Stigma towards psychosis: Cross‐cultural differences in prejudice,stereotypes, and discrimination in White British and South Asians

Public stigma towards people with mental health problems has been demonstrated in Western societies. Little is known about non‐Western cultures and whether cultures differ in their perceptions of people with mental health problems. Aim of this study was to examine cultural differences in prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination towards people with psychosis. Participants were from White British and South Asian backgrounds (N = 128, aged 16–20 years) recruited from two schools and colleges in the United Kingdom. They completed a cross‐sectional survey on affective, cognitive, and behavioural dimensions of stigma. Results revealed significant cultural differences on all three stigma dimensions. South Asians attributed higher anger (prejudice) and dangerousness (stereotypes) to people with psychosis than White British. They also reported lower willingness to help, greater avoidance, and higher endorsement of segregation (discrimination). The effects of ethnic group on helping intentions, avoidance, and segregation endorsement were mediated by anger and by dangerousness. Understanding cultural differences in stigma towards psychosis will be important for designing stigma interventions as well as treatments for people with different cultural backgrounds.     

Correction to: Embodied memories: Reviewing the role of the body in memory processes

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - This paper omitted a reference: Dutriaux, L., & Gyselinck, V. (2016). Learning is better with the hands free: The role of posture in the memory of...     

Does interference between self and other perspectives in theory of mind tasks reflect a common underlying process? Evidence from individual differences in theory of mind and inhibitory control

Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to understand that other agents have different beliefs, desires, and knowledge than oneself, has been extensively researched. Theory of mind tasks involve participants dealing with interference between their self-perspective and another agent’s perspective, and this interference has been related to executive function, particularly to inhibitory control. This study assessed whether there are individual differences in self–other interference, and whether these effects are due to individual differences in executive function. A total of 142 participants completed two ToM (the director task and a Level 1 visual perspective-taking task), which both involve self–other interference, and a battery of inhibitory control tasks. The relationships between the tasks were examined using path analysis. Results showed that the self–other interference effects of the two ToM tasks were dissociable, with individual differences in performance on the ToM tasks being unrelated and performance in each predicted by different inhibitory control tasks. We suggest that self–other differences are part of the nature of ToM tasks, but self–other interference is not a unitary construct. Instead, self–other differences result in interference effects in various ways and at different stages of processing, and these effects may not be a major limiting step for adults’ performance on typical ToM tasks. Further work is needed to assess other factors that may limit adults’ ToM performance and hence explain individual differences in social ability.

     

Cerebral blood flow in 5‐ to 8‐month‐olds: Regional tissue maturity is associated with infant affect

Infancy is marked by rapid neural and emotional development. The relation between brain function and emotion in infancy, however, is not well understood. Methods for measuring brain function predominantly rely on the BOLD signal; however, interpretation of the BOLD signal in infancy is challenging because the neuronal‐hemodynamic relation is immature. Regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) provides a context for the infant BOLD signal and can yield insight into the developmental maturity of brain regions that may support affective behaviors. This study aims to elucidate the relations among rCBF, age, and emotion in infancy. One hundred and seven mothers reported their infants' (infant age M ± SD = 6.14 ± 0.51 months) temperament. A subsample of infants completed MRI scans, 38 of whom produced usable perfusion MRI during natural sleep to quantify rCBF. Mother‐infant dyads completed the repeated Still‐Face Paradigm, from which infant affect reactivity and recovery to stress were quantified. We tested associations of infant age at scan, temperament factor scores, and observed affect reactivity and recovery with voxel‐wise rCBF. Infant age was positively associated with CBF in nearly all voxels, with peaks located in sensory cortices and the ventral prefrontal cortex, supporting the formulation that rCBF is an indicator of tissue maturity. Temperamental Negative Affect and recovery of positive affect following a stressor were positively associated with rCBF in several cortical and subcortical limbic regions, including the orbitofrontal cortex and inferior frontal gyrus. This finding yields insight into the nature of affective neurodevelopment during infancy. Specifically, infants with relatively increased prefrontal cortex maturity may evidence a disposition toward greater negative affect and negative reactivity in their daily lives yet show better recovery of positive affect following a social stressor.     

Crying threshold and intensity in major depressive disorder

Clinical lore suggests that depression is associated with frequent and intense crying. To test these postulations empirically, a standardized cry-evoking stimulus was presented to depressed and nondepressed participants, and their likelihood of crying and the magnitude of crying-related changes in their emotion experience, behavior, and autonomic physiology were compared. Unexpectedly, crying was no more likely in depressed than in nondepressed participants. Within the nondepressed group, participants who cried exhibited increases in the report and display of sadness and had greater cardiac and electrodermal activation than did participants who did not cry. There was less evidence of this crying-related emotional activation within the depressed group. The lack of emotional activation among clinically depressed participants who cried provides a tantalizing clue concerning how emotions are dysregulated in this disorder.     

