Attentional fixation in panic disorder

According to Beck's (1988) clinical observations, patients with panic disorder describe a fixation on their distressing physical and psychological symptoms and an inability to access corrective information during panic attacks. The present study sought to evaluate empirically the notion that attentional fixation is characteristic of these patients. A subset of panic patients participating in 3 cognitive therapy clinical trials completed the Attentional Fixation Questionnaire (AFQ) at intake, during treatment and at termination. The AFQ had adequate internal consistency at all time intervals, and it correlated positively with measures of depression, anxiety and distorted cognitive content. At termination, the AFQ total score and nearly all single items decreased significantly, and patients who continued to meet diagnostic criteria for panic disorder scored higher on most items than patients who no longer met diagnostic criteria for panic disorder. These preliminary data suggest that attentional fixation is an important dimension of cognition relevant to panic disorder.     

Belief in supernatural agents in the face of death

Four studies examined whether awareness of mortality intensifies belief in supernatural agents among North Americans. In Studies 1 and 2, mortality salience led to more religiosity, stronger belief in God, and in divine intervention. In Studies 3 and 4, mortality salience increased supernatural agent beliefs even when supernatural agency was presented in a culturally alien context (divine Buddha in Study 3, Shamanic spirits in Study 4). The latter effects occurred primarily among the religiously affiliated, who were predominantly Christian. Implications for the role of supernatural agent beliefs in assuaging mortality concerns are discussed.     

Is belief reasoning automatic?

Understanding the operating characteristics of theory of mind is essential for understanding how beliefs, desires, and other mental states are inferred, and for understanding the role such inferences could play in other cognitive processes. We present the first investigation of the automaticity of belief reasoning. In an incidental false-belief task, adult subjects responded more slowly to unexpected questions concerning another person's belief about an object's location than to questions concerning the object's real location. Results in other conditions showed that responses to belief questions were not necessarily slower than responses to reality questions, as subjects showed no difference in response times to belief and reality questions when they were instructed to track the person's beliefs about the object's location. The results suggest that adults do not ascribe beliefs to agents automatically.     

Determinants of offline processing of visual information for the control of reaching movements

The authors investigated the use of visual feedback as a form of knowledge of results (KR) for the control of rapid (200-250 ms) reaching movements in 40 participants. They compared endpoint accuracy and intraindividual variability of a full-vision group (FV) with those of no-vision groups provided with KR regarding (a) the endpoint in numerical form, (b) the endpoint in visual form, or (c) the endpoint and the trajectory in visual form (DEL). The FV group was more accurate and less variable than were the no-vision groups, and the analysis of limb trajectory variability indicated that their superior performance resulted primarily from better movement planning rather than from online visual processes. The FV group outperformed the DEL group even though both groups were obtaining the same amount of spatial visual information from every movement. That finding suggests that the effectiveness with which visual feedback is processed offline is not a simple function of the amount of visual information available, but depends on how that information is presented.     

Cross-count identity,distinctness, and the theory of internal and external relations

