Selective attention to threat in the dot probe paradigm: differentiating vigilance and difficulty to disengage

The dot probe task [J Abnorm Psychol 95 (1986) 15] is an often-used paradigm to investigate selective attention to threat. A facilitated response to probes that appear at the same location of threat information in comparison with responses to probes at the opposite location of threat information is interpreted as vigilance for threat. We argue that the findings in the dot probe paradigm are ambiguous evidence for the vigilance to threat hypothesis. Results can also be interpreted as a difficulty to disengage from threat. In this study, 44 undergraduates performed a pictorial version of the probe detection task. Taking into account the reaction times on neutral trials, we found no evidence for a facilitated detection of threatening information. It was found that the dot probe effects are at least partially due to disengagement effects. The implications of these results for the understanding of attentional bias in normal and anxious individuals are discussed.     

Automatic integration of non-perceptual action effect features: the case of the associative affective Simon effect

In the first phase of Experiment 1, participants were instructed to move a response key up or down in response to a go signal. One of both responses was consistently followed by an aversive stimulus, whereas the other response was never followed by the aversive stimulus. In a subsequent test phase, the same responses had to be emitted according to the grammatical category (noun or adjective) of positive and negative target words. Results showed that the level of affective correspondence between the task-irrelevant positive or negative connotation of the target and the motivational significance of the effect of the correct response influenced performance. The results of Experiment 2 replicated those of Experiment 1, using alternating target-response assignment. These findings point to the integration of affective action effect feature codes in the cognitive representation of actions.     

Attention to primes modulates affective priming of pronunciation responses

In studies on affective priming of pronunciation responses, two words are presented on each trial and participants are asked to read the second word out loud. Whereas some studies revealed shorter reaction times when the two words had the same valence than when they had a different valence, other studies either found no effect of affective congruence or revealed a reversed effect. In the present experiments, a significant effect of affective congruence only emerged when filler trials were presented in which the prime and target were identical and participants were instructed to attend to the primes (Experiment 2). No effects were found when participants were merely instructed to attend to or ignore the primes (Experiment 1), or when affectively incongruent filler trials were presented and participants were instructed to ignore the primes (Experiment 2).     

Do smokers have a negative implicit attitude toward smoking?

Swanson, Rudman, and Greenwald (2001 Swanson, J. E., Rudman, L. A. and Greenwald, A. G. 2001. Using the Implicit Association Test to investigate attitude-behavior consistency for stigmatised behaviour. Cognition and Emotion, 15: 207–230. [Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) used an Implicit Association Test (IAT) to measure attitudes toward smoking and found that smokers have negative implicit attitudes toward smoking. In a first experiment, we replicated the results of Swanson et al. but showed that scores on an attitude IAT do discriminate between smokers and nonsmokers to the same extent than scores on an IAT that is designed to measure associations between smoking and approach or avoidance. In a second experiment, we did find positive implicit attitudes toward smoking in smokers when we used a personalised version of the IAT that was designed to be less susceptible to effects of societal views. Our results indicate that implicit attitudes should not be dismissed as a causal factor in the maintenance of smoking behaviour.     

A time course analysis of the affective priming effect

The argument that automatic processes are responsible for affective/evaluative priming effects has been primarily based on studies that have manipulated the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA; i.e., the interval between the onset of the prime and the onset of the target). Moreover, these SOA studies provide an insight in the time course of the activation processes underlying automatic affect/attitude activation. Based on a fine-grained manipulation of the SOA employing either the evaluative decision task (Experiment 1) and the pronunciation task (Experiment 2) we concluded that affective priming, and hence automatic affect activation, is based on fast-acting automatic processes. The results of Experiment 3 provide a valid explanation for an apparent discrepancy between the results of Experiments 1 and 2 and previous findings. Finally, the results of Experiment 3 support the prediction of Jarvis and Petty (1996) that affective priming effects should be stronger for participants who are more chronically engaged in conscious evaluations.     

Affective states leak into movement execution: Automatic avoidance of threatening stimuli in fear of spider is visible in reach trajectories

Several studies have shown that the attentional blink (AB; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992) is diminished for highly arousing T2 stimuli (e.g., Anderson, 2005). Whereas this effect is most often interpreted as evidence for a more efficient processing of arousing information, it could be due also to a bias to report more arousing stimuli than neutral stimuli. We introduce a paradigm that allows one to control for such a response bias. Using this paradigm, we obtained evidence that the diminished AB for taboo words cannot be explained by a response bias. This supports the idea that the emotional modulation of the AB is caused by attentional processes.     

Norms of valence, arousal, dominance, and age of acquisition for 4,300 Dutch words

This article presents norms of valence/pleasantness, activity/arousal, power/dominance, and age of acquisition for 4,300 Dutch words, mainly nouns, adjectives, adverbs, and verbs. The norms are based on ratings with a 7-point Likert scale by independent groups of students from two Belgian (Ghent and Leuven) and two Dutch (Rotterdam and Leiden-Amsterdam) samples. For each variable, we obtained high split-half reliabilities within each sample and high correlations between samples. In addition, the valence ratings of a previous, more limited study (Hermans & De Houwer, Psychologica Belgica, 34:115-139, 1994) correlated highly with those of the present study. Therefore, the new norms are a valuable source of information for affective research in the Dutch language.     

Recommendations for Increasing Replicability in Psychology

Replicability of findings is at the heart of any empirical science. The aim of this article is to move the current replicability debate in psychology towards concrete recommendations for improvement. We focus on research practices but also offer guidelines for reviewers, editors, journal management, teachers, granting institutions, and university promotion committees, highlighting some of the emerging and existing practical solutions that can facilitate implementation of these recommendations. The challenges for improving replicability in psychological science are systemic. Improvement can occur only if changes are made at many levels of practice, evaluation, and reward. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Lie,truth, lie: the role of task switching in a deception context

A cornerstone of the task switching literature is the finding that task performance is typically slower and more error-prone when the task switches than when it repeats. So far, deception research has largely ignored that such cognitive switch costs should also emerge when switching between truth telling and lying, and may affect the cognitive cost of lying as reflected in higher prefrontal brain activity and slower and less accurate responding compared to truth telling. To get a grasp on the relative size of the switch costs associated with lying and truth telling, the current study had participants perform a reaction time-based deception task, in which they alternated between lying and telling the truth to yes/no questions that were related to activities performed in the lab (Experiment 1) or neutral autobiographical facts (Experiment 2). In both experiments, the error and reaction time switch costs were found to be equally large for switching from truth telling to lying and from lying to truth telling. This symmetry in switch costs can be explained from the hypothesis that lying requires a first step of truth telling, and demonstrates that task switching does not contribute to the cognitive cost of lying when the repetition/switch ratio is balanced. Theoretical and methodological implications are considered.