Separating sensitivity from response bias: implications of comparisons of yes-no and forced-choice tests for models and measures of recognition memory

A fundamental challenge to psychological research is the measurement of cognitive processes uncontaminated by response strategies resulting from different testing procedures. Test-free estimates of ability are vital when comparing the performance of different groups or different conditions. The current study applied several sets of measurement models to both forced-choice and yes-no recognition memory tests and concluded that the traditional signal-detection model resulted in distorted estimates of accuracy. Two-factor models were necessary to separate memory sensitivity from response bias. These models indicated that (a) memory accuracy did not differ across the tests and (b) the tests relied on the same underlying memory processes. The results illustrate the pitfalls of using a single-component model to measure accuracy in tasks that reflect 2 or more underlying processes.     

Recognition memory for source and occurrence: The importance of recollection

Previous recognition memory studies indicate that when both recollection and familiarity are expected to contribute to recognition performance (e.g., discriminating studied items from nonstudied items) the dual-process and the unequal-variance signal detection models provide comparable accounts of performance. When familiarity is not expected to be useful (e.g., when items from two equally familiar sources are discriminated between), the dual-process model provides a significantly better account of performance. In the present study, source recognition was tested under conditions in which familiarity could have been used to perform a list-discrimination task; participants were required to discriminate between strong studied items, weak studied items, and new items. The dual-process model provided a better account of performance than did the unequal-variance model. Moreover, the results indicated that the unequal-variance assumption in a single-process signal detection model was not a valid substitution for recollection and that recollection was used to make recognition judgments even when assessments of familiarity were useful.     

Predicting individual false alarm rates and signal detection theory: A role for remembering

The relationships between hit, remember, and false alarm rates were examined across individual subjects in three remember-know experiments in order to determine whether signal detection theory would be consistent with the observed data. The experimental data differed from signal detection predictions in two critical ways. First, remember reports were unrelated, or slightly negatively related, to the commission of false alarms. Second, both response types (remembers and false alarms) were uniquely related to hit rates, which demonstrated that the hit rate cannot be viewed as the result of a single underlying strength process. These results are consistent with the dual-process signal detection model of Yonelinas (1994), in which performance is determined by two independent processes--retrieval of categorical context information (remembering) and discriminations based on continuous item strength. Remember and false alarm rates selectively tap these processes, whereas the hit rate is jointly determined. Monte Carlo simulations in which the dual-process model was used successfully reproduced the pattern in the experimental data, whereas simulations in which a signal detection model, with separate "old" and "remember" criteria, was used, did not. The results demonstrate the utility of examining individual differences in response types when one is evaluating memory models.     

Responsibility attitudes and interpretations are characteristic of obsessive compulsive disorder

The cognitive-behavioural theory of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) proposes that a key factor influencing obsessional behaviour is the way in which the intrusive cognitions are interpreted. The present paper reports an investigation of links between clinical symptoms (of anxiety, depression and obsessionality) and responsibility beliefs. These beliefs include not only measures of general responsibility attitudes (assumptions) but also more specific responsibility appraisals consequent on intrusive cognitions. The characteristics of two new questionnaires specifically designed to measure these beliefs were assessed in patients suffering from Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, in patients suffering from other anxiety disorders and in non-clinical controls. The scales measuring negative beliefs about responsibility were found to have good reliability and internal consistency. Comparisons between criterion groups indicate considerable specificity for both assumptions and appraisals with respect to OCD. There was also good evidence of specificity in the association between responsibility cognitions and obsessional symptoms across groups, and that this association was not a consequence of links with anxiety or depressive symptoms. Although the two measures were correlated, they each made unique contributions to the prediction of obsessional symptoms. Overall, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that responsibility beliefs are important in the experience of obsessional problems.     

Covert face recognition in neurologically intact participants

Prosopagnosic patients may maintain some ability to recognize familiar faces, although they remain unaware of this ability. This phenomenon – called covert face recognition – was investigated in neurologically intact participants, using priming techniques. Participants were quicker to indicate that a target-name was familiar when the preceding prime-face belonged to the same person compared with an unrelated familiar person. This was observed both when prime-faces could be recognized overtly and when they were presented too briefly to be recognized overtly (Exps. 1 and 2). Thus, covert face recognition was observed in neurologically intact participants. In Exp. 3, participants were quicker to recognize a familiar face when that person's face had been seen previously, but only when it had been recognized overtly on the first encounter. These results are interpreted within the framework of an interactive activation model of face recognition. Received: 21 September 1998 / Accepted: 2 March 1999