Institutional creativity and pathologies of potential space: The modern university

Abstract

This paper proposes the applicability of object relations psychoanalytic conceptions of dialogue (Ogden, 1986 Ogden, T. 1986. The matrix of the mind, London: Karnac.  [Google Scholar], 1993 Ogden, T. 1993. “On potential space”. In In one's bones: The clinical genius of Winnicot, Edited by: Goldman, D. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aaronson.  [Google Scholar]) to thinking about relationships and relational structures and their governance in universities. It proposes that:

• the qualities of dialogic relations in creative institutions are the proper index of creative productivity; that is of, as examples, ‘thinking’ (Evans, 2004 Evans, M. 2004. Killing thinking: The death of the universities, London: Continuum.  [Google Scholar]), ‘emotional learning’ (Salzberger-Wittenburg et al., 1983 Salzberger-Wittenburg, I., Henry, G. and Osborne, E. 1983. The emotional experience of learning and teaching, London: Routledge.  [Google Scholar]) or ‘criticality’ (Barnett, 1997 Barnett, R. 1997. Higher education: A critical business, Buckingham: Open University Press.  [Google Scholar]);

• contemporary institutions' explicit preoccupation in assuring, monitoring and managing creative ‘dialogue’ can, in practice, pervert creative processes and thoughtful symbolic productivity, thus inhibiting students' development and the quality of ‘thinking space’ for teaching and research.

In this context the paper examines uncanny and perverse connections between Paulo Freire's (1972 Freire, P. 1972. Pedagogy of the oppressed, London: Penguin.  [Google Scholar]) account of educational empowerment and dialogics (from his Pedagogy of the oppressed) to the consumerist (see, for example, Clarke & Vidler, 2005 Clarke, J. and Vidler, E. 2005. Creating citizen-consumers: New labour and the remaking of public services. Public Policy and Administration, 20: 19–37.  [Google Scholar]) rhetoric of student empowerment, as mediated by some strands of managerialism in contemporary higher education. The paper grounds its critique of current models of dialogue, feedback loops, audit and other mechanisms of accountability (Power, 1997 Power, M. 1997. The Audit Society: Ritual's of verification, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  [Google Scholar]; Strathern, 2000 Strathern M. Audit cultures: Anthropological studies in accountability, ethics and the academy London Routledge 2000 [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), in a close analysis of how creative thinking emerges.

The paper discusses the failure to maintain a dialogic space in humanities and social science areas in particular, exploring psychoanalytic conceptions from Donald Winnicott (1971 Winnicott, D. W. 1971. Playing and Reality, London: Routledge.  [Google Scholar]), Milner (1979 Milner, M. 1979. On not being able to paint, New York: International Universities Press.  [Google Scholar]), Thomas Ogden (1986 Ogden, T. 1986. The matrix of the mind, London: Karnac.  [Google Scholar]) and Csikszentmihalyi (1997 Csikszentmihalyi, M. 1997. Creativity, New York: Harper Perennial.  [Google Scholar]). Coleridge's ideas about imagination as the movement of thought between subjective and objective modes are discussed in terms of both intra- and inter-subjective relational modes of ‘dialogue’, which are seen as subject to pathology in the pathologically structured psychosocial environment. Current patterns of institutional governance, by micromanaging dialogic spaces, curtail the ‘natural’ rhythms and temporalities of imagination by giving an over-emphasis to the moment of outcome, at the expense of holding the necessary vagaries of process in the institutional ‘mind’. On the contrary, as this paper argues, creative thinking lies in sporadic emergences at the conjunction of object/(ive) outcome and through (thought) processes.     

Segregated processing of facial identity and emotion in the human brain: A pet study

Abstract

The brain is organized into segregated areas of relative functional autonomy and specialization. This basic principle of cerebral organization is well documented for cognitive functions that differ drastically from one another, but less so for functions that belong to the same domain, such as face processing. Yet several sources of evidence point to a functional and structural dissociation of various aspects of face processing, as suggested by (1) an analysis of the perceptual and cognitive demands made by the processing of diverse properties conveyed by facial configurations, (2) selective impairment of aspects of face processing in brain-damaged patients, and (3) different localizations of face cells responsive to properties conveyed by faces such as identity and emotion in the monkey's brain. This study used positron emission tomography (PET) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) to delineate better the neurofunctional organization of face processing in the human brain, by measuring cerebral blood flow while subjects performed tasks involving the recognition of faces or the recognition of emotions expressed by faces. The results showed segregated processing of facial identity and facial emotion, with the former being performed predominantly in the ventro-mesial region of the right hemisphere including the limbic system, whereas the latter was carried out predominantly in the latter part of the right hemisphere and the dorsal region of the limbic system. This structural organization allows the parallel processing of different information contained in physiognomies and underlies the high efficiency with which humans process faces.     

