全文获取类型
收费全文 | 1069篇 |
免费 | 34篇 |
出版年
2021年 | 9篇 |
2020年 | 15篇 |
2019年 | 18篇 |
2018年 | 31篇 |
2017年 | 22篇 |
2016年 | 29篇 |
2015年 | 14篇 |
2014年 | 21篇 |
2013年 | 117篇 |
2012年 | 39篇 |
2011年 | 37篇 |
2010年 | 30篇 |
2009年 | 25篇 |
2008年 | 34篇 |
2007年 | 38篇 |
2006年 | 29篇 |
2005年 | 29篇 |
2004年 | 33篇 |
2003年 | 28篇 |
2002年 | 33篇 |
2001年 | 19篇 |
2000年 | 14篇 |
1999年 | 16篇 |
1997年 | 11篇 |
1996年 | 12篇 |
1995年 | 10篇 |
1994年 | 11篇 |
1991年 | 9篇 |
1990年 | 10篇 |
1989年 | 11篇 |
1988年 | 12篇 |
1986年 | 12篇 |
1985年 | 10篇 |
1984年 | 19篇 |
1983年 | 14篇 |
1982年 | 11篇 |
1981年 | 17篇 |
1980年 | 9篇 |
1979年 | 10篇 |
1977年 | 12篇 |
1976年 | 12篇 |
1975年 | 15篇 |
1974年 | 21篇 |
1973年 | 13篇 |
1972年 | 11篇 |
1970年 | 10篇 |
1969年 | 14篇 |
1968年 | 10篇 |
1967年 | 16篇 |
1966年 | 15篇 |
排序方式: 共有1103条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
241.
It is well known that a given physical input (e.g. intensity of light or sound, length or weight of an object) does not always give rise to the same sensation. For example, arrow heads affect the perceived length of lines (Muller-Lyer illusion) and size affects the apparent weight of an object (size-weight illusion). It is generally assumed that the differential threshold is a simple function of the physical intensity of the stimulus. We may however ask whether the differential threshold is affected by illusions.
To try to answer this question we estimate differential thresholds under a pair of conditions in which the relevant input is the same but appears different. Using the size-weight illusion, we have found that the differential threshold for weight is greater for a set of small weights than for a set of larger and apparently lighter weights. 相似文献
To try to answer this question we estimate differential thresholds under a pair of conditions in which the relevant input is the same but appears different. Using the size-weight illusion, we have found that the differential threshold for weight is greater for a set of small weights than for a set of larger and apparently lighter weights. 相似文献
242.
Conclusion In the face of the considerations set forth above, I submit that Anderson's proposed definition (D) does not represent an acceptable construction of the concept of conditional permission. This, in turn, suggests that conditional permission must be viewed as a viable deontic relationship in its own right, and is not definable in terms of unconditional deontic concepts. It appears, then, that a reduction of conditional to unconditional deontic logic is not warranted. 相似文献
243.
244.
John Ross 《Psychometrika》1966,31(1):27-31
It is shown that to combine readings from points of view configurations as assumed in Tucker and Messick's model is not to combine configurations in any simple way. Both empirical and logical consequences of the disparity are discussed. 相似文献
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.