Using potential performance theory to test five hypotheses about meta-attribution

Based on I. Kant's (1991) distinction between perfect and imperfect duties and the attribution literature pertaining to that distinction, the authors proposed and tested 5 hypotheses about meta-attribution. More specifically, violations of perfect duties have been shown to arouse both more negative affect and stronger correspondent inferences than do violations of imperfect duties (e.g., D. Trafimow, I. K. Bromgard, K. A. Finlay, & T. Ketelaar, 2005). But when it comes to making meta-attributions-that is, guessing the attributions others would make-is the affect differential an advantage or a disadvantage? In addition to the null hypothesis of no effect, the authors proposed and tested additional hypotheses about how negative affect might increase or decrease the effectiveness of people's meta-attribution strategies and how even if there is no effect on strategy effectiveness, negative affect could increase or decrease the consistencies with which these strategies could be used.     

Responses to Marriage Counselling

The experiences of clients who received marital counselling from trained volunteer marriage guidance counsellors were investigated. Fifty-one clients from 42 marriages were interviewed and questioned about why they chose the agency, what expectations they held, what happened during counselling, how they felt about the counsellor, and what if anything was achieved through counselling. They were also asked how they had fared since. Rating scales were used after the interview to evaluate satisfaction with counselling, benefit from counselling, aspects of the counselling relationship, etc. The clients were also asked to do a card-sort of statements about counselling to determine what aspects had been valuable and disappointing. Some of the preliminary results of the study are presented and discussed.     

Racial differences in socially desirable responding in selection contexts: magnitude and consequences

Two studies were conducted to examine the magnitude and consequences of racial differences on social desirability (SD) scales. Study 1 included 1,063 job applicants, and Study 2 included 3 sets of incumbents (total N = 534). In both studies, participants were administered several personality measures and an SD scale. Across all samples, Whites scored lower on the SD scale than Blacks (average d = .37), Hispanics (average d = .47), and Asians (average d = 1.04), but these differences were not observed on the personality scales. The consequence of differences in socially desirable responding (SDR) is that fewer minority group members would be selected if SD scales were used to derive cut scores to eliminate individuals from the applicant pool or if the scales were used to correct personality test scores for SDR. However, applying the SD correction did not affect the validity of the personality test for any of the racial groups. Overall, our findings suggest that researchers and practitioners should consider the use of SD scales very carefully, as their use may have unintended consequences. These studies also demonstrate a need to closely examine the construct validity of SD measures across diverse groups.     

What does it take to implicitly prime low-frequency category exemplars?

Prominent views of implicit priming agree that repetition of category exemplars should increase the probability of the exemplar coming to mind on a category production test. This prediction has been borne out in the data of numerous experiments that have used relatively high-frequency exemplars, but experiments that have used lower frequency exemplars have reported reduced or no priming on category production tests. Frameworks of memory disagree on why frequency would affect priming. The authors report 3 experiments, the first of which shows no priming of low-frequency exemplars under circumstances that yield priming of higher frequency instances. The second 2 experiments show that low-frequency instances can be primed, but the prior experience must bias the comprehension of the category label, not the exemplar.     

A Moral Economy of American Medicine in the Managed-Care Era

The moral economy of American medicine has been transformed by contentious innovations in organization, administration, regulation, and finance. In many settings old fee-for-service incentives and disincentives have been replaced by those of ``managed care,' while in other settings they have been diluted or distorted. In the everyday care of patients, old and new may alternate or interact. These innovations may also be having secondary effects on participation in life-sciences research and the development and employment of new technologies, discouraging collective support for preliminary investigation and delaying adoption of improved goods and services until cost-reducing potential has already been realized. This motivational complexity, particularly in its moral dimensions, is hard to address using standard assumptions and methods. I argue for different assumptions, based on the clinical behavior of individual patients rather than the market behavior of aggregated consumers, and I describe a different method, based on an old idea in political economy. I then present a new way to explain the core obligations of clinicians, researchers, and planners and to interpret the policy problems they must now share.     

