Lie,truth, lie: the role of task switching in a deception context

A cornerstone of the task switching literature is the finding that task performance is typically slower and more error-prone when the task switches than when it repeats. So far, deception research has largely ignored that such cognitive switch costs should also emerge when switching between truth telling and lying, and may affect the cognitive cost of lying as reflected in higher prefrontal brain activity and slower and less accurate responding compared to truth telling. To get a grasp on the relative size of the switch costs associated with lying and truth telling, the current study had participants perform a reaction time-based deception task, in which they alternated between lying and telling the truth to yes/no questions that were related to activities performed in the lab (Experiment 1) or neutral autobiographical facts (Experiment 2). In both experiments, the error and reaction time switch costs were found to be equally large for switching from truth telling to lying and from lying to truth telling. This symmetry in switch costs can be explained from the hypothesis that lying requires a first step of truth telling, and demonstrates that task switching does not contribute to the cognitive cost of lying when the repetition/switch ratio is balanced. Theoretical and methodological implications are considered.     

Context effects in evaluative conditioning of implicit evaluations

Propositional models of evaluative conditioning postulate that the impact of stimulus pairings on liking should depend not on the pairings themselves but on what the pairings imply about the relation between stimuli. Hence, context manipulations that change the implications of stimulus pairings should moderate evaluative conditioning. We manipulated context by varying the way in which context cues were paired with affective outcomes while keeping the pairings between target cues and affective outcomes constant. All participants saw one target cue compound that was followed by a positive outcome (XF+) and another target cue compound that was followed by a negative outcome (YG?). In condition Same, each context cue was consistently paired with a positive or negative outcome, regardless of whether it was presented alone or in compound with another cue (A+, B+, AB+; C?, D?, CD?). In condition Opposite, however, a context cue was paired with a certain outcome when presented alone and with an outcome of the opposite valence when presented in a compound with another cue (A+, B+, AB?; C?, D?, CD+). Employing several implicit measures, we assessed the implicit evaluations of the target cues X and Y. In all three studies, the outcome of the measurement procedure differed between conditions. In condition Same, the positively paired cue X was evaluated more positively than the negatively paired cue Y. In condition Opposite, however, this preference was not present. This pattern of results suggests that EC is determined not only by the objective pairings but also by the context in which these pairings occur. Implications for models of evaluative conditioning are discussed.     

The Semantic Simon Effect

Three experiments are reported in which a semantic variant of the Simon paradigm was used. In Experiment 1, participants saw Dutch and English words that corresponded to names of animals (e.g. DOG) or occupations (e.g. TEACHER). Participants were instructed to respond by saying ANIMAL or OCCUPATION, depending on whether the presented word was a Dutch or English word (i.e. relevant stimulus feature) but irrespective of whether the word was the name of an animal or an occupation (i.e. irrelevant stimulus feature). Results showed that responses were facilitated when the correct response corresponded to the name of the semantic category of the presented word (e.g. saying 'ANIMAL' to DOG) compared to when it was the name of a different semantic category (e.g. saying 'OCCUPATION' to DOG), even though the semantic category of the presented word was irrelevant and had to be ignored. Category membership also influenced response times when letter case (upper- or lower-case: Experiment 2) and grammatical category (noun or adjective: Experiment 3) had to be determined in order to select a category label as a response. The semantic Simon effect offers a new tool that can be used to study automatic semantic processing.     

Automatic motor activation by mere instruction

Previous behavioral studies have shown that instructions about stimulus–response (S-R) mappings can influence task performance even when these instructions are irrelevant for the current task. In the present study, we tested whether automatic effects of S–R instructions occur because the instructed stimuli automatically activate their corresponding responses. We registered the lateralized readiness potentials (LRPs) that were evoked by the instructed stimuli while participants were performing a task for which those mappings were irrelevant. Instructed S–R mappings clearly affected task performance in electrophysiological and behavioral measures. The LRP was found to deflect in the direction of the response tendency that corresponded with the instructed S–R mapping. Early activation of the instructed response was observed but occurred predominantly on slow trials. In contrast, response conflict evoked by instructed S–R mappings did not modulate the N2 amplitude. The results strongly suggest that, like experienced S–R mappings, instructed S–R mappings can lead to automatic response activation, but possibly via a different route.     

Unintentional processing of motivational valence

Recent motivational affective priming studies (Moors & De Houwer, 2001; Moors, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2004) showed that primes that indicate success on a goal-inducing task facilitate positive target responses whereas primes that indicate failure on that task facilitate negative target responses. In the current studies, we examined whether these priming effects depend on consciously intentional processing of the motivational valence of the primes. In Experiment 1, the outcome of success or failure was presented not only immediately before the target (i.e., the prime) but also a second time after the target response. This should encourage participants to ignore the prime. In Experiment 2, participants were asked to respond to the targets within 600 ms after target onset. As a result, participants had little opportunity to process the motivational prime valence in a consciously intentional way. Nevertheless, strong affective priming effects were found in both studies. These results provide additional support for the claim that motivational valence can be processed without the conscious intention to do so.     

A review of recent developments in research and theories on human contingency learning

Over the past 20 years, human contingency learning has resurfaced as an important topic within experimental psychology. This renewed interest was sparked mainly by the proposal that associative models of Pavlovian conditioning might also apply to human contingency learning--a proposal that has led to many new empirical findings and theoretical developments. We provide a brief review of these recent developments and try to point to issues that need to be addressed in future research.     

Cheating the Lie Detector: Faking in the Autobiographical Implicit Association Test

ABSTRACT— The autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT) was recently introduced in this journal as a new and promising lie-detection tool. The initial report found 91% accuracy in determining which of two autobiographical events was true. It was suggested that the aIAT, unlike other lie-detection tests, is resistant to faking. We investigated whether participants can strategically alter their performance on the aIAT. Experiment 1 showed that participants guilty of a mock theft were able to obtain an innocent test outcome. Two additional experiments showed that guilty participants can fake the aIAT without prior experience with the aIAT and when a response deadline is imposed. The aIAT is subject to the same shortcomings as other lie-detection tests.     

Generalization versus contextualization in automatic evaluation

Research has shown that automatic evaluations can be highly robust and difficult to change, highly malleable and easy to change, and highly context dependent. We tested a representational account of these disparate findings, which specifies the conditions under which automatic evaluations reflect (a) initially acquired information, (b) subsequently acquired, counterattitudinal information, or (c) a mixture of both. The account postulates that attention to contextual cues during the encoding of evaluative information determines whether this information is stored in a context-free representation or a contextualized representation. To the extent that attention to context cues is low during the encoding of initial information but is enhanced by exposure to expectancy-violating counterattitudinal information, initial experiences are stored in context-free representations, whereas counterattitudinal experiences are stored in contextualized representations. Hence, automatic evaluations tend to reflect the valence of counterattitudinal information only in the context in which this information was learned (occasion setting) and the valence of initial experiences in any other context (renewal effect). Four experiments confirmed these predictions, additionally showing that (a) the impact of initial experiences was reduced for automatic evaluations in novel contexts when context salience during the encoding of initial information was enhanced, (b) context effects were eliminated altogether when context salience during the encoding of counterattitudinal information was reduced, and (c) enhanced context salience during the encoding of counterattitudinal information produced context-dependent automatic evaluations even when there was no contingency between valence and contextual cues. Implications for automatic evaluation, learning theory, and interventions in applied settings are discussed.