Transformations in the couplings among intellectual abilities and constituent cognitive processes across the life span

Abstract— Two-component theories of intellectual development over the life span postulate that fluid abilities develop earlier during child development and decline earlier during aging than crystallized abilities do, and that fluid abilities support or constrain the acquisition and expression of crystallized abilities. Thus, maturation and senescence compress the structure of intelligence by imposing age-specific constraints upon its constituent processes. Hence, the couplings among different intellectual abilities and cognitive processes are expected to be strong in childhood and old age. Findings from a population-based study of 291 individuals aged 6 to 89 years support these predictions. Furthermore, processing robustness, a frequently overlooked aspect of processing, predicted fluid intelligence beyond processing speed in old age but not in childhood, suggesting that the causes of more compressed functional organization of intelligence differ between maturation and senescence. Research on developmental changes in functional brain circuitry may profit from explicitly recognizing transformations in the organization of intellectual abilities and their underlying cognitive processes across the life span.     

Preparing for perception and action (I): the role of grouping in the response-cuing paradigm

Human skilled behavior requires preparatory processes that selectively make sensory and motor systems more efficient for perceiving the upcoming stimulus and performing the correct action. We review the literature concerning these preparatory processes as studied by response-cuing paradigm, and propose a model that accounts for the major findings. According to the Grouping Model, advance or precue information directs a dynamic process of subgroup making-that is, a process of stimulus- and response-set reconfiguration-whereby the internal representation of the task is simplified. The Grouping Model assigns a critical role to the unit of selection, with Gestalt factors and interresponse dependencies mediating the formation and strength of stimulus and response subgroups. In a series of five experiments, we manipulated perceptual and motoric grouping factors, and studied their independent and interactive effects on the pattern of precuing benefits. Generally, the results were consistent with the Grouping Model's account of response-cuing effects.     

Unconscious symmetrical inferences: A role of consciousness in event integration

Explicit and implicit learning have been attributed to different learning processes that create different types of knowledge structures. Consistent with that claim, our study provides evidence that people integrate stimulus events differently when consciously aware versus unaware of the relationship between the events. In a first, acquisition phase participants sorted words into two categories (A and B), which were fully predicted by task-irrelevant primes-the labels of two other, semantically unrelated categories (C and D). In a second, test phase participants performed a lexical decision task, in which all word stimuli stemmed from the previous prime categories (C and D) and the (now nonpredictive) primes were the labels of the previous target categories (A and B). Reliable priming effects in the second phase demonstrated that bidirectional associations between the respective categories had been formed in the acquisition phase (A<-->C and B<-->D), but these effects were found only in participants that were unaware of the relationship between the categories! We suggest that unconscious, implicit learning of event relationships results in the rather unsophisticated integration (i.e., bidirectional association) of the underlying event representations, whereas explicit learning takes the meaning of the order of the events into account, and thus creates unidirectional associations.     

Priming and binding in and across perception and action: a correlational analysis of the internal structure of event files

Individual performance was compared across three different tasks that tap into the binding of stimulus features in perception, the binding of action features in action planning, and the emergence of stimulus-response bindings (“event files”). Within a task correlations between the size of binding effects were found within visual perception (e.g., the strength of shape-location binding correlated positively with the strength of shape-colour binding) but not between perception and action planning, suggesting different, domain-specific binding mechanisms. To some degree, binding strength was predicted by priming effects of the respective features, especially if these features varied on a dimension that matched the current attentional set.     

Action-feature integration blinds to feature-overlapping perceptual events: evidence from manual and vocal actions

Previous studies showed that the identification of a left- or right-pointing arrowhead is impaired when it appears while planning and executing a spatially compatible left or right keypress (Müsseler & Hommel, 1997a). We attribute this effect to stimulus processing and action control operating on the same feature codes so that, once a code is integrated in an action plan, it is less available for perceptual processing. In three pairs of experiments we tested the generality of this account by using stimulus-response combinations other than arrows and manual keypresses. Planning manual left-right keypressing actions impaired the identification of spatially corresponding arrows but not of words with congruent meaning. On the contrary, planning to say "left" or "right" impaired the identification of corresponding spatial words but not of congruent arrows. Thus, as the feature-integration approach suggests, stimulus identification is impaired only with overlap of perceptual or perceptually derived stimulus and response features while mere semantic congruence is insufficient.     

