Semantic activation in action planning

Four experiments investigated activation of semantic information in action preparation. Participants either prepared to grasp and use an object (e.g., to drink from a cup) or to lift a finger in association with the object's position following a go/no-go lexical-decision task. Word stimuli were consistent to the action goals of the object use (Experiment 1) or to the finger lifting (Experiment 2). Movement onset times yielded a double dissociation of consistency effects between action preparation and word processing. This effect was also present for semantic categorizations (Experiment 3), but disappeared when introducing a letter identification task (Experiment 4). In sum, our findings indicate that action semantics are activated selectively in accordance with the specific action intention of an actor.     

The generation of conscious awareness in an incidental learning situation

The purpose of the present experiments was to investigate the generation of conscious awareness (i.e., of verbal report) in an incidental learning situation. While the single-system account assumes that all markers of learning, verbal or nonverbal, index the same underlying knowledge representation, multiple-systems accounts grant verbal report a special status as a marker of learning because they assume that the nonverbal and verbal effects of learning rely on different memory representations. We tested these two accounts in two experiments in which we held the amount of learning in the nonverbal memory system constant while manipulating independent variables aimed at affecting learning in the declarative system. The results of both experiments revealed significant differences in verbal report between experimental conditions, but no significant differences in response times. Overall, these results provide clear evidence in favor of the multiple-systems account.     

Are strategy shifts caused by data-driven processes or by voluntary processes?

The present research investigates the role of voluntary, conscious processing in strategy change. In 2 experiments, we address whether the switch to a new strategy is the result of data-driven, automatic processes or of voluntary processes. Experiment 1 demonstrates that participants performing an alphabet verification task are able to (a) transfer a newly adopted strategy to dissimilar information never encountered before, (b) verbally describe the task regularity that allows for the generation and application of the new strategy immediately after the strategy was adopted. Using the same experimental task, Experiment 2 shows that participants, and (c) decide against adopting a new strategy when the available evidence suggests that the new strategy cannot be used for the entire range of problems encountered. Overall, the obtained results support the view that strategy change is mediated by voluntary controlled processing. They do not support the view that strategy change is an inevitable, automatic consequence of task practice. The present research thus highlights a potential function of conscious human processing.     

The Baroness's Comittee and the President's Council: ambition and alienation in public bioethics

The President's Council on Bioethics has tried to make a distinctive contribution to the methodology of such public bodies in developing what it has styled a "richer bioethics." The Council's procedure contrasts with more modest methods of public bioethical deliberation employed by the United Kingdom's Warnock Committee. The practices of both bodies are held up against the backdrop of concerns about moral and political alienation, prompted by the limitations of moral reasoning and by moral dissent from state policy under even the most democratic of governments. Although the President's Council's rhetoric is often scrupulously conciliatory, recurring features of its argumentative practice are regrettably divisive. They order these things better in Britain.     

The Role of Information Reduction in Skill Acquisition

Theories of skill acquisition assume that the effects of practice on task performance are due to either qualitative changes in the task structure, an increased efficiency of performing individual task components, an increased efficiency of performing sequences of task components, or some combination of these mechanisms. We propose an extension to the existing theories by arguing that for many tasks, practice affects which information is processed. More specifically, we argue that people learn, over the course of practice, to separate task-relevant from task-redundant information, and to limit their processing to relevant aspects of the task. In three experiments, subjects verified alphabetic strings, such as M [4] R S T. Strings were correct if they followed the alphabet when the number of letters, given by the digit in parentheses, was skipped. Strings were constructed such that errors occurred only within the initial “letter–digit–letter” triplet. Analyses of subjects’ RTs for strings of varying lengths demonstrated that: (a) subjects were able to distinguish relevant from redundant task information, and to limit their processing to the relevant information, (b) the ability to reduce the amount of information that is processed takes time and develops gradually over the course of practice, and (c) the mechanism underlying this ability appears to be largely stimulus-independent in the sense that structural components of a task are ignored, rather than specific task information. The findings and their implications for general theories of skill acquisition are discussed.     

A comment on Fry's "The role of caring in a theory of nursing ethics

Our response to Sara Fry's paper focuses on the difficulty of understanding her insistence on the fundamental character of caring in a theory of nursing ethics. We discuss a number of problems her text throws in the way of making sense of this idea, and outline our own proposal for how caring's role may be reasonably understood: not as an alternative object of value, competing with autonomy or patient good, but rather as an alternative way of responding toward that which is of value.