眼睛注视线索对经济领域风险决策的影响：基于框架效应范式

采用基金投资框架任务,结合眼动技术考察眼睛注视线索与框架类型对风险决策的影响。结果发现：（1）消极眼睛注视线索促进了被试在损失框架下的风险寻求行为,控制组与积极、中性、消极眼睛组的行为结果无显著差异;（2）以均字注视次数为指标的眼动结果表明,积极眼睛组和中性眼睛组对确定损益的关注差异大于对风险损益的关注差异;消极眼睛组和控制组被试对损失的关注大于对收益的关注,对确定项的关注大于对风险项的关注,但两者不存在交互作用。消极眼睛注视线索可能改变了个体对风险性和确定性的感知,并因此影响了人们的风险决策行为,规避消极情绪线索可能有助于减少经济决策中的风险寻求行为。     

Reflective,Critical, and Reconstructing Contemporary Chinese Ethics

Contemporary Chinese ethics faces two theoretical tasks: expansion in breadth and exploration in depth. The former refers to the opening of the problem area, and the latter refers to the deepening of ethics itself. To get out of the dilemma that academic results in the area are abundant in quantity but low in quality, contemporary Chinese ethics should expand and deepen in the three dimensions, namely, “no longer,” “being” and “not yet.” Within the framework of “no longer,” efforts should be made to deepen the studies of the history of moral concept and practice, and the ethics of culture from the perspective of genetics; with regard to the perspective of “being,” the ethical reflection on public crisis, system and Lnstitutional ethics, the dilemma of virtue theory and normative theory, and the conflicts and generalization between different moral paradigms will become the difficulties that require in-depth analysis and demonstration. As for the contemporary Chinese ethics towards “not yet,” attention must be paid to the duality of modern technology, the origin of human ethics based on building a community with a shared future for mankind and the moral philosophy that goes deep into people’s minds. To complete the above theoretical tasks, one must have judgment, thinking, and willingness, which can only be cultivated in the experience and thinking of “practical” life.     

“It is not a something,but not a nothing either!”—McDowell on Wittgenstein

This paper corrects a mistake in John McDowell’s influential reading of Wittgenstein’s attack on the idea of private sensations. McDowell rightly identifies a primary target of Wittgenstein’s attack to be the Myth of the Given. But he also suggests that Wittgenstein, in the ferocity of his battles with this myth, sometimes goes into overkill, which manifests itself in seemingly behavioristic denials about sensations. But this criticism of Wittgenstein is a mistake. The mistake is made over two important but notoriously difficult sections in the so-called Private Language Argument, namely §304 and §293 of the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein, maximally charitably read, commits no overkill in these two sections. This correction strengthens McDowell’s overall reading, but it is only a first step toward fully bringing out the deep but obscurely expressed insights in §304 and §293, the full treatment of which must await another occasion.     

Intentionality and partial belief

Suppose we wish to provide a naturalistic account of intentionality. Like several other philosophers, we focus on the intentionality of belief, hoping that we may later supplement our account to accommodate other intentional states like desires and fears. Now suppose that we also take partial beliefs or credences seriously. In cashing out our favoured theory of intentionality, we may for the sake of simplicity talk as if belief is merely binary or all-or-nothing. But we should be able to supplement or modify our account to accommodate credences. I shall argue, however, that it is difficult to do so with respect to certain causal or teleological theories of intentionality-in particular, those advanced by the likes of Stalnaker (Inquiry, 1984) and Millikan (J Philos 86:281–297, 1989). I shall first show that such theories are tailor-made to account for the intentionality of binary beliefs. Then I shall argue that it is hard to extend or supplement such theories to accommodate credences. Finally, I shall offer some natural ways of modifying the theories that involve an appeal to objective probabilities. But unfortunately, such modifications face problems.     

Different “routes” to a cognitive map: dissociable forms of spatial knowledge derived from route and cartographic map learning

