Character Strengths – Stability,Change, and Relationships with Well-Being Changes

Character strengths are positively valued personality traits that are assumed to be stable across time and situations, but also malleable due to cultivation or deliberate intervention. Also, studies showed that character strengths are robustly related to well-being. Consequently, character strengths have often been used in interventions aimed at increasing well-being. However, the stability of character strengths and the longitudinal relationships with well-being are widely unexplored: First, previous reports on the stability of character strengths have mainly focused on one assessment instrument only and second, they did not consider other indicators of stability (and malleability) besides rank-order stability, (i.e., mean-level stability). In this longitudinal study, we assessed character strengths and well-being at two time points and examined the stability and malleability of character strengths and the convergence of changes in character strengths and well-being by means of correlation analyses. Two samples (n₁ = 601, n₂ = 1162) completed different measures of character strengths and instruments for the assessment of well-being, ill-being, and health within up to three and a half years. Results showed that character strengths are stable over longer time periods (test-retest reliabilities ranging from r_tt = .60–.83) and that relationships between changes in strengths and well-being are highly parallel to what has been reported in cross-sectional studies (strongest relationships for zest, hope, curiosity, and love). Furthermore, results suggest that some strengths, most predominantly humor, but also spirituality and prudence might be more amenable for change than others. These results might bear important information for selecting character strengths in interventions.

     

Equal performance but distinct behaviors: sex differences in a novel object recognition task and spatial maze in a highly social cichlid fish

Animal Cognition - Sex differences in behavior and cognition can be driven by differential selection pressures from the environment and in the underlying neuromolecular mechanisms of...     

Truthmaking, Recombination, and Facts Ontology

The idea of truthmakers is important for doing serious metaphysics, since a truthmaker principle can give us important guidance in finding out what we would like to include into our ontology. Recently, David Lewis has argued against Armstrong’s argument that a plausible truthmaker principle requires us to accept facts. I would like to take a close look at the argument. I will argue in detail that the Humean principle of recombination on which Lewis relies is not plausible (independently of the issue of facts). Then I will show that the right truthmaker principle that vindicates facts is superior to the modified truthmaker principle that Lewis has proposed. This will lead into the topic of being and existence. It turns out that truthmaking and facts are plausible, well suited for one another, and very coherent with a plausible conception of being.     

Cooling the heat of temptation: Mental self‐control and the automatic evaluation of tempting stimuli

The present research investigated whether mental self‐control strategies can reduce the automatic positivity elicited by tempting stimuli. In two studies employing chocolate as the temptation of interest, we found that participants instructed to imagine a chocolate product in a nonconsummatory manner exhibited significantly less automatic positivity with regard to the product as compared to participants instructed to imagine the hedonic, consummatory aspects of the product and control participants engaged in a neutral task. These findings were replicated in a second study. Additionally, in Study 2 we found that automatic evaluations of chocolate were lowest for participants instructed to form implementation intentions to refrain from consumption. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that mental self‐control strategies such as nonconsummatory transformation and implementation intentions extend to the level of automatic processing by reducing the positivity of automatically activated affective responses. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Preparing lane changes while driving in a fixed-base simulator: Effects of advance information about direction and amplitude on reaction time and steering kinematics

Reaction times (RTs) of aiming movements are typically shorter when responses are prepared by informative precues. Aside from RT facilitation, response preparation can also modify the velocity profile of the movement trajectory. In this study we assess the preparatory effects of advance information about direction and number of lanes in a lane change task. Consistent with the findings of previous studies with aiming movements, prior information reduced RT and affected the velocity profile of the steering angle. The velocity profile was mainly shortened around the first peak steering wheel angle, and this finding is in line with the movement integration hypothesis. The results suggest that the findings from basic research can be generalized to driving tasks.     

Attention allocation in social anxiety during a speech

Cognitive models assume that social anxiety is associated with and maintained by biased information processing, leading to change in attention allocation, which can be measured by examining eye movement. However, little is known about the distribution of attention among positive, neutral and negative stimuli during a social task and the relative importance of positive versus negative biases in social anxiety. In this study, eye movement, subjective state anxiety and psychophysiology of individuals with high trait social anxiety (HSA) and low trait social anxiety (LSA) were measured during a speech task with a pre-recorded audience. The HSA group showed longer total fixation on negative stimuli and shorter total fixation on positive stimuli compared to the LSA group. We observed that the LSA group shifted attention away from negative stimuli, whereas the HSA group showed no differential attention allocation. The total duration of fixation on negative stimuli predicted subjective anxiety ratings. These results point to a negative bias as well as a lack of a positive bias in HSA individuals during social threat.