Cognitive Reorganization and the development of chess expertise

One current research strategy in the study of expertise is to compare experts and novices. An important aspect of decision making involves looking for similarities among problem types. Little is known about such processes. We used grid technique to examine similarity judgments associated with different levels of chess expertise. Novice, expert, and master chess players evaluated 4 sets of 12 chess boards. Average FIC scores showed a curvilinear relation to expertise, suggesting increasing differentiation followed by integration in cognitive frameworks for construing board positions. Additional cognitive measures based on move generation tended to support and extend this structural model.     

Producing Ethnographies: Workplace Ethnographies in History

Data on a large set of workplace ethnographies published from 1940 to 2002, compiled by Randy Hodson, are analyzed to show the trends over time in the production of such ethnographic work, its shifting disciplinary base, the relevance of the personal backgrounds of its authors, the contributions made by academic amateurs, the changing roles of gender and political stances, and the nature of different routes to publication. The definition of what counts as an ethnography is important to the character of the set available and has implications for its potential uses in secondary analysis. It is found that both personal and disciplinary identities and wider social factors have played roles in the production of ethnographic work that need to be understood to account for its history, though it is to be expected that the forms these take will differ for work in different subfields.     

Materialism: Matters Of Definition, Defense, and Deconstruction

How should the metaphysical hypothesis of materialism be formulated? What strategies look promising for defending this hypothesis? How good are the prospects for its successful defense, especially in light of the infamous “hard problem” of phenomenal consciousness? I will say something about each of these questions.     

The Soritical Centipede

Two philosophical questions arise about rationality in centipede games that are logically prior to attempts to apply the formal tools of game theory to this topic. First, given that the players have common knowledge of mutual rationality and common knowledge that they are each motivated solely to maximize their own profits, is there a backwards‐induction argument that (i) employs only familiar non‐technical concepts about rationality, (ii) leads to the conclusion that the first player is rationally obligated to end the game at the first step, (iii) is deductively valid, (iv) employs premises all of which are prima facie highly plausible, and (v) is prima facie sound (in virtue of features (iii) and (iv))? Second, if there is such an argument, then is it actually sound, or is it instead defective somehow despite being prima facie sound? Addressing these two questions is our project. We present a backwards‐induction argument that is prima facie sound; we argue that it is an instance of the notorious sorites paradox, and hence that the concepts of rational obligatoriness and rational permissibility are vague; and we briefly address the potential consequences of all this for the foundations of game theory and decision theory.