The relationship between reward and probability: Evidence that exploration may be intrinsically rewarding

ABSTRACT

The probability of an event occurring and the reward associated with the event can both modulate behaviour. Response times are decreased to stimuli that are either more rewarding or more likely. These two factors can be combined to give an Expected Value (EV) associated with the event (i.e., probability of the event x reward magnitude). In four experiments we investigate the effect of reward and probability on both saccadic and manual responses. When tested separately we find evidence for both a reward and probability effect across response types. When manipulations of reward magnitude and probability of the event were combined, the probability modulations dominated and these data were not well accounted for by the EV. However, a post-hoc model that included an additional intrinsic reward associated with responding provided an excellent account for the data. We argue that reward consists of both an explicit and intrinsic component. In our task, the saccadic and manual responses are linked to the information provided by the targets and the goals of the task, and successful completion of these is in itself rewarding. As a result, targets associated with a higher probability of being presented have a higher intrinsic reward.     

The relationship between productive and counterproductive work behaviour across four European countries

Research suggesting a similar but different relationship between Organizational Citizenship Behaviour (OCB) and Counterproductive Work Behaviour (CWB) is dominated by North American samples. Little evidence exists on whether these findings are replicated in other countries. To assess if a similar pattern emerged, we used the Social Axioms model (Bond et al., 2004) as a cultural framework and surveyed employees in the UK (105), The Netherlands (203), Turkey (185), and Greece (70) on the relationship between OCB and CWB, and the relationship between these behaviours and personality, justice, and commitment. Analysis supported a multidimensional structure to OCB and CWB and indicated a nonbipolar relationship between these behaviours. Culturally, somewhat different to OCB research in general, we find support for a convergence perspective across countries. Conceptually, linguistically and structurally the scale assessing OCB/CWB was shown to be equivalent across countries and a nonbipolar pattern of relationships was consistent across countries. Overall, findings imply a universal nature to the relationship between OCB and CWB across societal cultural groups.     

Self-Knowledge and the ‘Inner Eye’

Mutual perceptual knowledge is a prevalent feature of our everyday lives, yet appears to be exceptionally difficult to characterise in an acceptable way. This paper argues for a renewed understanding of Stephen Schiffer's iterative approach to mutual knowledge, according to which mutual knowledge requires an infinite number of overlapping, embedded mental states. It is argued that the charge of ‘psychological implausibility’ that normally accompanies discussion of this approach can be offset by identifying mutual knowledge, not with the infinite iterations themselves, but with the finite base which Schiffer proves is capable of generating those iterations. An understanding of this finite base as a primitive, relational property holding between two or more people, allows us to understand the iterations as an implicit and ‘harmless’ intrapersonal feature of what is an interpersonal phenomenon. The paper concludes by relating the account to joint attention in infant interaction.     

Measuring saccade curvature: A curve-fitting approach

Saccade curvature is becoming a popular measure for detecting the presence of competing saccadic motor programs. Several different methods of quantifying saccade curvature have been employed. In the present study, we compared these metrics with each other and with novel measures based on curve fitting. Initial deviation metrics were only moderately associated with the more widely used metric of maximum curvature. The latter was strongly related to a recently developed area-based measure and to the novel methods based on second- and third-order polynomial fits. The curve-fitting methods showed that although most saccades curved in only one direction, there was a population of trajectories with both a maximum and a minimum (i.e., double-curved saccades). We argue that a curvature metric based on a quadratic polynomial fit deals effectively with both types of trajectories and, because it is based on all the samples of a saccade, is less susceptible to sampling noise.     

Autonomy,Sanity and Moral Theory

The concept of autonomy plays atleast two roles in moral theory. First, itprovides a source of constraints upon action:because I am autonomous you may not interferewith me, even for my own good. Second, itprovides a foundation for moral theory: humanautonomy has been thought by some to producemoral principles of a more general kind.This paper seeks to understand what autonomyis, and whether the autonomy of which we arecapable is able to serve these roles. We wouldnaturally hope for a concept of autonomy thatis value-neutral rather than value-laden. Thatis to say, we would want the judgement that Iam autonomous to depend wholly on, say,structural features of my psychology, and in noway to require us to make ethical judgements, orother value judgements. Being value-neutral isperhaps desirable in a concept of autonomyserving the first role, and plausiblyindispensible in one playing the second. Ishall argue, however, that value-neutral conceptionsof autonomy are impoverished and out of linewith our intuitions; set out and defendan explicitly value-laden conception ofautonomy; and explore the implications of such a view for theability of autonomy to play the rolesmentioned above.