Memory for emotional faces in major depression following judgement of physical facial characteristics at encoding

The aim of the present study was to establish if patients with major depression (MD) exhibit a memory bias for sad faces, relative to happy and neutral, when the affective element of the faces is not explicitly processed at encoding. To this end, 16 psychiatric out-patients with MD and 18 healthy, never-depressed controls (HC) were presented with a series of emotional faces and were required to identify the gender of the individuals featured in the photographs. Participants were subsequently given a recognition memory test for these faces. At encoding, patients with MD exhibited a non-significant tendency towards slower gender identification (GI) times, relative to HC, for happy faces. However, the GI times of the two groups did not differ for sad or neutral faces. At memory testing, patients with MD did not exhibit the expected memory bias for sad faces. Similarly, HC did not demonstrate enhanced memory for happy faces. Overall, patients with MD were impaired in their memory for the faces relative to the HC. The current findings are consistent with the proposal that mood-congruent memory biases are contingent upon explicit processing of the emotional element of the to-be-remembered material at encoding.     

Contributors

The ‘imagined community’ (famously defined by Benedict Anderson) could not be created out of nothing. It built upon previously existing identities. And though nineteenth-century nationalism is often seen as essentially secular, the most powerful of these identities were frequently religious. Indeed the clergy often played a major role in promoting a national consciousness. While a ‘national church’ readily saw itself as the embodiment of the nation’s past history, present identity and future aspirations, religious minorities usually had a more ambivalent relationship with a nationalism that was always in some degree exclusive. And even in the case of a ‘national church’, the interests of politicians and ecclesiastics were not always the same. Moreover some nineteenth-century nationalisms were defined in ways to which religion was largely irrelevant, or were in explicit opposition to the Catholic Church. Nonetheless, in ways that varied in kind and degree from country to country, nationalism and Christianity came to be intertwined in nineteenth-century Europe. National identities were to an important degree defined by reference to specific Christian traditions, their history, their forms of worship, and their heroic figures. At the same time nationalism often came to be seen as an integral part of Christianity. Readiness to die for the motherland was presented as a Christian duty and, in particular, Christian preachers of this era were strongly influenced by the concept of a God-given national mission, which justified nationalist claims and might sometimes justify war.     

What Animated Cartoons Tell Viewers About Assault

Relying upon a content analysis of one specific type of medium to which young people are exposed beginning at an early age, on a regular basis, and for many years (i.e., animated cartoons), the present study examines what types of messages are provided about violence that takes the form of simple assault. Results indicate that assault is fairly prevalent in cartoons and that this prevalence has diminished over time. Most of the time, cartoons show assaults to “land” on their intended victims, but having done so, to cause few if any adverse effects. Moreover, assaults rarely backfire on the perpetrators. Anger, revenge, and inherent mean-spiritedness are the most common reasons implied for why characters commit acts of violent assault.     

Delusion,Dissociation and Identity

Abstract

Envy and resentment are generally thought to be unpleasant and unethical emotions which ought to be condemned. I argue that both envy and resentment, in some important forms, are moral emotions connected with concern for justice, understood in terms of desert and entitlement. They enable us to recognise injustice, work as a spur to acting against it and connect us to others. Thus, we should accept these emotions as part of the ethical life.     

Immediate Feedback Assessment Technique Promotes Learning and Corrects Inaccurate first Responses

The Psychological Record - Multiple-choice testing procedures that do not provide corrective feedback facilitate neither learning nor retention. In Studies 1 and 2, the performance of participants...     

Personality variable differences between disease clusters

Previous studies of personality and health have focused mainly on the influence of psychological factors on single diseases such as cancer and coronary heart disease (CHD), thereby neglecting the problem of comorbidity (i.e. the combination of different diseases). The main focus of the present study was the discrimination between single‐ and multiple‐disease conditions on the basis of personality traits. An extensive battery of personality scales implicated in health was administered to a sample of n=5133 individuals of both genders between the ages of 40 and 65. Subjects also reported their health or illness status. A factor analysis of the personality scales yielded five dimensions clearly interpretable as “Emotional Lability”, “Type A Behaviour”, “Behavioural Control”, “Locus of Control over Diseases”, and “Psychoticism”. Hierarchical cluster analyses of the subsample of participants who reported suffering from more than one disease led to eight clusters representing individuals with different combinations of diseases. Generally, there were very few significant differences between healthy and single‐disease participants with regard to personality. However, mean factor scores calculated for “Emotional Lability” were higher across the multiple‐disease groups than in the healthy and single‐disease groups. No other personality factor showed this trend. In general the results reported here show the important role negative affectivity (e.g. Emotional Lability, Neuroticism, Depression) plays in differentiating between single and multiple diseases. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Serial attention within working memory

It is proposed that people are limited to attending to just one “object” in working memory (WM) at any one time. Consequently, many cognitive tasks, and much of everyday thought, necessitate switches between WM items. The research to be presented measured the time involved in switching attention between objects in WM and sought to elaborate the processes underlying such switches. Two experiments required subjects to maintain two running counts; the order in which the counts were updated necessitated frequent switches between them. Even after intensive practice, a time cost was incurred when subjects updated the two counts in succession, relative to updating the same count twice. This time cost was interpreted as being due to a distinct switching mechanism that controls an internal focus of attention large enough for just one object (count) at a time. This internal focus of attention is a subset of WM (Cowan, 1988). Alternative visual and conceptual repetition-priming and memory retrieval explanations for the cost involved in switching between items in WM are addressed.