The cross-activation theory at 10

In 2001, Ramachandran and Hubbard introduced the cross-activation model of grapheme-colour synaesthesia. On the occasion of its 10-year anniversary, we review the evidence from experiments that have been conducted to test the model to assess how it has fared. We examine data from behavioural, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), anatomical studies (diffusion tensor imaging and voxel-based morphometry), and electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetoencephalography (MEG) studies of grapheme-colour synaesthesia. Although much of this evidence has supported the basic cross-activation hypothesis, our growing knowledge of the neural basis of synaesthesia, grapheme, and colour processing has necessitated two specific updates and modifications to the basic model: (1) our original model assumed that binding and parietal cortex functions were normal in synaesthesia; we now recognize that parietal cortex plays a key role in synaesthetic binding, as part of a two-stage model. (2) Based on MEG data we have recently collected demonstrating that synaesthetic responses begin within 140 ms of stimulus presentation, and an updated understanding of the neural mechanisms of reading as hierarchical feature extraction, we present a revised and updated version of the cross-activation model, the cascaded cross-tuning model. We then summarize data demonstrating that the cross-activation model may be extended to account for other forms of synaesthesia and discuss open questions about how learning, development, and cortical plasticity interact with genetic factors to lead to the full range of synaesthetic experiences. Finally, we outline a number of future directions needed to further test the cross-activation theory and to compare it with alternative theories.     

Effects of spatial cuing on the onset repulsion effect

Effects of cuing the onset (initial) location of a moving target on memory for the onset location of that target were examined. If a cue presented prior to target onset indicated the location where that target would appear, the onset repulsion effect (in which the judged initial location of the target was displaced in the direction opposite to target motion) was decreased, and the onset repulsion effect was smaller if the cue was valid than if the cue was invalid. If a cue presented during target motion or after the target vanished indicated the location where that target had appeared, the onset repulsion effect was eliminated. The data (1) suggest that positional uncertainty might contribute to the onset repulsion effect, (2) provide the first evidence of an effect of expectancy regarding target trajectory on the onset repulsion effect, and (3) are partially consistent with previous data involving effects of attention and spatial cuing on the Fröhlich effect and on representational momentum.     

Forms of momentum across space: Representational,operational, and attentional

Cognition can exhibit biases consistent with future expectations, and some of these biases result in momentum-like effects and have been linked with the idea of an internalization of the effects of momentum. These momentum-like effects include representational momentum, operational momentum, and attentional momentum. Similarities and differences between these different momentum-like effects are considered. Hubbard’s (2005) review of representational momentum is updated to include studies published since that review appeared, and the first full reviews of operational momentum and attentional momentum are provided. It is suggested that (1) many variables that influence one of these momentum-like effects have a similar influence on another momentum-like effect, (2) representational momentum, operational momentum, and attentional momentum reflect similar or overlapping mechanisms, and operational momentum and attentional momentum are special cases of representational momentum, and (3) representational momentum, operational momentum, and attentional momentum reflect properties of a more general spatial representation in which change or transformation of a stimulus is mapped onto motion in a spatial coordinate system.     

Representations in working memory yield interference effects found with externally-triggered representations

An act as simple as flicking a switch involves various stages of processing. Each stage is susceptible to interference from competing representations/processes. Interference at different stages of processing (e.g., perceptual stages versus response selection stages) leads to distinct behavioral, neural, and subjective effects. In the flanker task, for instance, one responds to a visual target and disregards flanking ‘distractors.’ Theoretically-predicted interference (increased response times, error rates, and subjective ‘urges to err’) is stronger when distractors and targets are associated with different actions (response interference) than when they look different but are associated with the same action (perceptual interference). Extant versions of the task tax working memory (WM) minimally, but many everyday actions (e.g., searching for keys or holding one's breath) require more WM-based control. To illuminate this uncharted area, we examined the nature of interference in delayed action tasks, which rely on WM. We found that systematic interference arises even when action-related representations are, not triggered solely by external stimuli, but actively held in WM. We discuss these findings with increased emphasis on the under-explored subjective effects of different kinds of interference. The implications of these findings for the study of action production, WM, and conscious processing are entertained.     

Launching, Entraining, and Representational Momentum: Evidence Consistent with an Impetus Heuristic in Perception of Causality

Displacements in the remembered location of stimuli in displays based on Michotte’s (1946/1963) launching effect and entraining effect were examined. A moving object contacted an initially stationary target, and the target began moving. After contacting the target, the mover became stationary (launching trials) or continued moving in the same direction and remained adjacent to the target (entraining trials). In launching trials, forward displacement was smaller for targets than for movers; in entraining trials, forward displacement was smaller for movers than for targets. Also, forward displacement was smaller for targets in launching trials than for targets in entraining trials. Data are consistent with a hypothesis that the launching effect involves an attribution that the mover imparted to the target a dissipating impetus that was responsible for target motion. Introspective experience of a perception of physical causality in the launching effect might result because behavior of movers and targets is consistent with that predicted by an impetus heuristic.     