It cannot be fitting to blame God

This paper argues that it cannot be fitting to blame God. I show that divine immutability, even on a weak conception, implies that God's ethical character cannot change. I then argue that blame aims at a change in the ethical character of the one blamed. This claim is directly intuitive, explains a wide set of intuitions about when blame is unfitting, and is implied by most of the theories blame offered in the philosophical literature. Since blame targeted at God aims to change God's ethical character, an impossibility, such blame is not fitting. I then draw on this conclusion to sketch a new theodicy. I argue that a necessary condition on being blameworthy is that one can be blamed under some possible condition. So, God cannot be blameworthy. Further, I argue that if someone cannot be blameworthy, then they cannot do wrong. Wrong actions tend to make us blameworthy, but since God cannot be blameworthy nothing can tend to make him blameworthy – God cannot do wrong.     

Shyness and sociotropy: additive and interactive relations in predicting interpersonal concerns

Sociotropy (an aspect of interpersonal dependence) and sociability (affiliative need) were examined as moderator variables of the relationship between shyness and interpersonal concerns in two studies. In Study 1, sociotropy, but not sociability, predicted unique variance in three indices of interpersonal concerns through both direct and interactive relations with shyness. An initial analysis in Study 2 showed that sociotropy, but not sociability, was predictive of participants' perceived competence in situations that involved initiation of conversations and assertion. In the second part of Study 2, sociotropy accounted for significant increments in variance when predicting cognitive and affective manifestations of distress related to simulated conversation and assertion situations, while sociability did not. Study 2 results suggest that sociotropy operates primarily in an additive manner with shyness in predicting interpersonal concerns, rather than moderating the relation between shyness and interpersonal concerns. Differences in the results of the two studies and implications for future research are discussed.     

A computer-based test battery for the assessment of static and dynamic spatial reasoning abilities

A battery of 10 computerized tests of spatial ability is described. It includes 5 tests that require reasoning about static spatial displays and 5 tests that require reasoning about dynamically displayed spatial information. An integrated software package for task presentation and data analysis is described, along with a summary of results from a validation study comparing performance on the computer-based tests with performance on standardized paper-and-pencil tests of spatial abilities. Finally, research applications of the current battery are discussed.     

The multiplicity of dreams: cognitive-affective correlates of lucid, archetypal, and nightmare dreaming

This preliminary research is the first to compare lucid, nightmare, and archetypal-mythological dreams on dimensions important in previous research on each. A first study of 100 subjects showed all three forms significantly correlated with each other and with estimates of dream recall. In a second study, 41 subjects were selected from the above on the basis of relative specialization in each dream form, with a control group equally high on dream recall. Here, the lucid and archetypal dreamers tended to separate themselves from nightmare sufferers on the basis of high imaginativeness, proclivity to waking mystical experience, spatial/analytic skills, and physical balance. It appears that the intensification of dreaming is expressed positively or negatively, depending on variations in these cognitive dimensions.     

Language laterality in Navajo reservation children: dichotic test results depend on the language context of the testing

Language lateralization in 40 Navajo and 20 Anglo fifth graders was assessed via the Dichotic Consonant-Vowel Task (DCVT). One group of Navajo children was tested by an experimenter who spoke only Navajo with them. The other Navajo group and the Anglo group were tested by an experimenter who spoke only English to them. Strong right ear advantages (REAs) were obtained for the Anglo group and for the Navajo group tested by the Navajo-speaking experimenter. The Navajo group tested by the English-speaking experimenter showed minimal, nonsignificant REAs. Previous findings of an absence of REAs in Native American children failed to consider the possibility that this might occur only when the experimenter does not speak the dominant language of the children. Our results are not consistent with the view that Native Americans are more right hemisphere dominant as a function of an "appositional" mode of language and thought.