Baxter (Australas J Philos 79:449–464, 2001) proposes an ingenious solution to the problem of instantiation based on his theory of cross-count identity. His idea is that where a particular instantiates a universal it shares an aspect with that universal. Both the particular and the universal are numerically identical with the shared aspect in different counts. Although Baxter does not say exactly what a count is, it appears that he takes ways of counting as mysterious primitives against which different numerical identities are defined. In contrast, I defend the idea—suggested, though not quite endorsed, by Baxter himself—that counts are independent dimensions of numerical identity. Different ways of counting are explained by the existence of these different sorts of identity (i.e., counts). For the instantiation of a universal by a particular, I propose one dimension concerned with the individuation of particulars (the p-count) and another dimension concerned with the individuation of universals (the u-count). On that basis, I give a clear definition of cross-count identity that explains its asymmetrical nature (i.e., the fact that particulars instantiate universals, but not vice versa). I extend the theory to a third dimension—that of time, or the t-count—and thereby defend Baxter’s ideas on change, and the contingency of instantiation. Baxter (Mind 97(388):575–582, 1988; Australas J Philos 79:449–464, 2001) proposes the related idea of composition as (cross-count) identity. Parts are individually cross-count identical with the wholes that they constitute, and they collectively share all aspects across counts with those wholes. I propose an innovation by which totality is shared distinctness across counts. The theory applies to both the totality of particulars that instantiate any given universal, and the totality of parts that constitute any given whole. I argue that this has several advantages over Armstrong’s view, which is based on a dubious external totalling relation. I also argue that Armstrong’s theory of numbers (or quantities) as internal relations ought to be rejected in favour of an account based on identity and distinctness. The paper concludes with a careful analysis of external relations in Baxter’s framework. I argue that we must recognise one further dimension of identity in order to differentiate between, e.g., the aspects of Abelard insofar as he loves Heloise and Abelard insofar as he loves Isobel. Each of these aspects is identical with Abelard and identical with loving-by, yet they must be in some way distinct. I therefore propose the r-count, in which multiple distinct relational properties are the very same relation (-part). The existence of these four independent dimensions explains the fact that particulars, universals, relations, and times are fundamentally different sorts of things in the ontology. Each is individuated with respect to a different dimension of identity.     

Backward recall and benchmark effects of working memory

Working memory was designed to explain four benchmark memory effects: the word length effect, the irrelevant speech effect, the acoustic confusion effect, and the concurrent articulation effect. However, almost all research thus far has used tests that emphasize forward recall. In four experiments, we examine whether each effect is observable when the items are recalled in reverse order. Subjects did not know which recall direction would be required until the time of test, ensuring that encoding processes would be identical for both recall directions. Contrary to predictions of both the primacy model and the feature model, the benchmark memory effect was either absent or greatly attenuated with backward recall, despite being present with forward recall. Direction of recall had no effect on the more difficult conditions (e.g., long words, similar-sounding items, items presented with irrelevant speech, and items studied with concurrent articulation). Several factors not considered by the primacy and feature models are noted, and a possible explanation within the framework of the SIMPLE model is briefly presented.     

Recollection deficits in dysphoric mood: An effect of schematic models and executive mode?

Depression and dysphoric mood states are often accompanied by quantitative or qualitative shifts in performance across a range of retention tasks. This study focuses on the recollection of both autobiographical events and word lists in dysphoric states. Recollection occurs when people are aware of some contextual detail allied to the encoding experience. This study establishes the presence of a recollection deficit in dysphoria in two distinct paradigms. In both autobiographical recall and in recognition memory, recollection in a dysphoric group was at lower levels than recollection in matched controls. The study examines the hypothesis that the extent of recollection is influenced by two factors: (1) the degree of differentiation of schematic mental models; and (2) the executive mode that predominates when memory tasks are carried out, with the latter assumed to be altered by rumination. The relationship between responses based on recollection and alternative mnemonic responses could be predicted by measures of these two factors. The results are discussed in terms of the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems model (Teasdale & Barnard, 1993) and the perspective it offers on the relationship between meaning systems and executive functions (Barnard, 1999).     

Sources and Types of Confidence Identified by World Class Sport Performers

This study identified the sources and types of confidence salient to 14 (7 male, 7 female) successful World Class athletes. Nine sources of confidence were identified: Preparation, performance accomplishments, coaching, innate factors, social support, experience, competitive advantage, self-awareness, and trust. A testament to the multi-dimensional nature of sport confidence, six types of sport confidence were also identified: skill execution, achievement, physical factors, psychological factors, superiority to opposition, and tactical awareness. Gender was related to both the sources of confidence and the subsequent types of confidence experienced by the athletes. For example, females placed more importance on good personal performances than males who derived confidence from winning. Results were discussed in the context of previous sport confidence literature and implications for sport psychology and coaching practices were drawn.