Gender symmetry in intimate aggression: an effect of intimacy or target sex?

Men's greater use of direct aggression is not evident in studies of intimate partner aggression. In previous research, the effects of target sex and relationship intimacy have frequently been confounded. This study sought to examine these effects separately. One hundred and seventy-four participants (59 male and 115 female) read vignette scenarios in which they were provoked by a same-sex best friend, an opposite-sex best friend, and a partner. For each target, participants estimated their likely use of direct physical and verbal aggression as well as noninjurious forms of anger expression. Results showed that men lower their aggression in the context of an intimate partnership and that this is an effect of the target's sex. In contrast, women raise their aggression in the context of an intimate partnership and this is an effect of intimacy with the target. The use of noninjurious angry behavior did not vary between targets for either sex of the participant, which suggests that the effects of target are confined to behaviors which carry an intention to harm. Possible effects of social norms and oxytocin-mediated emotional disinhibition on intimate partner aggression are discussed.     

Task-set reconfiguration and perceptual processing: behavioral and electrophysiological evidence

Oriet and Jolic?ur (2003) proposed that an endogenous task-set reconfiguration process acts as a hard bottleneck during which even early perceptual processing is impossible. We examined this assumption using a psychophysiological approach. Participants were required to switch between magnitude and parity judgment tasks within a predictable task sequence while event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded. Stimulus contrast and response stimulus interval (RSI) were manipulated. Behavioral data demonstrated typical task switch costs that decreased as RSI increased. However, whereas ERP analysis of visual ERP component latencies sensitively revealed the contrast effect, a switch-specific postponement of perceptual processing during task-set reconfiguration at short RSIs was not observed. The present findings indicate that the process of task-set reconfiguration does not constitute a hard bottleneck that delays perceptual processing.     

Vision and intelligence at age 83 in the Lothian Birth Cohort 1921

The extent to which visual function, measured as near and distant visual acuity and contrast sensitivity, is correlated with concurrently measured cognitive function and prior intellectual ability was investigated in a narrow age range group known as the Lothian Birth Cohort of 1921 (LBC1921). Participants were aged ~ 83 years at the time of testing (N = 321). A well-fitting structural equation model highlighted a significant contribution of a latent visual trait to a general fluid intelligence factor in old age, independent of the contribution from childhood intelligence. Additionally, childhood intelligence made a significant contribution to the general visual factor in old age. However, the model fitted equally well when the fluid intelligence factor is assumed to be a cause of the visual function latent trait, in which case childhood intelligence does not significantly influence vision in old age. We discuss these results with respect to four possible mechanisms by which vision and cognition can come to be correlated over the lifecourse.     

Specialised use of working memory by Portia africana,a spider-eating salticid

Using expectancy–violation methods, we investigated the role of working memory in the predatory strategy of Portia africana, a salticid spider from Kenya that preys by preference on other spiders. One of this predator’s tactics is to launch opportunistic leaping attacks on to other spiders in their webs. Focussing on this particular tactic, our experiments began with a test spider on a ramp facing a lure (dead prey spider mounted on a cork disc) that could be reached by leaping. After the test spider faced the lure for 30 s, we blocked the test spider’s view of the lure by lowering an opaque shutter before the spider leapt. When the shutter was raised 90 s later, either the same lure came into view again (control) or a different lure came into view (experimental: different prey type in same orientation or same prey type in different orientation). We recorded attack frequency (number of test spiders that leapt at the lure) and attack latency (time elapsing between shutter being raised and spiders initiating a leap). Attack latencies in control trials were not significantly different from attack latencies in experimental trials, regardless of whether it was prey type or prey orientation that changed in the experimental trials. However, compared with test spiders in the no-change control trials, significantly fewer test spiders leapt when prey type changed. There was no significant effect on attack frequency when prey orientation changed. These findings suggest that this predator represents prey type independently of prey orientation.     

Exploring the Evocation of Verbal Perspective Taking Using a Linguistic Relational Triangulation Questionnaire (RTQ-MST9)

The Psychological Record - The present article exhibits the use of a linguistic multiple-choice questionnaire format for evoking relational triangulation performances while examining whether...     

From Social Burden to Support Elicitation: Development and Validation of a New Measure of Workplace Support Elicitation Experiences

Journal of Business and Psychology - Receiving social support is widely considered a positive workplace phenomenon, but what about the employees from whom the support is being sought? Following...     

Task effects reveal cognitive flexibility responding to frequency and predictability: Evidence from eye movements in reading and proofreading

It is well-known that word frequency and predictability affect processing time. These effects change magnitude across tasks, but studies testing this use tasks with different response types (e.g., lexical decision, naming, and fixation time during reading; Schilling, Rayner, & Chumbley, 1998), preventing direct comparison. Recently, Kaakinen and Hyönä (2010) overcame this problem, comparing fixation times in reading for comprehension and proofreading, showing that the frequency effect was larger in proofreading than in reading. This result could be explained by readers exhibiting substantial cognitive flexibility, and qualitatively changing how they process words in the proofreading task in a way that magnifies effects of word frequency. Alternatively, readers may not change word processing so dramatically, and instead may perform more careful identification generally, increasing the magnitude of many word processing effects (e.g., both frequency and predictability). We tested these possibilities with two experiments: subjects read for comprehension and then proofread for spelling errors (letter transpositions) that produce nonwords (e.g., trcak for track as in Kaakinen & Hyönä) or that produce real but unintended words (e.g., trial for trail) to compare how the task changes these effects. Replicating Kaakinen and Hyönä, frequency effects increased during proofreading. However, predictability effects only increased when integration with the sentence context was necessary to detect errors (i.e., when spelling errors produced words that were inappropriate in the sentence; trial for trail). The results suggest that readers adopt sophisticated word processing strategies to accommodate task demands.     

Aristotle's Cognitive Science: Belief,Affect and Rationality

I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle's psychology and notion of rationality, which draws the line between animal and specifically human cognition. Aristotle distinguishes belief (doxa), a form of rational cognition, from imagining (phantasia), which is shared with non‐rational animals. We are, he says, “immediately affected” by beliefs, but respond to imagining “as if we were looking at a picture.” Aristotle's argument has been misunderstood; my interpretation explains and motivates it. Rationality includes a filter that interrupts the pathways between cognition and behavior. This prevents the subject from responding to certain representations. Stress and damage compromise the filter, making the subject respond indiscriminately, as non‐rational animals do. Beliefs are representations that have made it past the filter, which is why they can “affect [us] immediately.” Aristotle's claims express ceteris paribus generalizations, subject to exceptions. No list of provisos could turn them into non‐vacuous universal claims, but this does not rob them of their explanatory power. Aristotle's cognitive science resolves a tension we grapple with today: it accounts for the specialness of human action and thinking within a strictly naturalistic framework. The theory is striking in its insight and explanatory power, instructive in its methodological shortcomings.