Why aggregated learning follows the power law of practice when individual learning does not: comment on Rickard (1997, 1999), Delaney et al. (1998), and Palmeri (1999)

The power law of practice is often considered a benchmark test for theories of cognitive skill acquisition. Recently, P. F. Delaney, L. M. Reder, J. J. Staszewski, and F. E. Ritter (1998), T. J. Palmeri (1999), and T. C. Rickard (1997, 1999) have challenged its validity by showing that empirical data can systematically deviate from power-function fits. The main purpose of the present article is to extend their explanations in two ways. First, the authors empirically show that abrupt changes in performance are not necessarily based on a shift from algorithm to memory-based processing, but rather and more generally, that they occur whenever a more efficient task strategy is generated. Second, the authors show mathematically and per simulation that power functions can perfectly fit aggregated learning curves even when all underlying individual curves are discontinuous. Therefore, the authors question conclusions drawn from fits to aggregated data.     

Poor working memory predicts false memories

Two studies investigated whether individual differences in simple span verbal working memory and complex working memory capacity are related to memory accuracy and susceptibility to false memory development. In Study 1, undergraduate students (N=60) were given two simple span working memory tests: forward and backward digit span. They also underwent a memory task that is known to elicit false memories of nonpresented words, the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Poor simple span working memory (as reflected by suboptimal backward digit span scores) was related to elevated levels of false recognition. Study 2 (N=65) replicated this finding, in that suboptimal backward digit span performance was found to be predictive of false recognition. However, complex working memory capacity (operation span) was not related to false recognition. This pattern suggests that even in a homogenous sample of undergraduates, poor working memory is associated with the susceptibility to recollect words never presented.     

A shortened version of Raven’s standard progressive matrices for children and adolescents

Numerous developmental studies assess general cognitive ability, not as the primary variable of interest, but rather as a background variable. Raven’s Progressive Matrices is an easy to administer non-verbal test that is widely used to measure general cognitive ability. However, the relatively long administration time (up to 45 min) is still a drawback for developmental studies as it often leaves little time to assess the primary variable of interest. Therefore, we used a machine learning approach – regularized regression in combination with cross-validation – to develop a short 15-item version. We did so for two age groups, namely 9 to 12 years and 13 to 16 years. The short versions predicted the scores on the standard full 60-item versions to a very high degree r = 0.89 (9–12 years) and r = 0.93 (13–16 years). We, therefore, recommend using the short version to measure general cognitive ability as a background variable in developmental studies.     

Action-effect binding by observational learning

The acquisition of bidirectional action–effect associations plays a central role in the ability to intentionally control actions. Humans learn about actions not only through active experience, but also through observing the actions of others. In Experiment 1, we examined whether action–effect associations can be acquired by observational learning. To this end, participants observed how a model repeatedly pressed two buttons during an observation phase. Each of the buttonpresses led to a specific tone (action effect). In a subsequent test phase, the tones served as target stimuli to which the participants had to respond with buttonpresses. Reaction times were shorter if the stimulus–response mapping in the test phase was compatible with the action–effect association in the observation phase. Experiment 2 excluded the possibility that the impact of perceived action effects on own actions was driven merely by an association of spatial features with the particular tones. Furthermore, we demonstrated that the presence of an agent is necessary to acquire novel action–effect associations through observation. Altogether, the study provides evidence for the claim that bidirectional action–effect associations can be acquired by observational learning. Our findings are discussed in the context of the idea that the acquisition of action–effect associations through observation is an important cognitive mechanism subserving the human ability for social learning.     

An old problem: how can we distinguish between conscious and unconscious knowledge acquired in an implicit learning task?

A long lasting debate in the field of implicit learning is whether participants can learn without acquiring conscious knowledge. One crucial problem is that no clear criterion exists allowing to identify participants who possess explicit knowledge. Here, we propose a method to diagnose during a serial reaction time task those participants who acquire conscious knowledge. We first validated this method by using Stroop-like material during training. Then we assessed participants’ knowledge with the Inclusion/Exclusion task (Experiment 1) and the wagering task (Experiment 2). Both experiments confirmed that for participants diagnosed as having acquired conscious knowledge about the underlying sequence the Stroop congruency effect disappeared, whereas for participants not diagnosed as possessing conscious knowledge it only slightly decreased. In addition, both experiments revealed that only participants diagnosed as conscious were able to strategically use their acquired knowledge. Thus, our method allows to reliably distinguish between participants with and without conscious knowledge.     

