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Gordon Pennycook Robert M. Ross Derek J. Koehler Jonathan A. Fugelsang 《Psychonomic bulletin & review》2017,24(6):1774-1784
The Dunning–Kruger effect refers to the observation that the incompetent are often ill-suited to recognize their incompetence. Here we investigated potential Dunning–Kruger effects in high-level reasoning and, in particular, focused on the relative effectiveness of metacognitive monitoring among particularly biased reasoners. Participants who made the greatest numbers of errors on the cognitive reflection test (CRT) overestimated their performance on this test by a factor of more than 3. Overestimation decreased as CRT performance increased, and those who scored particularly high underestimated their performance. Evidence for this type of systematic miscalibration was also found on a self-report measure of analytic-thinking disposition. Namely, genuinely nonanalytic participants (on the basis of CRT performance) overreported their “need for cognition” (NC), indicating that they were dispositionally analytic when their objective performance indicated otherwise. Furthermore, estimated CRT performance was just as strong a predictor of NC as was actual CRT performance. Our results provide evidence for Dunning–Kruger effects both in estimated performance on the CRT and in self-reported analytic-thinking disposition. These findings indicate that part of the reason why people are biased is that they are either unaware of or indifferent to their own bias. 相似文献
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Yarrow K Roseboom W Arnold DH 《Journal of experimental psychology. Human perception and performance》2011,37(5):1657-1661
Cross-modal temporal recalibration describes a shift in the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS) between 2 events following repeated exposure to asynchronous cross-modal inputs--the adaptors. Previous research suggested that audiovisual recalibration is insensitive to the spatial relationship between the adaptors. Here we show that audiovisual recalibration can be driven by cross-modal spatial grouping. Twelve participants adapted to alternating trains of lights and tones. Spatial position was manipulated, with alternating sequences of a light then a tone, or a tone then a light, presented on either side of fixation (e.g., left tone--left light--right tone--right light, etc.). As the events were evenly spaced in time, in the absence of spatial-based grouping it would be unclear if tones were leading or lagging lights. However, any grouping of spatially colocalized cross-modal events would result in an unambiguous sense of temporal order. We found that adapting to these stimuli caused the PSS between subsequent lights and tones to shift toward the temporal relationship implied by spatial-based grouping. These data therefore show that temporal recalibration is facilitated by spatial grouping. 相似文献
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Past research suggests that cognitive and affective attitudes are more open to change toward cognitive and affective (i.e., matched) persuasive attacks, respectively. The present research investigates how attitude certainty influences this openness. Although an extensive literature suggests that certainty generally reduces an attitude's openness to change, the authors explore the possibility that certainty might increase an attitude's openness to change in the context of affective or cognitive appeals. Based on the recently proposed amplification hypothesis, the authors posit that high (vs. low) attitude certainty will boost the resistance of attitudes to mismatched attacks (e.g., affective attitudes attacked by cognitive messages) but boost the openness of attitudes to matched attacks (e.g., affective attitudes attacked by affective messages). Two experiments provide support for this hypothesis. Implications for increasing the openness of attitudes to both matched and mismatched attacks are discussed. 相似文献
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Probability matching is the tendency to match choice probabilities to outcome probabilities in a binary prediction task. This tendency is a long-standing puzzle in the study of decision making under risk and uncertainty, because always predicting the more probable outcome across a series of trials (maximizing) would yield greater predictive accuracy and payoffs. In three experiments, we tied the predominance of probability matching over maximizing to a generally adaptive cognitive operation that generates expectations regarding the aggregate outcomes of an upcoming sequence of events. Under conditions designed to diminish the generation or perceived applicability of such expectations, we found that the frequency of probability-matching behavior dropped substantially and maximizing became the norm. 相似文献
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Brandon L. Rickabaugh Derek L. McAllister 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2017,82(3):337-348
We argue there is a deep conflict in Paul Moser’s work on divine hiddenness (DH). Moser’s treatment of DH adopts a thesis we call SEEK: DH often results from failing to seek God on His terms. One way in which people err, according to Moser, is by trusting arguments of traditional natural theology to lead to filial knowledge of God. We argue that Moser’s SEEK thesis commits him to the counterfactual ACCESS: had the atheist sought after God in harmony with how God reveals himself, she would have had access to filial knowledge of God. By failing to incorporate arguments or propositional evidence for God’s existence, Moser’s account leaves the doubting seeker without any evidential reason to think that either SEEK or ACCESS is true. Without this rational motivation in place, the doubting seeker is unlikely to seek after God in the way ACCESS describes. We argue that natural theology provides an evidential epistemic aid to motivate persons to seek God the way ACCESS describes. Thus, Moser is mistaken. Such arguments can be evidentially helpful in coming to know God. In conclusion, we explain how our reply naturally fits how we form and maintain trusting interpersonal relationships with others. 相似文献