Task-set reconfiguration and perceptual processing: behavioral and electrophysiological evidence

Oriet and Jolic?ur (2003) proposed that an endogenous task-set reconfiguration process acts as a hard bottleneck during which even early perceptual processing is impossible. We examined this assumption using a psychophysiological approach. Participants were required to switch between magnitude and parity judgment tasks within a predictable task sequence while event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded. Stimulus contrast and response stimulus interval (RSI) were manipulated. Behavioral data demonstrated typical task switch costs that decreased as RSI increased. However, whereas ERP analysis of visual ERP component latencies sensitively revealed the contrast effect, a switch-specific postponement of perceptual processing during task-set reconfiguration at short RSIs was not observed. The present findings indicate that the process of task-set reconfiguration does not constitute a hard bottleneck that delays perceptual processing.     

Vision and intelligence at age 83 in the Lothian Birth Cohort 1921

The extent to which visual function, measured as near and distant visual acuity and contrast sensitivity, is correlated with concurrently measured cognitive function and prior intellectual ability was investigated in a narrow age range group known as the Lothian Birth Cohort of 1921 (LBC1921). Participants were aged ~ 83 years at the time of testing (N = 321). A well-fitting structural equation model highlighted a significant contribution of a latent visual trait to a general fluid intelligence factor in old age, independent of the contribution from childhood intelligence. Additionally, childhood intelligence made a significant contribution to the general visual factor in old age. However, the model fitted equally well when the fluid intelligence factor is assumed to be a cause of the visual function latent trait, in which case childhood intelligence does not significantly influence vision in old age. We discuss these results with respect to four possible mechanisms by which vision and cognition can come to be correlated over the lifecourse.     

Children Exposed to the Arrest of a Family Member: Associations with Mental Health

The arrest of a parent or other family member can be detrimental to children’s health. To study the impact of exposure to the arrest of a family member on children’s mental health and how said association may change across developmental periods, we examined baseline data for children (birth through 11 years) entering family-based systems of care (SOC). Children exposed to the arrest of a family member had experienced significantly more 5.38 (SD = 2.59) different types of potentially traumatic events (PTE) than children not exposed to arrest 2.84 (SD = 2.56). Multiple regression model results showed that arrest exposure was significantly associated with greater behavioral and emotional challenges after controlling for children’s age, gender, race/ethnicity, household income, caregiver’s education, parenting factors, and other PTE exposure. Further analyses revealed differences in internalizing and externalizing behaviors associated with arrest exposure across developmental levels. This study highlights some of the mental health challenges for children exposed to the arrest of a family member, while adding to our knowledge of how such an event affects children across different developmental periods. More trauma-informed, developmentally appropriate systems need to be in place at all levels to assist children and families experiencing arrest.     

Exploring the Evocation of Verbal Perspective Taking Using a Linguistic Relational Triangulation Questionnaire (RTQ-MST9)

The Psychological Record - The present article exhibits the use of a linguistic multiple-choice questionnaire format for evoking relational triangulation performances while examining whether...     

From Social Burden to Support Elicitation: Development and Validation of a New Measure of Workplace Support Elicitation Experiences

Journal of Business and Psychology - Receiving social support is widely considered a positive workplace phenomenon, but what about the employees from whom the support is being sought? Following...     

Evidence-Based Treatments in Community Mental Health Settings: Use and Congruence With Children’s Primary Diagnosis and Comorbidity

Research on Child and Adolescent Psychopathology - Many evidence-based treatments (EBTs) have been identified for specific child mental health disorders, but there is limited research on the use of...     

Patterns of Responding on a Balloon Analogue Task Reveal Individual Differences in Overall Risk-Taking: Choice Between Guaranteed and Uncertain Cash

ABSTRACT. We explored the utility of analyzing within- and between-balloon response patterns on a balloon analogue task (BAT) in relation to overall risk scores, and to a choice between a small guaranteed cash reward and an uncertain reward of the same expected value. Young adults (n = 61) played a BAT, and then were offered a choice between $5 in cash and betting to win $0 to $15. Between groups, pumping was differentially influenced by explosions and by the number of successive unexploded balloons, with risk takers responding increasingly on successive balloons after an explosion. Within-balloons, risk takers showed a characteristic pattern of constant high rate, while non-risk takers showed a characteristic variable lower rate. Overall, results show that the higher number of pumps and explosions that characterize risk takers at a molar level, result from particular forms of adaptation to the positive and negative outcomes of choices seen at a molecular level.

Color versions of one or more of the figures in the article can be found online at www.tandfonline.com/vgen.     

Task effects reveal cognitive flexibility responding to frequency and predictability: Evidence from eye movements in reading and proofreading

It is well-known that word frequency and predictability affect processing time. These effects change magnitude across tasks, but studies testing this use tasks with different response types (e.g., lexical decision, naming, and fixation time during reading; Schilling, Rayner, & Chumbley, 1998), preventing direct comparison. Recently, Kaakinen and Hyönä (2010) overcame this problem, comparing fixation times in reading for comprehension and proofreading, showing that the frequency effect was larger in proofreading than in reading. This result could be explained by readers exhibiting substantial cognitive flexibility, and qualitatively changing how they process words in the proofreading task in a way that magnifies effects of word frequency. Alternatively, readers may not change word processing so dramatically, and instead may perform more careful identification generally, increasing the magnitude of many word processing effects (e.g., both frequency and predictability). We tested these possibilities with two experiments: subjects read for comprehension and then proofread for spelling errors (letter transpositions) that produce nonwords (e.g., trcak for track as in Kaakinen & Hyönä) or that produce real but unintended words (e.g., trial for trail) to compare how the task changes these effects. Replicating Kaakinen and Hyönä, frequency effects increased during proofreading. However, predictability effects only increased when integration with the sentence context was necessary to detect errors (i.e., when spelling errors produced words that were inappropriate in the sentence; trial for trail). The results suggest that readers adopt sophisticated word processing strategies to accommodate task demands.     

Aristotle's Cognitive Science: Belief,Affect and Rationality

I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle's psychology and notion of rationality, which draws the line between animal and specifically human cognition. Aristotle distinguishes belief (doxa), a form of rational cognition, from imagining (phantasia), which is shared with non‐rational animals. We are, he says, “immediately affected” by beliefs, but respond to imagining “as if we were looking at a picture.” Aristotle's argument has been misunderstood; my interpretation explains and motivates it. Rationality includes a filter that interrupts the pathways between cognition and behavior. This prevents the subject from responding to certain representations. Stress and damage compromise the filter, making the subject respond indiscriminately, as non‐rational animals do. Beliefs are representations that have made it past the filter, which is why they can “affect [us] immediately.” Aristotle's claims express ceteris paribus generalizations, subject to exceptions. No list of provisos could turn them into non‐vacuous universal claims, but this does not rob them of their explanatory power. Aristotle's cognitive science resolves a tension we grapple with today: it accounts for the specialness of human action and thinking within a strictly naturalistic framework. The theory is striking in its insight and explanatory power, instructive in its methodological shortcomings.