Bioethics' gender

I argue that the field of bioethics is gendered feminine, but that the methods it uses to resist this gender identity pose real harm to actual women. Starting with an explanation of what I take 'gender' to be, I enumerate four drawbacks to being gendered feminine. I then argue that bioethics suffers from three of the same four drawbacks. I show how the field escapes the fourth disadvantage by adopting a masculine persona that inflicts damage on women, and conclude by urging bioethicists to reflect on their complicity in abusive power systems such as gender, race and class.     

The role of cognitive factors in the pathogenesis of obsessive-compulsive symptoms: a prospective study

Cognitive models of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) posit that specific kinds of dysfunctional beliefs (e.g., pertaining to responsibility and the significance of intrusive thoughts) underlie the development of this disorder. The present study was designed to prospectively evaluate whether dysfunctional beliefs thought to underlie OCD act as a specific vulnerability factor in the pathogenesis of obsessive-compulsive symptomatology. Eighty-five individuals were prospectively followed over a period of time thought to be associated with an increased onset of OCD symptoms -- childbirth and the postpartum. The majority of these new mothers and fathers experienced intrusive infant-related thoughts and performed neutralizing behaviors similar to, but less severe than, those observed in OCD. Scores on a measure of dysfunctional beliefs thought to underlie OCD predicted the development of obsessive-compulsive symptoms after controlling for pre-existing OCD symptoms, anxiety, and depression. Dysfunctional beliefs also predicted the severity of checking, washing, and obsessional OCD symptom dimensions, but not neutralizing, ordering, or hoarding symptom dimensions. These data provide evidence for specific dysfunctional beliefs as risk factors in the development of some types of OCD symptoms.     

Life-span development of visual working memory: when is feature binding difficult?

We asked whether the ability to keep in working memory the binding between a visual object and its spatial location changes with development across the life span more than memory for item information. Paired arrays of colored squares were identical or differed in the color of one square, and in the latter case, the changed color was unique on that trial (item change) or was duplicated elsewhere in the array (color-location binding change). Children (8-10 and 11-12 years old) and older adults (65-85 years old) showed deficits relative to young adults. These were only partly simulated by dividing attention in young adults. The older adults had an additional deficiency, specifically in binding information, which was evident only when item- and binding-change trials were mixed together. In that situation, the older adults often overlooked the more subtle, binding-type changes. Some working memory processes related to binding undergo life-span development in an inverted-U shape, whereas other, bias- and salience-related processes that influence the use of binding information seem to develop monotonically.     

Scope of attention, control of attention, and intelligence in children and adults

Recent experimentation has shown that cognitive aptitude measures are predicted by tests of the scope of an individual's attention or capacity in simple working memory tasks and also by the ability to control attention. However, these experiments do not indicate how separate or related the scope and control of attention are. An experiment with 52 children (10 to 11 years old) and 52 college students included measures of the scope and control of attention, as well as verbal and nonverbal aptitude measures. The children showed little evidence of using sophisticated attentional control, but the scope of attention predicted intelligence in that group. In adults, both the scope and control of attention varied among individuals and accounted for considerable individual variance in intelligence. About one third that variance was shared between scope an d control, and the rest was unique to one or the other.Scope and control of attention appear to be related but distinct contributors to intelligence.