The outcome specificity of learned predictiveness effects: parallels between human causal learning and animal conditioning

Two experiments examined the outcome specificity of a learned predictiveness effect in human causal learning. Experiment 1 indicated that prior experience of a cue-outcome relation modulates learning about that cue with respect to a different outcome from the same affective class but not with respect to an outcome from a different affective class. Experiment 2 ruled out an interpretation of this effect in terms of context specificity. These results indicate that learned predictiveness effects in human causal learning index an associability that is specific to a particular class of outcomes. Moreover, they mirror demonstrations of the reinforcer specificity of analogous effects in animal conditioning, supporting the suggestion that, under some circumstances, human causal learning and animal conditioning reflect the operation of common associative mechanisms.     

Animal Learning and Cognition: A neural network approach

by Nestor A. Schmajuk, Cambridge University Press, 1997. ￡29.95 (xii+340 pages) ISBN 0 521 45086 1.     

Effects of pre-exposure to the same or different pattern of extra-maze cues on subsequent extra-maze discrimination

In two experiments, rats learned a spatial discrimination between maze arms defined by their relationship to a variety of extra-maze cues. Prior exposure to the actual arms between which animals were required to discriminate tended to retard subsequent learning (by comparison with a control group either given no pre-exposure to the extra-maze cues or exposed only to arms pointing in the opposite direction), whereas prior exposure to arms intermediate between those used in discrimination training tended to facilitate subsequent learning. These results are consistent with the suggestion that pre-exposure will facilitate discrimination learning when it reduces the associability of features or elements common to the stimuli between which animals are required to discriminate, more than it reduces the associability of the features or elements unique to each.     

Winding one's ps and qs: mental rotation and mirror-image discrimination

Subjects were timed as they made judgments about ps and qs (also interpretable as ds and bs) in different angular orientations. Whether these judgments were left-right mirror-image discriminations (b vs. d or p vs. q) or up-down mirror-image discriminations (b vs. p or d vs. q), the subjects' reaction times increased sharply with the angular departure of each letter from its designated normal upright orientation, a fact implying mental rotation. This was so whether the subjects responded with the letter labels themselves (e.g., b vs. d) or with the labels left versus right or top versus bottom. It was again the case when the letters were replaced by nonletter forms, in which event there was also a left visual-field advantage in reaction time. This study is therefore the first to demonstrate a mental-rotation strategy when the canonical forms to be discriminated are up-down mirror images as well as when they are left-right mirror images. In both cases, however, the task requires the ability to tell left from right, and we suggest that this is the critical ingredient that induces mental rotation.     

Interaction between perceived and imagined rotation

In Experiment 1, subjects performed a mental-rotation task in which they were timed as they decided whether rotated letters were normal or backwards. Between presentations of the letters, they watched a rotating textured disk that induced an aftereffect of rotary movement on the letters. The function relating reaction times to orientation was influenced asymmetrically by the aftereffect, suggesting that perceived movement interacts with imagined movement. Experiment 2 showed that the aftereffect produced a negligible influence on perceived orientation, suggesting that the influence of the aftereffect on mental rotation was not caused by changes in the perceived orientations of the letters. Detailed analysis of the mental-rotation functions suggested that the aftereffect may sometimes have induced subjects to rotate letters through the larger rather than the smaller angle back to the upright where the aftereffect was in the appropriate direction.     

Externalizing and personalizing biases in persecutory delusions: the relationship with poor insight and theory-of-mind

The presence of externalizing bias (EB) for negative events together with personalizing bias (PB) (a bias to blame others rather than circumstances) may jointly constitute a vulnerability to develop persecutory delusions (PDs). Whereas EB purportedly serves to defend a vulnerable self-concept by avoiding negative self-attributions and might therefore exacerbate poor insight, PB may reflect cognitive deficits, including theory-of-mind impairment. We investigated these proposals in 34 schizophrenic patients with a history of PDs and 21 healthy controls. Patients with moderate- to severe-PDs and patients without a current PD showed excessive EB which was, surprisingly, absent in patients with mild persecutory delusions (mild-PDs). That EB might wax and wane with fluctuating delusional intensity was interpreted in accord with a new dynamic model of attribution self-representation cycles. As predicted, EB exacerbated poor insight. However, counter to predictions, theory-of-mind impairment did not increase PB, which was marked in all participants, whether clinical or non-clinical; instead, theory-of-mind impairment was also correlated with poor insight. Our findings indicate multiple pathways to poor insight, one of which is a theory-of-mind difficulty, impairing the capacity to simulate other perspectives for the purpose of critically evaluating one's own beliefs and circumstances.     

Blocking and unblocking in human causal learning

Three experiments sought to develop the suggestion that, under some circumstances, common associative learning mechanisms might underlie animal conditioning and human causal learning, by demonstrating, in humans, an effect analogous to the unblocking by reinforcer omission observed in animal conditioning. Experiment 1 found no such effect. Experiment 2, designed to prevent inhibitory influences that might have masked excitatory unblocking in Experiment 1, demonstrated unblocking, indicating common human-animal associative learning mechanisms in which the associability of a stimulus varies as a function of its predictive history. Experiment 3, using a similar design but with a procedure promoting application of rational inference processes, failed to detect the same unblocking effect, indicating that associative and cognitive mechanisms may influence human causal learning.     

Relational Turbulence Theory: Explaining Variation in Subjective Experiences and Communication Within Romantic Relationships

This essay extends the relational turbulence model as a framework for understanding communication in romantic relationships. Following the relational turbulence model, relational turbulence theory identifies relational uncertainty and interdependence as parameters that shape subjective experiences, but the theory clarifies the theoretical processes underlying their distinctive effects. In addition, relational turbulence theory articulates causal processes linking cognitive appraisals and emotions to communication. Relational turbulence theory also describes how episodes characterized by biased appraisals, intense emotions, and volatile communication coalesce into global evaluations of relationships as turbulent. In turn, the theory addresses the effect of relational turbulence on personal, relational, and social outcomes. Finally, the theory explains how communication can contribute to the development of both turbulence and resilience in romantic relationships.     

Tests of the ratio rule in categorization.

Many theories of learning and memory (e.g., connectionist, associative, rational, exemplar based) produce psychological magnitude terms as output (i.e., numbers representing the momentary level of some subjective property). Many theories assume that these numbers may be translated into choice probabilities via the ratio rule, also known as the choice axiom (Luce, 1959) or the constant-ratio rule (Clarke, 1957). We present two categorization experiments employing artificial, visual, prototype-structured stimuli constructed from 12 symbols positioned on a grid. The ratio rule is shown to be incorrect for these experiments, given the assumption that the magnitude terms for each category are univariate functions of the number of category-appropriate symbols contained in the presented stimulus. A connectionist winner-take-all model of categorical decision (Wills & McLaren, 1997) is shown to account for our data given the same assumption. The central feature underlying the success of this model is the assumption that categorical decisions are based on a Thurstonian choice process (Thurstone, 1927, Case V) whose noise distribution is not double exponential in form.