Am I My Genes? Perceived Genetic Etiology,Intrapersonal Processes,and Health

With the increasing popularity and affordability of DNA sequencing through direct‐to‐consumer DNA sequencing services, it has become apparent that researchers need to understand how the results of sequencing one's DNA affects consumers psychologically and behaviorally. In this paper, the authors discuss several intrapersonal processes that may impact how learning about our own genetic predispositions affects us. In particular, this paper sets out to identify the interplay between three relevant perspectives: genetic essentialist biases, perceived identity, and need for certainty. These interrelated perspectives and the empirical research that supports relevant underlying predictions provide a useful basis from which researchers can further identify testable hypotheses on these intrapersonal perceived genetics effects. Such research has potential far‐reaching implications, not the least of which are in the health domain.     

Do Immigrants Have Different Procedural Justice Perceptions of Personnel Selection methods? The case of native Israelis and immigrants from the former Soviet Union

Most prior research on perceived procedural justice vis‐à‐vis human resource management selection procedures focuses on comparisons between nations and between types of employees. So far, findings indicate slight, if any, differences between nations. Predicated on a random sample of 950 respondents – native Israelis and Israelis from the former Soviet Union – we find significant differences between the two groups concerning five selection methods, which we ascribe to inherent cultural dissimilarities. We attribute these differences to Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance dimension. These results may elicit increased focus on inherent cultural differences among potential employees with the view of considering these differences in opting for selection methods in order to accommodate for existing cultural differences. This consideration appears particularly pertinent in culturally diverse workforces, given the increased proportion of immigrants.     

When guessing what another person would say is better than giving your own opinion: Using perspective-taking to improve advice-taking

We investigated how perspective-taking might be used to overcome bias and improve advice-based judgments. Decision makers often tend to underweight the opinions of others relative to their own, and thus fail to exploit the wisdom of others. We tested the idea that decision makers taking the perspective of another person engage a less egocentric mode of processing of advisory opinions and thereby improve their accuracy. In Studies 1–2, participants gave their initial opinions and then considered a sample of advisory opinions in two conditions. In one condition (self-perspective), they were asked to give their best advice-based estimates. In the second (other-perspective), they were asked to give advice-based estimates from the perspective of another judge. The dependent variables were the participants' accuracy and indices that traced their judgment policy. In the self-perspective condition participants adhered to their initial opinions, whereas in the other-perspective condition they were far less egocentric, weighted the available opinions more equally and produced more accurate estimates. In Study 3, initial estimates were not elicited, yet the data patterns were consistent with these conclusions. All the studies suggest that switching perspectives allows decision makers to generate advice-based judgments that are superior to those they would otherwise have produced. We discuss the merits of perspective-taking as a procedure for correcting bias, suggesting that it is theoretically justifiable, practicable, and effective.     

Overconfidence in interval estimates: What does expertise buy you?

People’s 90% subjective confidence intervals typically contain the true value about 50% of the time, indicating extreme overconfidence. Previous results have been mixed regarding whether experts are as overconfident as novices. Experiment 1 examined interval estimates from information technology (IT) professionals and UC San Diego (UCSD) students about both the IT industry and UCSD. This within-subjects experiment showed that experts and novices were about equally overconfident. Experts reported intervals that had midpoints closer to the true value—which increased hit rate—and that were narrower (i.e., more informative)—which decreased hit rate. The net effect was no change in hit rate and overconfidence. Experiment 2 showed that both experts and novices mistakenly expected experts to be much less overconfident than novices, but they correctly predicted that experts would provide narrower intervals with midpoints closer to the truth. Decisions about whether to consult experts should be based on which aspects of performance are desired.     

Genetic essentialism: on the deceptive determinism of DNA

This article introduces the notion of genetic essentialist biases: cognitive biases associated with essentialist thinking that are elicited when people encounter arguments that genes are relevant for a behavior, condition, or social group. Learning about genetic attributions for various human conditions leads to a particular set of thoughts regarding those conditions: they are more likely to be perceived as (a) immutable and determined, (b) having a specific etiology, (c) homogeneous and discrete, and (d) natural, which can lead to the naturalistic fallacy. There are rare cases of "strong genetic explanation" when such responses to genetic attributions may be appropriate; however, people tend to overweigh genetic attributions compared with competing attributions even in cases of "weak genetic explanation," which are far more common. The authors reviewed research on people's understanding of race, gender, sexual orientation, criminality, mental illness, and obesity through a genetic essentialism lens, highlighting attitudinal, cognitive, and behavioral changes that stem from consideration of genetic attributions as bases of these categories. Scientific and media portrayals of genetic discoveries are discussed with respect to genetic essentialism, as is the role that genetic essentialism has played (and continues to play) in various public policies, legislation, scientific endeavors, and ideological movements in recent history. Last, moderating factors and interventions to reduce the magnitude of genetic essentialism, which identify promising directions to explore in order to reduce these biases, are discussed.     

Receiving advice on matters of taste: Similarity, majority influence, and taste discrimination

People routinely consider the opinions of others prior to making decisions on matters of taste (e.g., a restaurant or movie). Our theoretical framework highlights the role of two sources, social (majority) influence and similarityamong advisors, in such decisions. We suggest that individuals’ use of these sources depends on their taste discrimination. While highly discriminating judges seek the opinion of a similar advisor rather than the majority opinion, less discriminating judges do so less. In four studies participants made musical choices based on recommendations. The studies document the great appeal of behavioral similarity and the role of demographic similarity. They also provide evidence for the discrimination hypothesis. A formal simulation is developed to account for the relationship between taste discrimination and the predictive accuracy of the majority and of similar advisors. The results shed light on theories of advice utilization and social influence, and are connected with applications involving personalized recommendation systems.     

Prejudice,social stress,and mental health in lesbian,gay, and bisexual populations: conceptual issues and research evidence

In this article the author reviews research evidence on the prevalence of mental disorders in lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals (LGBs) and shows, using meta-analyses, that LGBs have a higher prevalence of mental disorders than heterosexuals. The author offers a conceptual framework for understanding this excess in prevalence of disorder in terms of minority stress--explaining that stigma, prejudice, and discrimination create a hostile and stressful social environment that causes mental health problems. The model describes stress processes, including the experience of prejudice events, expectations of rejection, hiding and concealing, internalized homophobia, and ameliorative coping processes. This conceptual framework is the basis for the review of research evidence, suggestions for future research directions, and exploration of public policy implications.