A functional approach for research on cognitive control: Analysing cognitive control tasks and their effects in terms of operant conditioning

Cognitive control is an important mental ability that is examined using a multitude of cognitive control tasks and effects. The present paper presents the first steps in the elaboration of a functional approach, which aims to uncover the communalities and differences between different cognitive control tasks and their effects. Based on the idea that responses in cognitive control tasks qualify as operant behaviour, we propose to reinterpret cognitive control tasks in terms of operant contingencies and cognitive control effects as instances of moderated stimulus control. We illustrate how our approach can be used to uncover communalities between topographically different cognitive control tasks and can lead to novel questions about the processes underlying cognitive control.     

Fear expression and return of fear following threat instruction with or without direct contingency experience

Prior research showed that mere instructions about the contingency between a conditioned stimulus (CS) and an unconditioned stimulus (US) can generate fear reactions to the CS. Little is known, however, about the extent to which actual CS–US contingency experience adds anything beyond the effect of contingency instructions. Our results extend previous studies on this topic in that it included fear potentiated startle as an additional dependent variable and examined return of fear (ROF) following reinstatement. We observed that CS–US pairings can enhance fear reactions beyond the effect of contingency instructions. Moreover, for all measures of fear, instructions elicited immediate fear reactions that could not be completely overridden by subsequent situational safety information. Finally, ROF following reinstatement for instructed CS+s was unaffected by actual experience. In summary, our results demonstrate the power of contingency instructions and reveal the additional impact of actual experience of CS–US pairings.     

Automatic effects of instructions do not require the intention to execute these instructions

Prior research established that newly instructed stimulus-response mappings, which have never been executed overtly before, can lead to automatic response-congruency effects. Such instruction-based congruency effects have been taken as evidence for the hypothesis that the intention to execute stimulus-response mappings results into functional associations that serve future execution. The present study challenges this hypothesis by demonstrating in a series of four experiments that maintaining instructed stimulus-response mappings for future recognition, rather than for future execution, can also lead to an instruction-based congruency effect. These findings indicate that the instruction-based congruency effect emerges even when it is very unlikely that participants form the intention to execute instructions. Alternative interpretations of the instruction-based congruency effect are discussed.     

The contextual malleability of approach-avoidance training effects: approaching or avoiding fear conditioned stimuli modulates effects of approach-avoidance training

Previous research showed that the repeated approaching of one stimulus and avoiding of another stimulus typically leads to more positive evaluations of the former stimuli. In the current study, we examined whether approach and avoidance training (AAT) effects on evaluations of neutral stimuli can be modulated by introducing a regularity between the approach-avoidance actions and a positive or negative (feared) stimulus. In an AAT task, participants repeatedly approached one neutral non-word and avoided another neutral non-word. Half of the participants also approached a negative fear-conditioned stimulus (CS+) and avoided a conditioned safe stimulus (CS?). The other half of the participants avoided the CS+ and approached the CS?. Whereas participants in the avoid CS+ condition exhibited a typical AAT effect, participants in the approach CS+ condition exhibited a reversed AAT effect (i.e. they evaluated the approached neutral non-word as more negative than the avoided non-word). These findings provide evidence for the malleability of the AAT effect when strongly valenced stimuli are approached or avoided. We discuss the practical and theoretical implications of our findings.     

On the role of beliefs in observational flavor conditioning

In previous research (Baeyens, Vansteenwegen et al., 1996) we demonstrated that when observers consume a series of CS+ and CS−flavored drinks while simultaneously watching a videotaped model who synchronically drinks identical drinks and facially expresses his evaluation (dislike to CS+, neutral to CS−) of the liquids, the observers acquire a dislike for CS+ flavored relative to CS−flavored drinks. The aim of the present experiments was to test some predictions derived from a “direct conditioning” theory of such observational flavor learning. Using the same observational flavor conditioning procedure, we investigated (Exp. 1) the effect of manipulating the observers’ belief concerning the relationship between the drinks that they and the model were consuming (same/different/no information). Observational flavor conditioning was obtained when observers were led to believe that they were drinking the same drinks as the model did, and when they were not informed about this relationship, but not when told to be drinking different drinks. At the same time, however, the observers were not able to correctly identify the source of the model’s expression of dislike: They showed no CS-US contingency-awareness. Whereas the former finding suggests the causal involvement of conscious beliefs and cognitive inference processes in observational learning, the latter is more in line with the idea that the model’s facial expressions may act like a US’ which is automatically associated with the paired flavor CS+, without any involvement of conscious beliefs or cognitive inferences. These two crucial findings were replicated in Exp. 2. Also, we obtained evidence in this study that the belief manipulation affected learning through its influence on the observers’ attention for the model’s facial evaluative expressions. These results can be integrated either by a cognitive theory allowing the beliefs on which the inferences are based to be of an implicit nature, or by a “direct conditioning” theory that conceives of the US’ as an interpreted event, rather than as a mechanistically and invariantly acting physical entity.     

