Framing and Risky Choice as Influenced by Comparison of One's Achievements with Others: The Case of Investment in the Stock Exchange

Based on social comparison theory and equity theory, the first aim of this study was to examine the hypothesis that framing is affected not only by previous success or failure, but also by comparisons with relevant others' outcomes as well. The second aim of the study was to examine prospect theory propositions that people are risk aversive for gains and risk seeking for losses. A total of 220 students were administered scenarios that described outcomes of their stock investments (gains or losses). In addition, they were provided with information about their close friends' outcomes investing in similar stocks. Generally, the hypothesis regarding the influence of others' outcomes on framing was confirmed. However, results showed that, in contradiction to prospect theory, gain framing rather than loss framing was related to risk seeking behavior. Specifically, in the gain framing situation, the readiness to take risks was highest when the others' outcomes were equal to those of the participants. The limitations of prospect theory are discussed.     

Prediction of wins and losses in a series of field hockey games: A study of probability assessment quality and cognitive information-processing models of players

The ability of players in a competitive team sport to assess win/loss probabilities, and the role that feedback plays in improving the quality of their assessments are the major foci of this study. The paper describes a study of sequential probability assessments by members of a women's field hockey team participating in a championship series. Several classes of cognitive models of probability revision were postulated and tested. The results of the paper indicate that (1) players generally attain a high level of calibration in their assessments, (2) their assessments are reliable and of high quality, (3) those who systematically and sensitively revise their probabilities attain, on average, significantly higher quality forecasts than those who are more conservative in responding to feedback scores, and (4) most of those who systematically revise their assessments in response to feedback scores appear to employ myopic models utilizing information about only one team—either their own or their opponents.     

When guessing what another person would say is better than giving your own opinion: Using perspective-taking to improve advice-taking

We investigated how perspective-taking might be used to overcome bias and improve advice-based judgments. Decision makers often tend to underweight the opinions of others relative to their own, and thus fail to exploit the wisdom of others. We tested the idea that decision makers taking the perspective of another person engage a less egocentric mode of processing of advisory opinions and thereby improve their accuracy. In Studies 1–2, participants gave their initial opinions and then considered a sample of advisory opinions in two conditions. In one condition (self-perspective), they were asked to give their best advice-based estimates. In the second (other-perspective), they were asked to give advice-based estimates from the perspective of another judge. The dependent variables were the participants' accuracy and indices that traced their judgment policy. In the self-perspective condition participants adhered to their initial opinions, whereas in the other-perspective condition they were far less egocentric, weighted the available opinions more equally and produced more accurate estimates. In Study 3, initial estimates were not elicited, yet the data patterns were consistent with these conclusions. All the studies suggest that switching perspectives allows decision makers to generate advice-based judgments that are superior to those they would otherwise have produced. We discuss the merits of perspective-taking as a procedure for correcting bias, suggesting that it is theoretically justifiable, practicable, and effective.     

Single prolonged stress disrupts retention of extinguished fear in rats

Clinical research has linked post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) with deficits in fear extinction. However, it is not clear whether these deficits result from stress-related changes in the acquisition or retention of extinction or in the regulation of extinction memories by context, for example. In this study, we used the single prolonged stress (SPS) animal model of PTSD and fear conditioning procedures to examine the effects of prior traumatic stress on the acquisition, retention, and context-specificity of extinction. SPS administered one week prior to fear conditioning had no effect on the acquisition of fear conditioning or extinction but disrupted the retention of extinction memories for both contextual and cued fear. This SPS effect required a post-stress incubation period to manifest. The results demonstrate that SPS disrupts extinction retention, leading to enhanced fear renewal; further research is needed to identify the neurobiological processes through which SPS induces these effects.     

