全文获取类型
收费全文 | 77篇 |
免费 | 1篇 |
出版年
2020年 | 1篇 |
2018年 | 1篇 |
2013年 | 4篇 |
2012年 | 2篇 |
2011年 | 3篇 |
2010年 | 4篇 |
2009年 | 4篇 |
2008年 | 4篇 |
2007年 | 4篇 |
2006年 | 2篇 |
2005年 | 3篇 |
2003年 | 1篇 |
2000年 | 1篇 |
1998年 | 1篇 |
1997年 | 2篇 |
1996年 | 3篇 |
1992年 | 1篇 |
1991年 | 1篇 |
1990年 | 1篇 |
1989年 | 1篇 |
1987年 | 1篇 |
1986年 | 2篇 |
1985年 | 4篇 |
1984年 | 2篇 |
1983年 | 1篇 |
1982年 | 3篇 |
1981年 | 3篇 |
1980年 | 1篇 |
1979年 | 1篇 |
1978年 | 1篇 |
1973年 | 1篇 |
1970年 | 1篇 |
1968年 | 1篇 |
1958年 | 2篇 |
1957年 | 1篇 |
1956年 | 2篇 |
1955年 | 2篇 |
1954年 | 1篇 |
1953年 | 2篇 |
1951年 | 1篇 |
1948年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有78条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
61.
Thoughts Without Distinctive Non-Imagistic Phenomenology 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
WILLIAM S. ROBINSON 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2005,70(3):534-562
Silent thinking is often accompanied by subvocal sayings to ourselves, imagery, emotional feelings, and non-sensory experiences such as familiarity, rightness, and confidence that we can go on in certain ways. Phenomenological materials of these kinds, along with our dispositions to give explanations or draw inferences, provide resources that are sufficient to account for our knowledge of what we think, desire, and so on. We do not need to suppose that there is a distinctive, non-imagistic 'what it is like' to think that p , and a different non-imagistic 'what it is like' to think that q. Nor need we suppose that there is a proprietary 'what it is like' to have one propositional attitude type rather than another. 相似文献
62.
IAN PROOPS 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2005,70(3):588-612
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant appears to characterize analytic judgments in four distinct ways: once in terms of "containment," a second time in terms of "identity," a third time in terms of the explicative-ampliative contrast, and a fourth time in terms of the notion of "cognizability in accordance with the principle of contradiction." The paper asks which, if any, of these characterizations—or apparent characterizations—has the best claim to be Kant's fundamental conception of analyticity in the first Critique. It argues that it is the second. The paper argues, further, that Kant's distinction is intended to apply only to judgments of subject-predicate form, and that the fourth alleged characterization is not properly speaking a characterization at all. These theses are defended in the course of a more general investigation of the distinction's meaning and tenability. 相似文献
63.
64.
65.
PETER STRELAN IAN MCKEE DRAGANA CALIC LAUREN COOK LISA SHAW 《Personal Relationships》2013,20(1):124-139
We propose that people forgive to serve particular functions, depending on the extent to which forgiveness is intended to benefit the self, the offender, and their relationship. Three studies on personally experienced transgressions in valued relationships (Ns = 233, 239, and 83) indicate that victims are more likely to forgive for the sake of the self and the relationship than for an offender. Relationship focus is associated with increased benevolence and relationship quality and decreased revenge and avoidance. Offender focus is associated with nonvengeful motivations. Self focus is associated with avoidance and lower relationship closeness; in the immediate aftermath of a transgression, it is also related to unforgiving responses and reduced relationship satisfaction. The findings have important implications for forgiveness theorizing and application. 相似文献
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.