Adult attachment and attention to positive and negative emotional face expressions

The present study investigated the relation between adult attachment styles and attention for happy, angry, and neutral emotional face expressions. Using a modified version of the exogenous cueing paradigm, we found that the combination of high attachment anxiety and high attachment avoidance was associated with reduced attention for angry faces. We also observed that anxious people tended to orient attention away from happy faces, especially in combination with high scores on attachment avoidance. These findings replicate and extend the results of a previous study and provide additional information on the role of attention in adult attachment.     

Affective priming of nonaffective semantic categorization responses

Recent studies have shown that robust affective priming effects can be obtained when participants are required to categorize the targets on the basis of their valence, but not when participants are asked to categorize the targets on the basis of nonaffective features. On the basis of this pattern of results, it has been argued that affective priming is due to processes that operate at a response selection stage rather than to processes that operate at an encoding stage. We demonstrate (a) that affective priming of nonaffective semantic categorization responses can be obtained when participants assign attention to the affective stimulus dimension, and (b) that affective priming in the standard evaluative categorization task is strongly reduced when participants assign attention to nonaffective stimulus features. On the basis of these findings, we argue (a) that processes operating at an encoding stage do contribute to the affective priming effect, and (b) that automatic affective stimulus processing is reduced when participants selectively attend to nonaffective stimulus features.     

Willingness of Mentally Ill Individuals to Sign Up for a Novel Proposal to Prevent Firearm Suicide

The study goal was to determine whether a significant number of high suicide risk individuals would confidentially put their own names onto a list to prevent future gun purchases. An anonymous written survey was administered in an inpatient psychiatric unit and two outpatient psychiatric clinics at an academic medical center. Two hundred forty individuals were approached to fill out the survey, of whom 200 (83.3%) did so. Forty‐six percent of participants stated that they would put their own name onto the list. This novel suicide prevention proposal, a Do‐Not‐Sell List, would appeal to many people at high risk for suicide.     

On the automaticity of relational stimulus processing

Psychological Research - While it is widely accepted that the semantic analysis of a stimulus can take place in an automatic fashion, it is typically assumed that non-automatic processes are...     

Generalization versus contextualization in automatic evaluation

Research has shown that automatic evaluations can be highly robust and difficult to change, highly malleable and easy to change, and highly context dependent. We tested a representational account of these disparate findings, which specifies the conditions under which automatic evaluations reflect (a) initially acquired information, (b) subsequently acquired, counterattitudinal information, or (c) a mixture of both. The account postulates that attention to contextual cues during the encoding of evaluative information determines whether this information is stored in a context-free representation or a contextualized representation. To the extent that attention to context cues is low during the encoding of initial information but is enhanced by exposure to expectancy-violating counterattitudinal information, initial experiences are stored in context-free representations, whereas counterattitudinal experiences are stored in contextualized representations. Hence, automatic evaluations tend to reflect the valence of counterattitudinal information only in the context in which this information was learned (occasion setting) and the valence of initial experiences in any other context (renewal effect). Four experiments confirmed these predictions, additionally showing that (a) the impact of initial experiences was reduced for automatic evaluations in novel contexts when context salience during the encoding of initial information was enhanced, (b) context effects were eliminated altogether when context salience during the encoding of counterattitudinal information was reduced, and (c) enhanced context salience during the encoding of counterattitudinal information produced context-dependent automatic evaluations even when there was no contingency between valence and contextual cues. Implications for automatic evaluation, learning theory, and interventions in applied settings are discussed.