An Unconscious Universal in the Mind is Like an Immaterial Dinner in the Stomach. A Debate on Logical Generalism (1914–1919)

The debate on the a fortiori and the universal that took place between April 1914 and April 1919 in the journal Mind has a double interest for argumentation theorists. First, the discussion is an example of a philosophical polylogue that exhibits the characteristics of a quasi-engaged dialogue (Blair Blair, J. A. (2012 [1998]). “The Limits of the Dialogue Model of Argument”. Argumentation 12, pp. 325–339. Reprinted in J.A. Blair, Groundwork in the Theory of Argumentation, pp. 231–244. Dordrecht: Springer, 2012.), confirming Blair’s hypothesis that journal papers and scholarly monographs can be analyzed as turns in non-engaged or quasi-engaged dialogues. It could be said that philosophical argumentation is dialectical but not dialogical. Second, the debate is a discussion in argumentation theory. Generalism in the theory of argument claims that the very possibility of arguing depends on a suitable supply of general rules that specify what kinds of conclusions can be drawn from what kinds of data, while particularism denies this. Although the terminology may be alien, I will also show that the debate on the a fortiori and the universal was a debate on generalism and particularism.

     

The Return of the Myth of the Mental∗

McDowell's claim that “in mature human beings, embodied coping is permeated with mindedness”,1 1. “What Myth?”, this issue, p. 339. suggests a new version of the mentalist myth which, like the others, is untrue to the phenomenon. The phenomena show that embodied skills, when we are fully absorbed in enacting them, have a kind of non‐mental content that is non‐conceptual, non‐propositional, non‐rational and non‐linguistic.

This is not to deny that we can monitor our activity while performing it. For solving problems, learning a new skill, receiving coaching, and so forth, such monitoring is invaluable. But monitoring what we are doing as we are doing it degrades performance to at best competence. On McDowell's view, there is no way to account for such a degradation in performance since the same sort of content would be involved whether we were fully absorbed in or paying attention to what we were doing.

McDowell claims that it is an advantage of his conceptualism that it avoids any foundationalist attempt to build up the objective world on the basis of an indubitable Given or any other ground‐floor experience. And, indeed, if the world is all that is the case and our minds are unproblematically open to it, all experience is on the same footing. But one must distinguish motor intentionality, and the interrelated solicitations our coping body is intertwined with, from conceptual intentionality and the world of propositional structures it opens onto. The existential phenomenologist can then agree with McDowell in rejecting traditional foundationalisms, while yet affirming and describing the ground‐floor role of motor intentionality in providing the support on which all forms of conceptual intentionality are based.     

Verb frequency and enactment in implicit and explicit memory

In this article we report on two experiments concerning the effects of verb frequency and enactment on explicit- and implicit-memory tests. The results showed that verb frequency and enactment had additive effects on (explicit) recognition. Moreover, an (implicit) verb-identification test showed that prior enactment had absolutely no influence on this test, while verb frequency had a clear-cut effect. These results speak in favor of the assumption that verb-frequency and enactment effects are based on different types of information. It is further assumed that the verb-frequency effect is a lexical effect, whereas the enactment effect is not.     

The person as co-investigator in self-research: Valuation theory

Recent developments in self-research show the self to be increasingly conceived as an organized and highly dynamic phenomenon. In combination with the arguments presented in the preceding article, these developments are a good reason for adopting a method in which the psychologist and the subject work together in the study of the self: The self-confrontation method and the theory on which it is based—valuation theory—are presented as an example of such an approach. This method construes the self as an organized process of valuations, a valuation being any unit of meaning that the person finds of importance in thinking about his or her life. Formulated in the language of the person him- or herself; these valuations and how they develop over time are considered in a dialogue between the psychologist and the subject. For the purposes of demonstration, two phenomena that are not easily observedare discussed here: (a) the existence of an imaginal figure not visibly present but functioning as a signifcant other in the person's daily life, and (b) the presence of a character in a recurring dream, which later gets included as an integral part of the self: Finally, the present approach is briefly discussed as representing a constructivist view of personality psychology.     

Simplified regression patterns for classification

A transformation of a set of partial regression equations to a potentially simple form is shown to be permissible for personnel classification purposes when all individuals are assigned to jobs. Simplification is achieved by maximizing the number of near zero partial regression weights.     

Self-pluralism and dissociation

The study examined the relationships among self-pluralism and dissociative experiences. 100 students were assessed using the Self-pluralism Scale and the Dissociative Experiences Scale. Scores on self-pluralism were positively correlated with others: overall Dissociation (r=.50), Absorption (r=.54), Depersonalization (r=.43) and Amnesia (r = .28).     

A heuristic method for the comparison of related structures

By extending a technique for testing the difference between two dependent correlations developed by Wolfe, a strategy is proposed in a more general matrix context for evaluating a variety of data analysis schemes that are supposed to clarify the structure underlying a set of proximity measures. In the applications considered, a data analysis scheme is assumed to reconstruct in matrix form the given data set (represented as a proximity matrix) based on some specific model or procedure. Thus, an evaluation of the adequacy of reconstruction can be developed by comparing matrices, one containing the original proximities and the second containing the reconstructed values. Possible applications in multidimensional scaling, clustering, and related contexts are emphasized using four broad categories: (a) Given two different reconstructions based on a single data set, does either represent the data significantly better than the other? (b) Given two reconstructions based on a single data set using two different procedures (or possibly, two distinct data sets and a common method), is either reconstruction significantly closer to a particular theoretical structure that is assumed to underlie the data (where the latter is also represented in matrix form)? (c) Given two theoretical structures and one reconstruction based on a single data set, does either represent the reconstruction better than the other? (d) Given a single reconstruction based on one data set, is the information present in the data accounted for satisfactorily by the reconstruction? In all cases, these tasks can be approached by a nonparametric procedure that assesses the similarity in pattern between two appropriately defined matrices. The latter are obtained from the original data, the reconstructions, and/or the theoretical structures. Finally, two numerical examples are given to illustrate the more general discussion.