Naïve impetus and Michotte's "tool effect": evidence from representational momentum

Displacement in the remembered position of targets in displays based on Michotte's (1951/1991) tool effect paradigm was examined. Targets in tool effect displays exhibited less forward displacement than did otherwise identical targets presented in isolation; the decrease in forward displacement was not dependent upon the motion of a visible intermediary, but was dependent upon a visible intermediary contacting both the launcher and the target. The data were consistent with na?ve impetus theory and the hypothesis that decreases in forward displacement of targets in tool effect displays resulted from the intermediary transferring perceived impetus of the launcher to the target and a dissipation of that impetus with subsequent target motion. Possible connections between displacement, impetus, and the perception of causality are discussed.     

Environmental invariants in the representation of motion: Implied dynamics and representational momentum,gravity, friction,and centripetal force

Memory for the final position of a moving target is often shifted or displaced from the true final position of that target. Early studies of this memory shift focused on parallels between the momentum of the target and the momentum of the representation of the target and called this displacementrepresentational momentum, but many factors other than momentum contribute to the memory shift. A consideration of the empirical literature on representational momentum and related types of displacement suggests there are at least four different types of factors influencing the direction and magnitude of such memory shifts: stimulus characteristics (e.g., target direction, target velocity), implied dynamics and environmental invariants (e.g., implied momentum, gravity, friction, centripetal force), memory averaging of target and nontarget context (e.g., biases toward previous target locations or nontarget context), and observers’ expectations (both tacit and conscious) regarding future target motion and target/context interactions. Several theories purporting to account for representational momentum and related types of displacement are also considered.     

Adaptational Style and Dispositional Structure: Coping in the Context of the Five-Factor Model

ABSTRACT We review prior evidence—and present data of our own—linking measures of adaptational style to the traits comprising the five-factor model of personality. Neuroticism has been studied most extensively and is consistently associated with passive and ineffective coping mechanisms. Conscientiousness has emerged as an equally powerful predictor of coping; however, it is related to active, problem-focused response strategies. Extraversion is less broadly related to coping but tends to be correlated with social support seeking, positive reappraisal, and problem-focused coping. Openness is largely unrelated to many traditional coping inventories, but appears to reflect a more flexible, imaginative, and intellectually curious approach to problem solving. Finally, Agreeableness is only modestly related to coping. These results demonstrate the value of using well-articulated taxonomic schemes as a framework for trait-based research.     

Self-other agreement in personality and affectivity: the role of acquaintanceship, trait visibility, and assumed similarity

Self- and other-ratings on the Big Five and a comprehensive inventory of trait affect were obtained from 74 married couples, 136 dating couples, and 279 friendship dyads. With the exception of Surprise, all scales showed significant self-other agreement in all 3 samples, thereby establishing their convergent validity. Consistent with the trait visibility effect, however, the Big Five consistently yielded higher agreement correlations than did the affectivity scales. Conversely, the affective traits consistently showed stronger evidence of assumed similarity (i.e., the tendency for judges to rate others as similar to themselves) than did the Big Five. Cross-sample comparisons indicated that agreement was significantly higher in the married sample than in the other 2 groups; however, analyses of 3 potential moderators in the dating and friendship samples failed to identify the source of this acquaintanceship effect.     

Depressive thoughts limit working memory capacity in dysphoria

Dysphoria is associated with persistence of attention on mood-congruent information. Longer time attending to mood-congruent information for dysphoric individuals (DIs) detracts from goal-relevant information processing and should reduce working memory (WM) capacity. Study 1 showed that DIs and non-DIs have similar WM capacities. Study 2 embedded depressive information into a WM task. Compared to non-DIs, DIs showed significantly reduced WM capacity for goal-relevant information in this task. Study 3 replicated results from Studies 1 and 2, and further showed that DIs had a significantly greater association between processing speed and recall on the depressively modified WM task compared to non-DIs. The presence of inter-task depressive information leads to DI-related decreased WM capacity. Results suggest dysphoria-related WM capacity deficits when depressive thoughts are present. WM capacity deficits in the presence of depressive thoughts are a plausible mechanism to explain day-to-day memory and concentration difficulties associated with depressed mood.