Right hemispheric specialization for mental imagery: A review of the evidence

An implicit assumption in the literature on functional hemispheric asymmetry is that the right hemisphere plays a special role in mental imagery. Using a definition of mental imagery as quasi-perceptual experience, we draw distinctions among visual imagery, visual recognition memory, and visuospatial abilities. We then review the research literature to evaluate the hypothesis that mental imagery is a specialized function of the right cerebral hemisphere, and find that it receives little unambiguous support. Case reports of loss of imagery are no more frequent with right than with left unilateral brain damage. Systematic studies of brain-injured patients provide some support for the hypothesis, but are also consistent with the alternative hypothesis of bilateral representation of imagery. Commissurotomized patients report dreaming and being able to form visual images. Behavioral and psychophysiological studies of non-brain-injured patients either fail to provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis or can be interpreted as compatible with the alternate hypothesis of bilateral hemispheric involvement in imagery. We conclude that there is, presently, insufficient empirical basis for considering imagery a right hemispheric function. We then discuss implications of this conclusion for future research.     

Intentional inferences are not more likely than unintentional ones: some evidence against the intentionality bias hypothesis

We conducted a study to test the hypothesis that inferences about intentionality are biased toward an intentional interpretation. Contrary to previous research, participants were no more likely to judge ambiguous actions as intentional in a speeded compared to an unspeeded condition. Further, participants were faster to respond and more consistent in responding to unintentional rather than intentional actions.     

A Developmental Neuroscience of Borderline Pathology: Emotion Dysregulation and Social Baseline Theory

Theoretical and empirical research has linked poor emotion regulation abilities with dysfunctional frontolimbic circuitry. Consistent with this, research on borderline personality disorder (BPD) finds that frontolimbic dysfunction is a predominant neural substrate underlying the disorder. Emotion regulation is profoundly compromised in BPD. However, BPD is also associated with broad impairment across multiple domains, including impulse control, interpersonal relationships, and cognitive functioning. To date, BPD research has focused largely on single areas of dysfunction, failing to account for overlap at either the biological or behavioral levels of analysis. We examine the literature on frontolimbic dysfunction in BPD within the context of Coan’s social baseline theory. Social baseline theory proposes that healthy human functioning is dependent upon adequate social support and that, at baseline, biological systems are adapted to operate interdependently rather than independently. The social baseline perspective is particularly useful for understanding borderline personality development because the impulsive and emotionally dysregulated behaviors common among those with BPD occur almost invariably within an interpersonal context. We discuss clinical and research implications of this work.     

Facets of Emotional Clarity and Suspiciousness

In a college student sample, we explored the relations between individual differences in facets of emotional clarity and suspiciousness. Previous theory and research has treated emotional clarity as a one-dimensional construct. Boden and Berenbaum (2011) proposed that a second facet of emotional clarity, source awareness (a general understanding of the cause of their emotions), could be distinguished from type awareness (a general understanding of the type of emotions [anger, fear] experienced). We found that source and type awareness were incrementally, inversely associated with suspiciousness when statistically accounting for the extent to which emotions are attended to, and gender. Additionally, source awareness significantly predicted suspiciousness after accounting for anger, anxious arousal, and social anxiety, whereas type awareness did not. Findings are consistent with the hypothesis that, among individuals with low source and type awareness, suspicious beliefs are formed to make sense of and explain emotional arousal.     

Relationships Between Parent and Child Emotion Regulation Strategy Use: A Brief Report

We examined the direct relationships between parent and child emotion regulation (ER) strategy use during the transitionary and understudied developmental periods of middle childhood through to adolescence. Three hundred and seventy-nine participants aged between 9 and 19 years, completed the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire for Children and Adolescents. In addition, 358 of their mothers and 207 of their fathers completed the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire. Providing partial support for the hypothesis, maternal use of the ER Expressive Suppression strategy was significantly predictive of their child’s use of Suppression. However, paternal ER strategy use was unrelated to their child’s ER strategy use. Child age did not moderate the relationships investigated. These findings suggest that children’s ER during middle childhood and adolescence is more closely related to the ER of their mother than their father. It is proposed that this may be accounted for by emotion socialization processes.