Correction to: Embodied memories: Reviewing the role of the body in memory processes

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - This paper omitted a reference: Dutriaux, L., & Gyselinck, V. (2016). Learning is better with the hands free: The role of posture in the memory of...     

Does interference between self and other perspectives in theory of mind tasks reflect a common underlying process? Evidence from individual differences in theory of mind and inhibitory control

Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to understand that other agents have different beliefs, desires, and knowledge than oneself, has been extensively researched. Theory of mind tasks involve participants dealing with interference between their self-perspective and another agent’s perspective, and this interference has been related to executive function, particularly to inhibitory control. This study assessed whether there are individual differences in self–other interference, and whether these effects are due to individual differences in executive function. A total of 142 participants completed two ToM (the director task and a Level 1 visual perspective-taking task), which both involve self–other interference, and a battery of inhibitory control tasks. The relationships between the tasks were examined using path analysis. Results showed that the self–other interference effects of the two ToM tasks were dissociable, with individual differences in performance on the ToM tasks being unrelated and performance in each predicted by different inhibitory control tasks. We suggest that self–other differences are part of the nature of ToM tasks, but self–other interference is not a unitary construct. Instead, self–other differences result in interference effects in various ways and at different stages of processing, and these effects may not be a major limiting step for adults’ performance on typical ToM tasks. Further work is needed to assess other factors that may limit adults’ ToM performance and hence explain individual differences in social ability.

     

Separating sensitivity from response bias: implications of comparisons of yes-no and forced-choice tests for models and measures of recognition memory

A fundamental challenge to psychological research is the measurement of cognitive processes uncontaminated by response strategies resulting from different testing procedures. Test-free estimates of ability are vital when comparing the performance of different groups or different conditions. The current study applied several sets of measurement models to both forced-choice and yes-no recognition memory tests and concluded that the traditional signal-detection model resulted in distorted estimates of accuracy. Two-factor models were necessary to separate memory sensitivity from response bias. These models indicated that (a) memory accuracy did not differ across the tests and (b) the tests relied on the same underlying memory processes. The results illustrate the pitfalls of using a single-component model to measure accuracy in tasks that reflect 2 or more underlying processes.     

Recognition memory for source and occurrence: The importance of recollection

Previous recognition memory studies indicate that when both recollection and familiarity are expected to contribute to recognition performance (e.g., discriminating studied items from nonstudied items) the dual-process and the unequal-variance signal detection models provide comparable accounts of performance. When familiarity is not expected to be useful (e.g., when items from two equally familiar sources are discriminated between), the dual-process model provides a significantly better account of performance. In the present study, source recognition was tested under conditions in which familiarity could have been used to perform a list-discrimination task; participants were required to discriminate between strong studied items, weak studied items, and new items. The dual-process model provided a better account of performance than did the unequal-variance model. Moreover, the results indicated that the unequal-variance assumption in a single-process signal detection model was not a valid substitution for recollection and that recollection was used to make recognition judgments even when assessments of familiarity were useful.     

Predicting individual false alarm rates and signal detection theory: A role for remembering

The relationships between hit, remember, and false alarm rates were examined across individual subjects in three remember-know experiments in order to determine whether signal detection theory would be consistent with the observed data. The experimental data differed from signal detection predictions in two critical ways. First, remember reports were unrelated, or slightly negatively related, to the commission of false alarms. Second, both response types (remembers and false alarms) were uniquely related to hit rates, which demonstrated that the hit rate cannot be viewed as the result of a single underlying strength process. These results are consistent with the dual-process signal detection model of Yonelinas (1994), in which performance is determined by two independent processes--retrieval of categorical context information (remembering) and discriminations based on continuous item strength. Remember and false alarm rates selectively tap these processes, whereas the hit rate is jointly determined. Monte Carlo simulations in which the dual-process model was used successfully reproduced the pattern in the experimental data, whereas simulations in which a signal detection model, with separate "old" and "remember" criteria, was used, did not. The results demonstrate the utility of examining individual differences in response types when one is evaluating memory models.     

Colour matching of isoluminant samples and backgrounds: a dimming effect

Sequential asymmetrical colour matching of forty Munsell samples simulated under illuminant C and one of eight test illuminants was carried out. The subjects matched the appearance of each sample under illuminant C with its appearance under the test illuminant. Samples and background (N7) were presented for 1 s under the test illuminant and were isoluminant with each other. Subjects adjusted hue, chroma, and value under illuminant C. The experiments distinguished two groups of subjects; some observers needed to reduce the luminance of the sample to make a match while others did not. This 'dimming' occurred when the matches were close to cardinal axes, especially the tritanopic confusion line. A model of luminance and cone-opponent mechanisms contributing to brightness can account for the dimming effect. Details of analysis in cone-opponent space (L - M, L + M - S, L + M) are presented in the companion paper (Stanikunas et al, 2005 Perception 34 this issue).     

Emotional intensity of idiographic sad memories in depression predicts symptom levels 1 year later

When cued with generic happy and sad words, depressed individuals have been found to articulate contextually impoverished memories of autobiographical events. Although this pattern predicts a worse symptomatic course of disorder in some depressed samples, longitudinal findings with the cue-word paradigm are inconsistent. To address the etiological significance of autobiographical memories outside the cue-word paradigm, the authors used an idiographic interview in which depressed participants generated memories of their happiest and saddest lifetime events. Each memory was coded for detail and emotional intensity. At a 1-year follow-up, participants' levels of depressive symptoms were reassessed. Lower emotional intensity of saddest memories predicted higher levels of depressive symptoms at follow-up. Several implications for understanding sadness and emotional disclosure in depression are discussed.     

Are there interactions among dysfunctional beliefs in obsessive compulsive disorder?

Contemporary cognitive models of obsessive-compulsive disorder emphasize the importance of various types of dysfunctional beliefs, such as beliefs about inflated responsibility, perfectionism and the importance of controlling one's thoughts. These beliefs have been conceptualized as main effects, each influencing obsessive-compulsive symptoms independent of the contributions of other beliefs. It is not known whether beliefs interact with one another in their influence on obsessive-compulsive symptoms. To investigate this issue, data from 248 obsessive-compulsive disorder patients were analyzed. Dependent variables were the factor scores on the 4 Padua Inventory subscales. Predictor variables were the factor scores from the 3 factors (inflated responsibility, perfectionism and controlling one's thoughts) of the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire and their 2- and 3-way interactions. Regression analyses revealed significant main effects; in almost all analyses one or more of inflated responsibility, perfectionism, and controlling one's thoughts factors predicted scores on the Padua factors even after controlling for general distress. There was no evidence that beliefs interact in their effects on obsessive-compulsive symptoms, thereby providing a relatively unusual instance in which a simpler explanation (main effects only) is just as powerful as a more complex model.