives a critical evaluation of the philosophical presuppositions and implications of two current schools in the sociology of knowledge: the Strong Programme of Bloor and Barnes; and the Constructivism of Latour and Knorr-Cetina. Bloor's arguments for his externalist symmetry thesis (i.e., scientific beliefs must always be explained by social factors) are found to be incoherent or inconclusive. At best, they suggest a Weak Programme of the sociology of science: when theoretical preferences in a scientific community, SC, are first internally explained by appealing to the evidence, e, and the standards or values, V, accepted in SC, then a sociologist may sometimes step in to explain why e and V were accepted in SC. Latour's story about the social construction of facts in scientific laboratories is found to be misleading or incredible. The idea that scientific reality is an artifact turns out to have some interesting affinities with classical pragmatism, instrumentalism, phenomenology, and internal realism. However, the constructivist account of theoretical entities in terms of negotiation and social consensus is less plausible than the alternative realist story which explains consensus by the preexistence of mind-independent real entities. The author concludes that critical scientific realism, developed with the concept of truthlikeness, is compatible with the thesis that scientific beliefs or knowledge claims may be relative to various types of cognitive and practical interests. However, the realist denies, with good reasons, the stronger type of relativism which takes reality and truth to be relative to persons, groups, or social interests.This paper was presented at the 8th Inter-Nordic Philosophical Symposium, Oslo, 18–20 May 1989. Some ideas from this paper were first expressed in a lecture in Professor Aant Elzinga's seminar in Gothenburg, 22 April 1988.     

Verisimilitude vs. legisimilitude

The recent theories of truthlikeness have not paid attention to the distinction between lawlike and accidental generalizations. L.J. Cohen has expressed this by saying that science aims at legisimilitude rather than verisimilitude. G. Oddie has given a reply to Cohen by defining the notion of legisimilitude in terms of higher-order logics. This paper gives a different reply to Cohen by treating laws as physically necessary generalizations and by defining the notion of legisimilitude as closeness to a suitably chosen lawlike sentence.     

How Not to Criticise Scientism

This paper argues that the main global critiques of scientism lose their punch because they rely on an uncharitable definition of their target. It focuses on epistemological scientism and divides it into four categories in terms of how strong (science is the only source of knowledge) or weak (science is the best source of knowledge) and how narrow (only natural sciences) or broad (all sciences or at least not only the natural sciences) they are. Two central arguments against scientism, the (false) dilemma and self-referential incoherence, are analysed. Of the four types of epistemological scientism, three can deal with these counterarguments by utilizing two methodological principles: epistemic evaluability of reliability and epistemic opportunism. One hopes that these considerations will steer the discussion on scientism to more fruitful pastures in the future. For example, there are interesting methodological considerations concerning what evaluability or reliability and epistemic opportunism entail.