Academic self-concept in high school: predictors and effects on adjustment in higher education

Academic self-concept is considered a relevant psychological construct influencing many educational outcomes directly or indirectly. Therefore, the major focus of the current study is on the predictors and effects of academic self-concept in late adolescence. First, we studied the simultaneous effects of individual, class-average and school-average achievement (i.e., assessed by school grades) on academic self-concept in the final year of high school, thereby replicating and extending previous research on the big-fish-little-pond effect model. Second, the predictive value of high school academic self-concept for academic adjustment and success in the first year of higher education was examined. The sample comprised 536 twelfth grade students (44% boys) recruited from 24 schools (67 classes) that were representative with regard to geographical region and educational network in Flanders. Structural equation modeling showed that, when examining the joint contribution of school- and class-average achievement, only class-average achievement was significantly and negatively associated with academic self-concept. Furthermore, a significant effect of academic self-concept in high school on academic adjustment and success in higher education (in addition to any effects of high school academic achievement) was found. These results highlight the importance of considering academic self-concept in educational research and policy.     

Reward and Punishment Sensitivity in Children with ADHD: Validating the Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire for Children (SPSRQ-C)

This study validates the Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensitivity to Reward Questionnaire for children (SPSRQ-C), using a Dutch sample of 1234 children between 6–13 years old. Factor analysis determined that a 4-factor and a 5-factor solution were best fitting, explaining 41% and 50% of the variance respectively. The 4-factor model was highly similar to the original SPSRQ factors found in adults (Punishment Sensitivity, Reward Responsivity, Impulsivity/Fun-Seeking, and Drive). The 5-factor model was similar to the 4-factor model, with the exception of a subdivision of the Punishment Sensitivity factor into a factor with ‘social-fear’ items and a factor with ‘anxiety’ items. To determine external validity, scores of three groups of children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) were compared on the EFA models: ADHD-only (n = 34), ADHD and autism spectrum disorder (ADHD+ASD; n = 22), ADHD and oppositional defiant disorder (ADHD+ODD; n = 22). All ADHD groups scored higher than typical controls on Reward Responsivity and on the ‘anxiety’ factor (n = 75). The ADHD-only and ADHD+ODD group scored higher than other groups on Impulsivity/Fun-Seeking and Drive, while the ADHD+ASD group scored higher on Punishment Sensitivity. The findings emphasize the value of the SPSRQ-C to quickly and reliably assess a child’s sensitivity to reinforcement, with the aim to provide individually-tailored behavioral interventions that utilize reward and reprimands.     

The subjective experience of committed errors and the Discrepancy-Attribution hypothesis

In routine sequential behavior, we sometimes become aware of having committed an error. However, often we do not. Here, we investigated the processes underlying conscious error detection within a typing paradigm. Our assumption according to the Discrepancy-Attribution hypothesis is that the (explicit) judgment of having made an error is due to a perceived discrepancy between expected and actually experienced performance which then is attributed to an error. In 4 experiments, participants were instructed to type single words without seeing what they were typing and, afterwards, to judge whether typing was correct. Experiments 1 through 3 tested the assumption that conscious awareness about an error is due to a perceived discrepancy between an expectation and the experienced performance. Experiment 4 investigated the assumption of a separate attribution process triggered by the perceived discrepancy. The results support the Discrepancy-Attribution hypothesis and argue for a two-stage model of conscious error detection.     

Optimal Self‐esteem is Contingent: Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic and Upward Versus Downward Contingencies

We argue that noncontingent, unconditional self‐esteem is not optimal but defensive. We introduce the concept of intrinsic contingency, where self‐esteem is affected by whether one's actions are self‐congruent and conducive to personal growth. Whereas external contingencies, especially social and appearance, were negatively correlated with authenticity, self‐compassion, and personal well‐being, intrinsic contingencies were positively correlated with these measures, and uncorrelated with aggression and self‐esteem instability. Participants with high intrinsic contingency rated higher on measures of psychological adaptiveness than noncontingent participants. In addition, we distinguish upward from downward contingencies, the latter being more harmful in case of external contingencies but not for intrinsic contingencies. We conclude that intrinsic contingency, rather than noncontingency, may reflect true self‐esteem as implied in self‐determination theory. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.