NON‐CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE

The paper is an investigation into the prospects of an epistemology of non‐conceptual knowledge. According to the orthodox view, knowledge requires concepts and belief. I present several arguments to the effect that there is non‐conceptual, non‐doxastic knowledge, the obvious candidate for such knowledge being non‐conceptual perception. Non‐conceptual perception seems to be allowed for by cognitive scientists and it exhibits the central role features of knowledge—it plays the knowledge role: it respects an anti‐luck condition, it is an achievement, it enables one to act for a reason, and it provides justification. Furthermore, it makes a straightforward and elegant explanation of (doxastic) perceptual knowledge possible: doxastic perceptual knowledge builds on non‐conceptual perception as non‐conceptual knowledge. Three objections that might naturally arise will be discussed and answered. Thus, the prospects of an epistemology without belief seem to be much better than the orthodoxy wants to have it. We can extend knowledge into the non‐conceptual realm.     

From Unemployment to Employment and Back: Professional Trajectories and Well-Being

Applied Research in Quality of Life - So far, only few studies have considered different aspects of well-being in studying losing or gaining employment. We examined life satisfaction, mental...     

Personalized medicine: evidence of normativity in its quantitative definition of health

Systems medicine, which is based on computational modelling of biological systems, is emerging as an increasingly prominent part of the personalized medicine movement. It is often promoted as ‘P4 medicine’ (predictive, preventive, personalized, and participatory). In this article, we test promises made by some of its proponents that systems medicine will be able to develop a scientific, quantitative metric for wellness that will eliminate the purported vagueness, ambiguity, and incompleteness—that is, normativity—of previous health definitions. We do so by examining the most concrete and relevant evidence for such a metric available: a patent that describes a systems medicine method for assessing health and disease. We find that although systems medicine is promoted as heralding an era of transformative scientific objectivity, its definition of health seems at present still normatively based. As such, we argue that it will be open to influence from various stakeholders and that its purported objectivity may conceal important scientific, philosophical, and political issues. We also argue that this is an example of a general trend within biomedicine to create overly hopeful visions and expectations for the future.     

The role of philosophy and ethics at the edges of medicine

Background

The purpose of this study is to make a philosophical argument against the phenomenological critique of standardization in clinical ethics. We used the context of clinical ethics in Saudi Arabia to demonstrate the importance of credentialing clinical ethicists.

Methods

Philosophical methods of argumentation and conceptual analysis were used.

Results

We found the phenomenological critique of standardization to be flawed because it relies on a series of false dichotomies.

Conclusions

We concluded that the phenomenological framing of the credentialing debate relies upon two extreme views to be navigated between, not chosen among, in the credentialing of clinical ethicists.