Unconditioned freezing is enhanced in an appetitive context: implications for the contextual dependency of unconditioned fear

It has been well established that expression of conditioned fear is context independent, but the context dependency of unconditioned fear expression has rarely been explored. A recent study reported that unconditioned freezing in rats is enhanced in a familiar context, which suggests that unconditioned fear expression can be modulated by contextual processing. In order to further explore this possibility we examined unconditioned freezing in novel, familiar, and appetitive contexts; and attempted to identify brain regions critical for context-related changes in unconditioned freezing by measuring c-Fos mRNA levels in emotional circuits. Unconditioned freezing was enhanced in the appetitive context, and this enhancement was accompanied by increased c-Fos mRNA expression in the medial amygdala and hippocampus, but attenuated expression in the medial prefrontal cortex. In the appetitive context, expectation of a reward coupled with detection of threat may have enhanced unconditioned fear expression, which suggests that unconditioned fear expression can be modulated by contextual factors. Context-related expectancy mismatch may explain the enhancement of unconditioned fear expression seen in this study and warrants further examination.     

Computational psychiatry

Computational ideas pervade many areas of science and have an integrative explanatory role in neuroscience and cognitive science. However, computational depictions of cognitive function have had surprisingly little impact on the way we assess mental illness because diseases of the mind have not been systematically conceptualized in computational terms. Here, we outline goals and nascent efforts in the new field of computational psychiatry, which seeks to characterize mental dysfunction in terms of aberrant computations over multiple scales. We highlight early efforts in this area that employ reinforcement learning and game theoretic frameworks to elucidate decision-making in health and disease. Looking forwards, we emphasize a need for theory development and large-scale computational phenotyping in human subjects.     

Cultural differences in the primacy effect for person perception

Previous work has shown there are robust differences in how North Americans and East Asians form impressions of people. The present research examines whether the tendency to weigh initial information more heavily—the primacy effect—may be another component of these cultural differences. Specifically, we tested whether Americans would be more likely to use first impressions to guide person perception, compared to Japanese participants. In this experiment, participants read a vignette that described a target person's behaviour, then rated the target's personality. Before reading the vignette, some trait information was given to create an expectation about the target's personality. The data revealed that Americans used this initial information to guide their judgments of the target, whereas the Japanese sample based their judgments on all the information more evenly. Thus, Americans showed a stronger primacy effect in their impression formation than Japanese participants, who engaged in more data‐driven processing.     

Model-based and model-free Pavlovian reward learning: Revaluation,revision, and revelation

Evidence supports at least two methods for learning about reward and punishment and making predictions for guiding actions. One method, called model-free, progressively acquires cached estimates of the long-run values of circumstances and actions from retrospective experience. The other method, called model-based, uses representations of the environment, expectations, and prospective calculations to make cognitive predictions of future value. Extensive attention has been paid to both methods in computational analyses of instrumental learning. By contrast, although a full computational analysis has been lacking, Pavlovian learning and prediction has typically been presumed to be solely model-free. Here, we revise that presumption and review compelling evidence from Pavlovian revaluation experiments showing that Pavlovian predictions can involve their own form of model-based evaluation. In model-based Pavlovian evaluation, prevailing states of the body and brain influence value computations, and thereby produce powerful incentive motivations that can sometimes be quite new. We consider the consequences of this revised Pavlovian view for the computational landscape of prediction, response, and choice. We also revisit differences between Pavlovian and instrumental learning in the control of incentive motivation.     

Am I My Genes? Perceived Genetic Etiology,Intrapersonal Processes,and Health

With the increasing popularity and affordability of DNA sequencing through direct‐to‐consumer DNA sequencing services, it has become apparent that researchers need to understand how the results of sequencing one's DNA affects consumers psychologically and behaviorally. In this paper, the authors discuss several intrapersonal processes that may impact how learning about our own genetic predispositions affects us. In particular, this paper sets out to identify the interplay between three relevant perspectives: genetic essentialist biases, perceived identity, and need for certainty. These interrelated perspectives and the empirical research that supports relevant underlying predictions provide a useful basis from which researchers can further identify testable hypotheses on these intrapersonal perceived genetics effects. Such research has potential far‐reaching implications, not the least of which are in the health domain.