An important, but as yet incompletely resolved, issue is whether spatial knowledge acquired during navigation differs significantly from that acquired by studying a cartographic map. This, in turn, is relevant to understanding the generalizability of the concept of a “cognitive map,” which is often likened to a cartographic map. On the basis of previous theoretical proposals, we hypothesized that route and cartographic map learning would produce differences in the dynamics of acquisition of landmark-referenced (allocentric) knowledge, relative to view-referenced (egocentric) knowledge. We compared this model with competing predictions from two other models linked to route versus map learning. To test these ideas, participants repeatedly performed a judgment of relative direction (JRD) and a scene- and orientation-dependent pointing (SOP) task while undergoing route and cartographic map learning of virtual spatial environments. In Experiment 1, we found that map learning led to significantly faster improvements in JRD pointing accuracy than did route learning. In Experiment 2, in contrast, we found that route learning led to more immediate and greater improvements overall in SOP accuracy, as compared to map learning. Comparing Experiments 1 and 2, we found a significant three-way interaction effect, indicating that improvements in performance differed for the JRD versus the SOP task as a function of route versus map learning. We interpreted these findings as suggesting that the learning modality differentially affects the dynamics of how we utilize primarily landmark-referenced versus view-referenced knowledge, suggesting potential differences in how we utilize spatial representations acquired from routes versus cartographic maps.     

生命意义的缺失与追寻

生命意义(Meaning in life)指人们对自己生命中的目的、目标的认识和追求,主要包括意义存在(Presence of Meaning)和意义追求(Search for Meaning)两个维度。生命意义缺失(Absence of Meaning)指个体缺乏生活的目标、对自身存在价值和意义感的感知。意义缺失的体验一方面会带来焦虑、抑郁等消极影响,另一方面将激发起个体强烈的重构意义的动机,引导人们进行意义追求。未来研究应增加对生命意义的获取和提升、意义缺失的原因、含义与结构、意义追求的动机和效果的研究。     

Are Decisions Made by Group Representatives More Risk Averse? The Effect of Sense of Responsibility

We tested the hypothesis that a sense of responsibility drives group representatives' decisions to be more risk averse compared with decisions made by individuals. The hypothesis was supported when the monetary considerations (i.e., payoff inequality and the magnitude effect) were controlled for in the potential gain domain as well as in the potential loss domain. Evidence showed that this is because the group representatives were concerned about how they would view themselves (e.g., guilt and self‐blame) and also how they would be viewed by others (i.e., to avoid being blamed and looked down upon by others). This study provided new insights into understanding group representatives' decision making under risk. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Problem Clarity as a Moderator between Trait Affect and Self‐Perceived Creativity

Empirical studies on the relationship between affect and creativity often produce conflicting results. This inconsistency has led us to believe that the relationship between affect and creativity may be better understood by looking at potential moderators. Our study looked specifically at trait affect and self‐perceived creativity. Using the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) theory with problem clarity as the potential moderator, we hypothesized that when individuals are faced with problems that lack clarity, trait affect has greater sway over their self‐perceived creativity. Our results provided evidence that problem clarity moderated the relationship between positive trait affect and self‐perceived creativity; the positive relationship between positive trait affect and self‐perceived creativity is stronger when problem clarity is low and weaker when problem clarity is high. No moderating effect was found in the relationship between negative trait affect and self‐perceived creativity.     

Dynamic Creative Interaction Networks and Team Creativity Evolution: A Longitudinal Study

To assess the dynamical effects of creative interaction networks on team creativity evolution, this paper elaborates a theoretical framework that links the key elements of creative interaction networks, including node, edge and network structure, to creativity in teams. The process of team creativity evolution is divided into four phases, including formation, growth, maturity and decline/restart. The importance of domain‐relevant knowledge, creativity‐relevant skill, interaction frequency, interaction length, network density and closeness centrality are emphasized in specific phases of team creativity evolution in a complex creative context. To test our assumptions, a longitudinal study of creative teams in a “Challenge Cup” Creative Business Plan Competition for university students is performed and the full networks of 17 creative entrepreneur teams are mapped. Both static comparison and dynamic analysis are conducted to analyze the relationship between creative interaction networks and team creativity evolution. For specific phases of team creativity evolution, we find confirmation of our predictions. The implications of dynamic creative interaction networks for all the phases of creative teams from formation to decline/restart are discussed.     

家庭支持与朋友支持对不同自理能力老年人抑郁水平的影响

探讨社会支持中的家庭支持和朋友支持对不同自理能力老年人抑郁水平的影响作用。结果发现:(1)社会支持可有效缓解老年人抑郁症状;(2)对个体而言,家庭支持是较稳定的支持来源,受个体年龄和健康水平的影响较小,而朋友支持变动较大,随年龄增长和健康水平的下降,朋友支持逐渐减少;(3)社会支持对不可完全自理老年人抑郁水平的解释率高于对可完全自理老年人抑郁水平的解释率;(4)对于生活可完全自理的老人,朋友支持比家庭支持有更大的预测作用,而对于生活不能完全自理的老人,家庭支持的作用更大。