Revealing Ireland's “Proper” Heart: Apology,Shame, Nation

This article contributes to feminist expositions of emotion and “matters of the heart” by highlighting the gendered nature of the mobilization of shame. It focuses on the role shame plays in state apology and the desire to recover pride. Specifically, it analyzes the state apology offered to the survivors of Magdalen Laundries by Enda Kenny, the Taoiseach (prime minister) of Ireland. By drawing out how the state apology recreates the Irish nation, it traces the deployment of a potentially productive variety of the politics of shame, which comes to be subverted in the service of keeping the virtuous, feeling “heart” of Ireland—the nation's very core—intact across a temporal, moral continuum.     

Calibration of phase field parameters demonstrated on kinetics of a shrinking single grain

The phase field method is frequently employed to simulate evolution of rather complex microstructures. In order to accurately describe the real kinetics of a specific material system, the phase field parameters must be calibrated to standard thermodynamic quantities such as interface mobilities or interface energies. This letter presents a convenient method, based on thermodynamic modelling of shrinking of a single grain embedded in single crystal (matrix), how to calibrate the phase field parameters. It also shows, how the required thermodynamic quantities can be met by proper rescaling of a phase field simulation carried out for given phase field parameters.     

Context-specific adjustment of cognitive control: Transfer of adaptive control sets

Cognitive control protects processing of relevant information from interference by irrelevant information. The level of this processing selectivity can be flexibly adjusted to different control demands (e.g., frequency of conflict) associated with a certain context, leading to the formation of specific context–control associations. In the present study we investigated the robustness and transferability of the acquired context–control demands to new situations. In three experiments, we used a version of the context-specific proportion congruence (CSPC) paradigm, in which each context (e.g., location) is associated with a specific conflict frequency, determining high and low control demands. In a learning phase, associations between context and control demands were established. In a subsequent transfer block, stimulus–response mappings, whole task sets, or context–control demands changed. Results showed an impressive robustness of context–control associations, as context-specific adjustments of control from the learning phase were virtually unaffected by new stimuli and tasks in the transfer block. Only a change of the context–control demand eliminated the context-specific adjustment of control. These findings suggest that context–control associations that have proven to be adaptive in the past are continuously applied despite major changes in the task structure as long as the context–control associations remain the same.     

Learning new problem-solving strategies leads to changes in problem representation

Children sometimes solve problems incorrectly because they fail to represent key features of the problems. One potential source of improvements in children's problem representations is learning new problem-solving strategies. Ninety-one 3rd- and 4th-grade students solved mathematical equivalence problems (e.g., 3 + 4 + 6 = 3 + __) and completed a representation assessment in which they briefly viewed similar problems and either reconstructed each problem or identified it in a set of alternatives. Experimental groups then received a lesson about one or both of two solution strategies, the equalize strategy and the add–subtract strategy. A control group received no instruction. All children completed posttest assessments of representation and problem solving. Children taught the equalize strategy improved their problem representations more than those not taught it. This pattern did not hold for the add–subtract strategy. These results indicate that learning new strategies is one source of changes in problem representation. However, some strategies are more effective than others at promoting accurate problem representation.     

Your Sexism Predicts My Sexism: Perceptions of Men’s (but not Women’s) Sexism Affects One’s Own Sexism Over Time

The effects of perceived normative (societal) levels of benevolent (BS) and hostile sexism (HS) on one’s own sexist attitudes were examined over a four-month period in an undergraduate New Zealand sample (76 women, 26 men). Perceptions of normative levels of men’s BS produced longitudinal change in one’s own BS, and this effect was invariant across gender. However, contrary to previous research suggesting that women endorse BS when men are high in HS for its protective benefits, women instead expressed subjectively positive paternalistic attitudes toward their gender to the extent that they perceived BS as normative in men. The transmission of patriarchical-defined ideologies is tempered by the degree to which such ideologies espouse benevolent versus more overtly hostile attitudes toward women.     

Differential redundancy gain in onset detection versus offset detection

In a visual simple reaction time paradigm with attention divided between the left and right visual fields, redundancy gain refers to the finding of faster responses to stimuli presented in both fields than to single stimuli. The present study investigated whether the effects of low-level perceptual processing affect the redundancy gain by comparing the detection of onsets versus offsets. In different blocks, participants responded to left and right visual field stimuli that either appeared (onset) or disappeared (offset), with a single stimulus change in some trials and two redundant stimulus changes in others. With onset stimuli, the results replicated previous redundancy gain effects. In contrast, there was much less redundancy gain when participants responded to stimulus offsets. This finding suggests that redundancy gain is sensitive to low-level perceptual characteristics, such as onset versus offset presentation of stimuli.     

Words may not be enough! No increased emotional Stroop effect in obsessive-compulsive disorder

Conflicting evidence has been obtained whether or not patients diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) share an attentional bias towards disorder-related stimuli. Some of these inconsistencies can be accounted for by suboptimal stimuli selection. In consideration of the heterogeneity of OCD, we investigated Stroop interference effects for two classes of OCD items (i.e., washing and checking) in 23 OCD patients and 23 healthy controls. In order to cover prevalent OCD concerns, item compilation was based on experts' appraisals. Patients neither displayed greater immediate as well as delayed Stroop interference nor any bias for OCD and subtype-congruent stimuli. On the contrary, for washing-related items, OCD patients, and here especially washers, displayed facilitation relative to healthy controls. Although the present study at first sight refutes the notion of an attentional bias in OCD in contrast to other anxiety disorders, several potential moderators need to be considered before this account is ultimately dismissed. In particular, an attentional bias may only be elicited using visual material that is more attention-grabbing than verbal stimuli. Finally, blockwise instead of random item administration and greater consideration of individual relevance may be crucial prerequisites for the effect to emerge.     

How many hindsight biases are there?

The answer is three: questioning a conceptual default assumption in hindsight bias research, we argue that the hindsight bias is not a unitary phenomenon but consists of three separable and partially independent subphenomena or components, namely, memory distortions, impressions of foreseeability and impressions of necessity. Following a detailed conceptual analysis including a systematic survey of hindsight characterizations in the published literature, we investigated these hindsight components in the context of political elections. We present evidence from three empirical studies that impressions of foreseeability and memory distortions (1) show hindsight effects that typically differ in magnitude and sometimes even in direction, (2) are essentially uncorrelated, and (3) are differentially influenced by extraneous variables. A fourth study found similar dissociations between memory distortions and impressions of necessity. All four studies thus provide support for a separate components view of the hindsight bias. An important consequence of such a view is that apparent contradictions in research findings as well as in theoretical explanations (e.g., cognitive vs. social-motivational) might be alleviated by taking differences between components into account. We also suggest conditions under which the components diverge or converge.