Emerging adult romantic relationship narratives during COVID-19: Understanding relational challenges and opportunities

This cross-sectional study sought to understand how emerging adult college students currently in relationships experienced and dealt with COVID-19 stress during a key time for romantic relationship development. Using a relational turbulence theory (RTT) framework, we examined romantic relationship narratives in three different groups of students for indicators of uncertainty (break-up anxiety [BUA]), interference (conflict and negative emotion), facilitation (support), and coping strategies. Of particular interest was whether these indicators would vary as a function of when the stress of the pandemic was assumed to be more compared to less disruptive to relationships (Group 1 Fall 2020 and Group 2 Spring 2021, off campus/unvaccinated; Group 3 Fall 2021, on campus/vaccinated). As expected, students interviewed during periods when pandemic stress was assumed to be higher showed more break-up anxiety, increased conflict, and angry word use to describe conflict events. However, contrary to expectations, sad emotions and support did not vary as a function of when students were interviewed. Regardless of when students were interviewed, there were several strategies they used to cope with the stresses of COVID-19. The most frequent strategies students described were using technology/media to stay connected and taking steps to keep themselves and their families healthy.     

Determining the influence of tangible items on screaming and handmouthing following an inconclusive functional analysis

A brief experimental analysis was used to compare the effects of the presence of tangible objects in an alone condition following an inconclusive functional analysis of screaming and handmouthing behavior of an 8‐year‐old boy. The alone condition with tangibles involved having toys available throughout the session with no interaction from the therapist and produced a higher percentage of intervals with screaming and handmouthing. The study demonstrates the importance of evaluating the effects of the presence of tangible items during a functional analysis. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children’s success at detecting circular explanations and their interest in future learning

These studies explore elementary-school-aged children’s ability to evaluate circular explanations and whether they respond to receiving weak explanations by expressing interest in additional learning. In the first study, 6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds (n = 53) heard why questions about unfamiliar animals. For each question, they rated the quality of single explanations and later selected the best explanation between pairs of circular and noncircular explanations. When judging single explanations, 8- and 10-year-olds, and to some extent 6-year-olds, provided higher ratings for noncircular explanations compared to circular ones. When selecting between pairs of explanations, all age groups preferred noncircular explanations to circular ones, but older children did so more consistently than 6-year-olds. Children who recognized the weakness of the single circular explanations were more interested in receiving additional information about the question topics. In Study 2, all three age groups (n = 87) provided higher ratings for noncircular explanations compared to circular ones when listening to responses to how questions, but older children showed a greater distinction in their ratings than 6-year-olds. Moreover, the link between recognizing circular explanations as weak and interest in future learning could not be accounted for solely by individual differences in verbal intelligence. These findings illustrate the developmental trajectory of explanation evaluation and support that recognition of weak explanations is linked to interest in future learning across the elementary years. Implications for education are discussed.     

Understanding (in) Newton’s Argument for Universal Gravitation

In this essay, I attempt to assess Henk de Regt and Dennis Dieks recent pragmatic and contextual account of scientific understanding on the basis of an important historical case-study: understanding in Newton’s theory of universal gravitation and Huygens’ reception of universal gravitation. It will be shown that de Regt and Dieks’ Criterion for the Intelligibility of a Theory (CIT), which stipulates that the appropriate combination of scientists’ skills and intelligibility-enhancing theoretical virtues is a condition for scientific understanding, is too strong. On the basis of this case-study, it will be shown that scientists can understand each others’ positions qualitatively and quantitatively, despite their endorsement of different worldviews and despite their convictions as what counts as a proper explanation.     

No evidence for object alternation impairment in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD)

Recent neuroimaging studies have consistently ascribed the orbito-frontal cortex (OFC) a pivotal role in the pathogenesis of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Cognitive tests presumed sensitive to this region, such as the Object Alternation Task (OAT), are considered important tools to verify this assumption and to investigate the impact of cortical dysfunction on behavior. The aim of the present study was to assess if patients with OCD show enhanced perseveration errors on the OAT relative to healthy controls taking into account several potential moderators, especially comorbid depression and OCD subtype. Thirty-five OCD patients and 18 healthy controls underwent the OAT as well as the Trail-Making Tests (TMT) A and B. In line with prior studies, OCD patients were slowed on both TMT tasks. In contrast, samples performed similarly on the OAT. While the latter finding does not invalidate the assumption that the OFC is affected in OCD, dysfunctions involving this region may be more subtle than often claimed and likely encompass only a small subset of functional domains hosted in the OFC.     

The word of others

Tyler Burge has argued that one has an a priori prima facie entitlement to believe in the truth of what one takes to have been presented as true by an interlocutor. This thesis, however, is problematic, since the alleged a priori prima facie entitlement to believe in the truth of our seeming understanding of things presented as true to us, rests on the possibility of determining assertoric force on a purely intellectual basis. This thesis is not plausible and Burge's analogy from memory does not support it. Two routes for defending Burge's thesis of the a priori prima facie entitlement to believe in the truth of what has been asserted can be identified: the Transcendental Route and the Intrinsic Rationality Route. David Lewis' account of linguistic convention would serve as a transcendental argument for the a priori prima facie entitlement to believe in the truth of what has been asserted, but flaws in Lewis' theory leave us deprived of any good transcendental argument for such an entitlement. The Intrinsic Rationality Route is in better standing, but we have yet to see an argument for why we should resort to that measure.     

United we win,divided we fail? Effects of cognitive merger representations and performance feedback on merging groups

Research has shown that cognitive representations of mergers influence intergroup evaluations. This paper extends this research by studying how cognitive representations of mergers (one group, dual identity, and two groups) interact with performance feedback (success and failure) to affect intergroup evaluations. Two competing hypotheses were tested, which made different predictions in case of superordinate group salience combined with subgroup salience after merger failure: The subgroup‐salience‐hypothesis predicts that subgroup salience during a merger generally results in pre‐merger ingroup bias toward the pre‐merger outgroup (i.e., two groups and dual identity). The superordinate‐ salience‐hypothesis predicts that subgroup salience only results in pre‐merger ingroup bias if superordinate group salience is low (i.e., two groups). Both hypotheses predict low levels of ingroup bias after merger success. Study 1 confirmed the second hypothesis using a 3 (merger representation: one group, dual identity, and two groups) × 2 (merger feedback: failure and success) design with interacting groups. Study 2 replicated the results in an adapted minimal group paradigm. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Words may not be enough! No increased emotional Stroop effect in obsessive-compulsive disorder

Conflicting evidence has been obtained whether or not patients diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) share an attentional bias towards disorder-related stimuli. Some of these inconsistencies can be accounted for by suboptimal stimuli selection. In consideration of the heterogeneity of OCD, we investigated Stroop interference effects for two classes of OCD items (i.e., washing and checking) in 23 OCD patients and 23 healthy controls. In order to cover prevalent OCD concerns, item compilation was based on experts' appraisals. Patients neither displayed greater immediate as well as delayed Stroop interference nor any bias for OCD and subtype-congruent stimuli. On the contrary, for washing-related items, OCD patients, and here especially washers, displayed facilitation relative to healthy controls. Although the present study at first sight refutes the notion of an attentional bias in OCD in contrast to other anxiety disorders, several potential moderators need to be considered before this account is ultimately dismissed. In particular, an attentional bias may only be elicited using visual material that is more attention-grabbing than verbal stimuli. Finally, blockwise instead of random item administration and greater consideration of individual relevance may be crucial prerequisites for the effect to emerge.