Forgetting having denied: The “amnesic” consequences of denial

The concept of denial has its roots in psychoanalysis. Denial has been assumed to be effective in blocking unwanted memories. In two experiments, we report that denial has unique consequences for remembering. In our two experiments, participants viewed a video of a theft, and half of the participants had to deny seeing certain details in the video, whereas the other half had to tell the truth. One day later, all participants were given either a source-monitoring recognition or a recall task. In these tasks, they were instructed to indicate (1) whether they could remember talking about certain details and (2) whether they could recollect seeing those details in the video. In both experiments, we found that denial made participants forget that they had talked about these details, while leaving memory for the video itself unaffected. This denial-induced forgetting was evident for both the source-monitoring recognition and recall tests. Furthermore, when we asked participants after the experiment whether they could still not remember talking about these details, those who had to deny were most likely to report that they had forgotten talking about the details. In contrast to a widely held belief, we show that denial does not impair memory for the experienced stimuli, but that it has a unique ability to undermine memory for what has been talked about.     

Long-term retention in 3.5-month-olds: familiarization time and individual differences in attentional style

Using a paired-comparison procedure, we examined the effect of familiarization variables on 3.5-month-old infants' (n = 120) retention of dynamic visual stimuli after 1-min, 1-day, and 1-month delays. The proportion of total looking time to the novel stimulus revealed novelty, null, and familiarity preferences after 1-min, 1-day, and 1-month delays, respectively, for infants who were permitted 30 s of familiarization time. Twenty seconds of familiarization time was insufficient to produce novelty preferences. These results support models of infant retention in which the direction of attentional preferences (novel, familiar, or null) depends on memory accessibility. To examine the impact of individual differences in familiarization or attentional style on memory, infants were identified as long or short lookers according to their peak-look duration on pretest and familiarization trial measures. Compared to long lookers, short lookers showed better retention over time indicating that much of the variability in the infant group data could be accounted for by these individual differences.     

The measurement of optimism and pessimism

Procedures employed in the development and validation of a new Optimism & Pessimism Scale are described, and information about test-retest reliability is reported. Internal consistency analyses and other data suggest that optimism and pessimism are not polar opposites and bring up questions about the intrerelatedness of the cognitive and affective realms. The magnitude of the correlation between pessimism and measures of anxiety suggests a link between this measure and the Negative Affectivity construct, and the potential relationships among optimism, pessimism, the Pollyanna Principle, and Positive and Negative Affect are discussed. Conceptually, it appears that optimism and pessimism may aid in psychological defense by helping to bind anxiety. This report was based on theses submitted separately by the second and third authors to the Division of Graduate Studies and Research of the University of Cincinnati, both in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree. For reprints of the article or copies of the Optimism & Pessimism Scale, please direct requests to William N. Dember, Department of Psychology, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio 45221.     

Integration of Intention and Outcome Information by Students and Circuit Court Judges: Design Economy and Individual Differences1

In two experiments the subjects, who included State Circuit Court Judges, assigned a quantitative judgment of blame to hypothetical offenders as a function of level of intention and seriousness of outcome. In accordance with the findings of numerous other investigators using the Intent x Damage paradigm, averaged subjects appeared to follow an adding rule for the integration of intention and outcome damage information. Furthermore, and in keeping with a key methodological purpose of the research, equivalent averaged results were observed whether student subjects made just one judgment of a single Level of Intention x Level of Outcome Damage treatment combination (independent groups design) or multiple judgments of all possible such factorial treatment combinations (repeated measures design). However, statistical analysis of individual students' and individual judges' repeated measures showed that about half of them adopted an adding rule whereas the judgments of others conformed to an intention-only rule. Some implications of the findings are: (a) in critical respects students' results are quite generalizable since there were no striking student versus judge differences; (b) averaged outcomes conceal important interpretable individual differences in information processing that are highly commensurate for students and judges; and (c) there is thus a defensible and pragmatically desirable economy in the adoption of repeated measures designs for the study of individual persons in such less accessible categories as the Judiciary.