Target integration and the attentional blink

If people monitor a visual stimulus stream for targets they often miss the second (T2) if it appears soon after the first (T1)--the attentional blink. There is one exception: T2 is often not missed if it appears right after T1, i.e., at lag 1. This lag-1 sparing is commonly attributed to the possibility that T1 processing opens an attentional gate, which may be so sluggish that an early T2 can slip in before it closes. We investigated why the gate may close and exclude further stimuli from processing. We compared a control approach, which assumes that gate closing is exogenously triggered by the appearance of nontargets, and an integration approach, which assumes that gate closing is under endogenous control. As predicted by the latter but not the former, T2 performance and target reversals were strongly affected by the temporal distance between T1 and T2, whereas the presence or the absence of a nontarget intervening between T1 and T2 had little impact.     

Attentional control in the attentional blink is modulated by odor

Increasing evidence suggests that `aromas have distinctive effects on the allocation of attention in space: Arousing olfactory fragrances (e.g., peppermint) are supposed to induce a more focused state, and calming olfactory fragrances (e.g., lavender) a broader attentional state. Here, we investigate whether odors have similar effects on the allocation of attention in time. Participants performed the attentional blink (AB) task, known to produce a deficit in reporting the second of two target stimuli presented in close succession in a rapid sequence of distractors, while being exposed to either a peppermint or a lavender aroma. In two experiments using a between-subjects and a within-subjects design, respectively, we show that the two odors have specific effects on attentional control: As compared with the calming lavender aroma, the arousing peppermint condition yielded a larger AB. Our results demonstrate that attentional control is systematically modulated by factors that induce a more or a less distributed state of mind.     

DEVELOPMENT OF THE PARENT‐CHILD PLAY SCALE FOR USE IN CHILDREN WITH FEEDING DISORDERS

The Parent‐Child Play Scale was developed as a scale that complements the Parent‐Child Feeding Scale, created by I. Chatoor et al. (1997), to evaluate mother–infant/toddler interactions in two different caregiving contexts of a young child's everyday life, specifically play and feeding. This Play Scale can be used with infants and toddlers ranging in age from 1 month to 3 years and provides reliable global ratings of mother–child interactions during 10 min of videotaped free‐play in a laboratory setting. The scale consists of 32 mother and infant/toddler interactive behaviors which are rated by trained observers from videotaped observations. Four subscales are derived: Dyadic Reciprocity, Maternal Unresponsiveness to Infant's/Toddler's Cues, Dyadic Conflict, and Maternal Intrusiveness. Construct validity and interrater and test‐retest reliability of the Play Scale have been demonstrated. This Play Scale discriminates between children with and without feeding disorders as well as between children with different subtypes of feeding disorders as defined by the Diagnostic Classification of Mental Health and Developmental Disorders of Infancy and Early Childhood, Revised (DC:0–3R) (Feeding Disorder of State Regulation, Feeding Disorder of Caregiver‐Infant Reciprocity, and Infantile Anorexia). It can be used for research or clinical practice in the diagnosis and treatment of early feeding problems, to assess the pervasiveness of mother–infant/toddler difficulties and to monitor changes following therapy.     

S-R Compatibility Effects Without Response Uncertainty

Five experiments investigated whether cognitively based spatial S-R correspondence effects or "compatibility" effects can occur in simple reaction time (SRT) tasks and if so, which factors might be responsible for their occurrence and size. In Experiment 1, responses were cued before each trial, but made only after presentation of a Go signal. There were considerably faster responses with spatial correspondence of Go signal and response, demonstrating that response certainty does not prevent a compatibility effect. Experiment 2, a SRT task with "extra" trials requiring responses with the same or the opposite hand, indicated a major determinant of this effect to be the keeping of two task-relevant responses in a state of readiness. Experiment 3 provided preliminary evidence for 'inertia' effects-that is, for stronger correspondence effects with frequent than with infrequent alternations between left-hand and right-hand blocks. Experiment 4 showed that correspondence effects can be obtained by using a within-hand response repertoire. Experiment 5, a replication of Experiment 3 with within-hand responses, found further evidence for inertia effects. For all experiments, reaction time distribution analyses were carried out to gain insight into the temporal dynamics of correspondence effects. Altogether the results strongly suggest that most if not all correspondence effects had a cognitive rather than an anatomical origin. This raises some doubts about conclusions from prior attempts to measure interhemispheric transmission costs by means of SRT tasks.