Can we get sick if we want to? Children's and adults' recognition of intentionality in the origins of illness and injuries

The present set of studies examined the impact of intentionality (wanting/not wanting to get sick) on the transmission of contagious illness and injuries. Study 1 examined whether preschoolers and adults thought that a recipient of an illness is more likely to get sick if he/she wanted to. Studies 2, 2a, and 3 examined if the intentions of the transmitter would influence the transmission of illness to the recipient. Study 4 examined the influence of germs on intentionality. Both preschoolers and adults reasoned that the intentions of the recipient would play a significant role in the probability of contracting an illness but only adults reasoned that the recipient having knowledge of the transmitter's intentions would have an impact on illness. Moreover, preschoolers (but not adults) judged that biological contaminants such as germs would interact with the intentionality of the recipient to increase the chances of contracting an illness whereas adults reasoned that psychological states can have a direct influence on the manifestation of illness. These results suggest that preschoolers and adults entertain a highly sophisticated and selective process when assessing, the impact of psychological factors such as intentionality on biological processes such as the origins of illness.     

Management of day-to-day organisational human relations: a Henri Rey perspective

Nearly all contributions to applying psychoanalytic understanding to organisational life rely either on a group relations model or observing and commenting on how people impact on each other. In this paper, I use a particular theory of human relations from post-Kleinian psychoanalysis to understand the complexity of the manager/staff relationship which is not unlike the analyst/therapist relationship with a patient.     

CHANGING LANDSCAPE IN SCIENCE-RELIGION DIALOGUES

One peculiarity of the broad theme of science-religion dialogues is that while it has been growing significantly, it seems to be moving farther and farther away from its goal of establishing bridges and understandings between the two enterprises. This essay explores this unhappy situation, with particular reference to the works of two scholars who have been critical of some of the pioneer theologians and have suggested some radically new approaches to the issues.     

THERE'S MORE TO TIME THAN TICKING AWAY

Time is an element that each of us experiences in the core of our being. Yet it also is one of the great mysteries in our conceptual grasp of reality. The notion of time has therefore been reflected upon and explored by thinkers and scientists since ancient times. In this essay I relate the multiple ways in which Antje's Jackelén's scholarly and stimulating work Time and Eternity analyzes the historical, philosophical, theological, and scientific perspectives on the notion of time lived and its relation to the conceptual endless time that we call eternity, and offer some of my own contextual reflections on the topic.     

Rigid general terms and essential predicates

What does it mean for a general term to be rigid? It is argued by some that if we take general terms to designate their extensions, then almost no empirical general term will turn out to be rigid; and if we take them to designate some abstract entity, such as a kind, then it turns out that almost all general terms will be rigid. Various authors who pursue this line of reasoning have attempted to capture Kripke’s intent by defining a rigid general term as one that applies to the objects in its extension essentially. I argue that this account is significantly mistaken for various reasons: it conflates a metaphysical notion (essentialism) with a semantic one (rigidity); it fails to countenance the fact that any term can be introduced into a language by stipulating that it be a rigid designator; it limits the extension of rigid terms so much that terms such as ‘meter’, ‘rectangle’, ‘truth’, etc. do not turn out to be rigid, when they obviously are; and it wrongly concentrates on the predicative use of a general term in applying a certain test offered by Kripke to determine whether a term is rigid.