ROTATION OF MENTAL IMAGES IN BABOONS WHEN THE VISUAL INPUT IS DIRECTED TO THE LEFT CEREBRAL HEMISPHERE

Abstract— The mental rotation phenomenon was examined in baboons and humans using a video-formatted matching-to-sample task. Sample stimuli were presented either centrally or in the right or left visual half-field. Immediately afterward, subjects had to distinguish the previously presented sample Stimulus from its mirror image after both had been rotated to the same angular deviation. A mental rotation phenomenon was found in baboons and humans, but in baboons this effect wax limited to conditions in which visual input was directed to the right visual half-field. These data represent the first evidence of mental rotation in a nonhuman species.     

On the Misrecognition of Identity: Muslims' Everyday Experiences in Scotland

Political theory is interested in the misrecognition of identity because it impacts individuals' autonomy in their self-definition and thus their ability to articulate and pursue identity-related interests. Here, we explore minority group members' experiences of being seen in terms that do not accord with their self-definition. Our data are qualitative, gathered through walking interviews with 24 Muslims in Scotland. Focusing on interactions in which they reported discrepancies between how they and others saw them, we differentiate four forms of misrecognition: (1) having the meaning of a valued identity (i.e., one's Muslim identity) defined by others in ways that one judges inaccurate and inappropriate; (2) having one's membership of a valued community (e.g., as a member of Scottish society) denied or rejected; (3) having one's identity (i.e., one's Muslim identity) overlooked such that one's distinctive identity-related needs are not taken into account; (4) being seen in terms of just one of one's many social identities (i.e., one's Muslim identity) such that other identities (judged more situationally relevant) are ignored. This empirically grounded typology contributes to wider debates about the forms of identity (mis)recognition and their political implications.     

Genetic influence on the expression of hand preferences in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes): evidence in support of the right-shift theory and developmental instability

Genetic mechanisms have been proposed to explain the pervasive representation of right-handedness in humans, whereas random, nongenetic factors have been posited to explain the lack of population-level right-handedness in nonhuman primates. We report evidence that hand preferences in chimpanzees are heritable, even among related individuals raised in different environments. Furthermore, we report that the degree of heritability is modified by factors associated with developmental instability, notably, offspring parity. The data are interpreted to reconcile both genetic models for handedness and hypotheses suggesting that developmental instability influences variation in handedness.     

Intergroup differentiation: stereotyping as a function of status hierarchy

The authors explored how negative intergroup comparisons affect intergroup differentiation. More specifically, they tested the prediction that the in-group's negative intergroup comparisons with a high-status group would result in more negative stereotyping of a lower status out-group. The authors elicited stereotypes of a lower status university in 2 conditions. In the 1st, the participants judged only the middle-ranking university in-group and a lower status university. In the 2nd, those judgments followed comparison with a higher status university. In the 2nd condition, there was an increased differentiation between the in-group and the lower status out-group because of the more negative stereotyping of the lower status out-group. This evidence of intergroup differentiation was found only on the dimension judged most important and along which the in-group was negatively compared with the higher status group.     

Psychology and the End of History: A Critique and a Proposal for the Psychology of Social Categorization

This paper suggests that self-categories provide the basis for political action, that those who wish to organize political activity do so through the ways in which they construct self-categories, and that political domination may be achieved through reifying social categories and therefore denying alternative ways of social being. Hence, the way in which social psychology approaches the matter of self-categorization provides a touchstone for its politics. To the extent that we too take categories for granted, we are in danger of supporting conservative and undemocratic politics. The only way to eschew tendencies toward reification within social psychology is to add a historical dimension to our own analysis of self-categorical processes.     

Kant, Quasi-Realism, and the Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement

Aesthetic judgements are autonomous, as many other judgements are not: for the latter, but not the former, it is sometimes justifiable to change one’s mind simply because several others share a different opinion. Why is this? One answer is that claims about beauty are not assertions at all, but expressions of aesthetic response. However, to cover more than just some of the explananda, this expressivism needs combining with some analogue of cognitive command, i.e. the idea that disagreements over beuaty can occur, and when they do it is a priori that one side has infringed the norms governing aesthetic discourse. This combination can be achieved by reading Kant’s aesthetic theory in expressivist terms. The resulting view is a form of quasi‐realism about beauty. The position has its merits, but cannot ultimately explain the phenomena which motivate it. This conclusion generalises to quasi‐realism about other matters.     

The planning and control model (PCM) of motorvisual priming: reconciling motorvisual impairment and facilitation effects

Previous research on dual-tasks has shown that, under some circumstances, actions impair the perception of action-consistent stimuli, whereas, under other conditions, actions facilitate the perception of action-consistent stimuli. We propose a new model to reconcile these contrasting findings. The planning and control model (PCM) of motorvisual priming proposes that action planning binds categorical representations of action features so that their availability for perceptual processing is inhibited. Thus, the perception of categorically action-consistent stimuli is impaired during action planning. Movement control processes, on the other hand, integrate multi-sensory spatial information about the movement and, therefore, facilitate perceptual processing of spatially movement-consistent stimuli. We show that the PCM is consistent with a wider range of empirical data than previous models on motorvisual priming. Furthermore, the model yields previously untested empirical predictions. We also discuss how the PCM relates to motorvisual research paradigms other than dual-tasks.