Questioning the Virtual Friendship Debate: Fuzzy Analogical Arguments from Classification and Definition

Arguments from analogy are pervasive in everyday reasoning, mathematics, philosophy, and science. Informal logic studies everyday argumentation in ordinary language. A branch of fuzzy logic, approximate reasoning, seeks to model facets of everyday reasoning with vague concepts in ill-defined situations. Ways of combining the results from these fields will be suggested by introducing a new argumentation scheme—a fuzzy analogical argument from classification—with the associated critical questions. This will be motivated by a case study of analogical reasoning in the virtual friendship debate within information ethics. The virtual friendship debate is a disagreement over whether virtual friendships are genuine friendships. It will be argued that the debate could move away from its current impasse, caused by unproductive metaphysical and logical assumptions, if extant arguments are reinterpreted as fuzzy analogical arguments from classification, and subjected to a new set of critical questions which would replace the quest for facts of essence about friendship with an emphasis on empirical data, persuasion, and definitional power.     

Scientific Progress,Understanding, and Knowledge: Reply to Park

Dellsén (2016) has recently argued for an understanding-based account of scientific progress, the noetic account, according to which science (or a particular scientific discipline) makes cognitive progress precisely when it increases our understanding of some aspect of the world. I contrast this account with Bird’s (2007, 2015); epistemic account, according to which such progress is made precisely when our knowledge of the world is increased or accumulated. In a recent paper, Park (2017) criticizes various aspects of my account and his arguments in favor of the noetic account as against Bird’s epistemic account. This paper responds to Park’s objections. An important upshot of the paper is that we should distinguish between episodes that constitute and promote scientific progress, and evaluate account of scientific progress in terms of how they classify different episodes with respect to these categories.     

Rosa Luxemburg, “The Russian Revolution”

The essay concerns the highly controversial pamphlet of Rosa Luxemburg The Russian Revolution (1918/1922), in which Luxemburg criticizes Lenin’s post-revolutionary policies, in particular his dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, an elected body. The essay reviews the history of the text’s publication and the intense debate, which continues to this day, over whether or not Luxemburg changed her mind on its central critique. At stake in the argument is not only Luxemburg’s evaluation of Lenin’s actions but also the correct weighting to be given to the two components in the central Marxist–Leninist dialectic of revolution: spontaneity and consciousness. In elaborating this point the essay brings in examples from the writings of Lukács and Stalin, and also discusses the dialectic’s centrality in socialist realism.     

On Defining ‘Argument’

There is no concept more central to logic and critical thinking than the concept of an argument. I here address the definition of ‘argument’ in the logical sense of the term and defend the claim that many current proposals, once they are interpreted in a way that makes them sufficiently precise, are extensionally inadequate. Definitions found in some contemporary, prominent critical thinking textbooks will serve as a springboard. I claim that each may be interpreted in an absolutist way (i.e., as providing a definition of ‘argument’ simpliciter) or a relativistic way (as providing a definition of ‘argument-for-S’, where S is some agent or group of agents), yet all turn out to be objectionable no matter which route is taken. I finish with a proposal on which the definition of ‘argument’ is an absolutist one, yet one that avoids the problems discussed for the earlier proposals.     

Scientific Writing Between Tabloid Storytelling,Arcane Formulaic Hermetism,and Narrative Knowledge

The present discussion contribution argues that O. Müller not only suppresses Goethe’s declared intentions with regard to the latter’s Theory of Colors and ignores his place in what in any case is a different scientific culture than his (Müller’s) own or Newton’s, namely a premodern culture of “narrative knowledge” in the sense specified by Lyotard. Moreover, Müller entangles himself in the paradox of wanting on the one hand to back up Goethe on the level of fact when the latter opposes the militant selfrighteousness of the Newtonian school, but doing so on the other hand by constructing an epic-heroic narrative of Newtonian militance, not to say eristic belligerence contradictory to Goethe’s own “tolerant enlightenment” in Lakatos’ sense. Thus, we are confronted with one of those cases where, as Paul de Man puts it, a multidimensional critical reading on the semiological as well as rhetorical levels shows “that the text does not practice what it preaches” (1979, 5).     

Lenin on democratic theory

Lenin’s State and Revolution is not only a project for imminent revolutionary policy and not only a legitimization argument for a revolutionary dictatorship, but also a theory of state and theory of democracy. Lenin points at the reduplication of state organs that is inherent in a democratic state. While the Russian revolutionary thinks of this reduplication as something transitory, we today increasingly see it as a durable condition coterminous with the late-modern democratic state. I use Lenin’s treatise as a point of inspiration to briefly characterize my dialectical theory of state.     

Psychological correlates of violent and non-violent Hong Kong juvenile probationers

There is little known about Hong Kong juvenile offenders on probation. The purpose of this study was to compare Hong Kong juvenile violent with non-violent probationers on static demographic and psychological variables. The study comprised 109 male juvenile probationers aged 14-20 years (M = 16.97, SD = 1.44) in community transitional housing; 34 were adjudicated for violent offenses, while 75 were non-violent. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES), Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWLS), Social Bonding Scale-Theft (SBS-T), Social Bonding Scale-Violent Crime (SBS-VC), Positive and Negative Affect Scales (PANAS), Impulsiveness Scale-Short Form (IS-SF) and CRIME-PICS II were administered to measure self-esteem, life satisfaction, social bond, positive and negative affect, impulsivity, pro-offending attitudes, and self-perceived life problems. Data on onset age of delinquent behavior, age of first adjudication, number of prior adjudications, and frequency of self-reported delinquency in the past year were also collected. t-tests were consistent with significant differences for violent offenders including higher self-esteem (p < 0.05). Non-violent offenders self-reported significantly more theft (p < 0.05) with a tendency to deny victim hurt more often (p < 0.01); 76.5% of violent offenders self-reported both violent and non-violent crime, while 58.7% of non-violent offenders reported only non-violent crime. For violent and non-violent offenders, the onset of delinquency was inversely related to the frequency of self-reported delinquency. Using ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression analyses, self-anticipated violent reoffending risk was predicted by age of onset, frequency of self-reported delinquency, social bond (inversely), and impulsivity, while non-violent reoffending risk was predicted by the number of prior convictions and self-reported delinquency. Only two psychological correlates, social bond and impulsivity, were related to violent delinquency; interventions are suggested.     

帕金森病与重症抑郁障碍两者中的抑郁及睡眠障碍特征对比

由于帕金森病早期常仅存在抑郁、睡眠障碍等非运动症状表现,其与重症抑郁障碍难以鉴别.本研究通过对帕金森病患者及重症抑郁障碍患者行汉密尔顿抑郁量表、匹兹堡睡眠指数及多导睡眠监测评定抑郁及睡眠特征,尝试发现两者之间差异,为早期鉴别及诊断帕金森病提供理论基础.